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2 ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the relationship between ethnicity and nation-building 
and nationalism in Nigeria. It is argued that ethnicity is not necessarily incompatible 
with nationalism and nation-building. Ethnicity and nationalism both play a role in 
nation-state formation. They are each functional to political stability and, therefore, to 
civil peace and to the ability of individual Nigerians to pursue their non-political goals.
Ethnicity is functional to political stability because it provides the basis for 
political socialization and for popular allegiance to political actors. It provides the 
framework within which patronage is institutionalized and related to traditional forms 
of welfare within a state which is itself unable to provide such benefits to its subjects. 
Ethnicity as identity and as pragmatic pursuit of economic and political advantage are, 
therefore, the routes to the political centre and so contribute to the legitimacy of the 
state.
Nationalism is functional to political stability because it legitimates state power. 
However, as an elite ideology to legitimate the control of state power and struggles for 
it, nationalism articulates ethnicity and destabilizes the society, creating an identity 
crisis for individuals and communities. As the people increasingly resort to religion to 
correct their identity crisis, new political actors arise to challenge the existing order, 
using established religious ideologies to criticise and challenge the oppressive 
structure of elite-led secular nationalism. The Nigerian experience demonstrates that 
nationalism is best understood as a result of a continuous tradition in which 
legitimation claims of a social order are sustained and challenged rather than the 
result of modern industrialization.
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INTRODUCTION
Traditional sociological wisdom claims that ethnic pluralism is an ephemeral 
problem. It assumes that inexorable historical forces, such as urbanization, 
industrialization and secularization, are bound to erode communal identities and 
produce an overarching loyalty to the state. Such nationalism will transform ethnically 
divided societies into nation-states. The experience of Nigeria demonstrates, however, 
that the pursuit of nationalist policies has the effect of further dividing rather than 
uniting ethnically divided societies.
This study investigates this paradox. Is it that ethnicity and nation-building and 
nationalism are incompatible? What is the relationship between ethnicity and the 
intended and unintended processes of nation-building? Why is nationalism divisive in 
Nigeria?
The major issue explored is how multi-ethnic societies like Nigeria have held 
together despite their inability to become nations. Although some analysts have noted 
this paradox,1 there has not been any systematic attempt to probe how these 
societies are internally maintained by their constituent ethnic groups or how ethnic and 
state sentiments have been reconciled. I hope to explain, with the aid of evidence 
assembled from interviews, observations, and primary and secondary sources, how 
it is that Nigeria has managed, since the civil war, to avoid either secession or 
domination by any one ethnic group.
My original theoretical contributions pertain to how compatible ethnicity is with
1 See for instance, Pierre L. van den Berghe, Race and Racism, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 
1967, p. 302, and R.H. Jackson and C.G. Rosberg, "Popular Legitimacy in African Multi-Ethnic States", 
JMAS, 22, 2, 1984, p. 198.
nationalism and nation-building. I argue that ethnicity can be incompatible with 
nationalism and nation-building especially if the federal system comprises a small 
number of large states whose populations are perceived, broadly, as ethnically 
different. I further argue that ethnicity is not necessarily incompatible with nationalism 
and nation-building. Under certain conditions such as has obtained in post civil war 
Nigeria, ethnicity may be beneficial for nationalism and nation-building. An important 
condition is to increase the number of the constituent states in the federation and 
breaking up large ethnic states. In Nigeria almost all sections of the population, at 
least the leaders and representatives of the ethnic groups, recognize that national 
cohesion cannot occur without their coming to terms with the durability and pertinacity 
of ethnicity of one sort or the other. Ethnicity as identity and as pragmatic pursuit of 
economic and political advantage are, in certain contexts, the routes to the political 
centre. In that way, there is an added contribution, which may be largely unintended, 
to the legitimacy of the state. The more groups participate in the political centre, and 
the more effects that has on regional and communal interests and pursuits, the 
stronger will be the perception of Nigeria as an entity commanding loyalty from its 
people. It is also recognized that the break-up of Nigeria would not be in the interests 
of the many minorities who have been able to negotiate political alliances to assert 
and pursue their interest. Furthermore, even though there are threats from the Muslim 
north to dominate Nigeria as a whole, this could be contained by the fear that if that 
leads to secession on the part of other regions the north would be left in a rather poor 
state.
What all this amounts to is that while ethnicity may, in some circumstances and 
in some areas of social life, obstruct the growth of national identity and cohesion, it
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may not do so in others. Ethnicity, nationalism and nation-building are reconciled 
through some of the intended and unintended effects that each has upon the others.
All of this discussion assumes that allegiances or interests other than ethnic 
ones may now and more so in the future, intersect ethnic ties and contribute further 
to the process whereby ethnic ties adjust to other circumstances. This is already 
happening with Christian and Islamic identities increasingly displacing ethnic identities 
in importance in national life. This new setting for the dialectic between ethnicity and 
nationalism in Nigeria is considered an increasingly important factor in legitimating 
Nigeria’s nationhood. Elite-led secular nationalism promised the people salvation from 
national bondage and personal suffering, instead they became alienated victims of 
nationalism. Most Nigerians have consequently turned to previously established 
religious identities as a corrective to disorder and meaninglessness in their lives. The 
increasing importance of religion in national life is thus both an expression of the 
identity crisis facing Nigerians and a means of resolving this crisis.
The study is arranged in twelve chapters. The first chapter outlines my 
theoretical orientation and spells out the means and methods and terms and concepts 
which I have employed in the study. The nationalist ideologies which legitimize nation- 
building in Nigeria are examined in Chapter Two. Two major attempts at political 
engineering, that is the restructuring of the federal system and the related issue of 
federal character, Nigeria’s equivalent of ‘ethnic arithmetic’, are examined in Chapters 
Three and Four respectively. Socialization through the educational system and the 
National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) is discussed in Chapter Five while Chapter Six 
examines another kind of socialization, that is mass campaigns to generate a popular 
sense of a homogeneous national identity. Cultural engineering in relation to language,
history, literature, mass media and art festivals is dealt with in Chapter Seven while 
Chapter Eight examines the state’s religious policy. The next three chapters examine 
the nature of ethnicity and nationalism in Nigeria. The theoretical issues examined 
concern the relationship between ethnic identity and nationalism. If, as traditional 
sociological wisdom indicates, ethnicity and nationalism are not only different but also 
mutually incompatible, how are they then harmonized in the individual Nigerian? Are 
they fundamentally incompatible and prone to conflict or can they, despite their 
different claims on the individual co-exist in harmony? Ethnicity and nationalism are 
respectively examined-in Chapters Nine and Ten while the increasing importance of 
religious identities in national life is explored in Chapter Eleven. Chapter Twelve is the 
concluding chapter in which the argument of the thesis is summarized and its 
implications for social theory indicated.
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CHAPTER ONE 
THEORIES OF NATION-BUILDING AND ETHNICITY
Introduction
The success of anti-colonial nationalism in sub-Saharan Africa around the 
1960s generated great optimism about the future of the newly independent states. It 
was commonly hoped and expected that these states would rapidly follow the path of 
economic, political and cultural development established by European and colonial- 
settler states. When this proved not to be the case the claims of ‘modernization theory’ 
were discredited. One of these claims was that ‘nation-building’ would rapidly erode 
traditional ‘ethnic’ cultural identities and cleavages. Post-modemization theory views 
ethnicity as a major source of instability for post-colonial states that is unlikely to 
disappear in the foreseeable future. If this pessimistic view is correct then sub-Saharan 
Africa is likely to have a future of civil conflict that will severely hamper attempts to 
create economic, political and cultural development. Indeed, one may easily produce 
a list of cases in support of such a view: Katanga in Zaire, Biafra in Nigeria and, more 
recently, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Ethiopia, Sudan, Liberia, Somalia, Kenya and 
even South Africa. Nevertheless, many multi-ethnic states have existed for decades 
without any widespread conflict. Even those states which have experienced such 
violence have normally settled down subsequently to a relatively peaceful existence. 
No post-colonial state in Africa has yet been permanently divided along ethnic lines 
(although both Ethiopia and Somalia may do so along demarcations dating from 
colonial times). This co-existence of state structures and ethnic identities is not 
adequately explicable in the terms of either modernization or post-modernization
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theories. In this chapter I shall firstly elaborate this claim and then attempt to outline 
a theoretical explanation of this continuing co-existence.
THEORIES OF NATION-BUILDING
For over a century traditional sociological wisdom regarded nation-building as 
incontrovertibly desirable. Assimilation of cultural groups into a national society was 
considered a necessary aspect of political and socio-economic development. Ethnic 
and parochial identities were looked upon as primitive and inimical to progress. 
Nationalism was hailed as the sentiment that both dissolved atavistic parochial 
sentiments within divided societies and held together such societies. This view of 
nationalism made its debut in nineteenth century European history where philosophers 
like Herder and Fichte described how the new sentiment dissolved the old society with 
its clerics, kings and local loyalties and then provided a common allegiance that gave 
the reconstituted societies an unprecedented cohesiveness. This approach lost favour 
in studies of European societies in the 1950s as nationalism was blamed for the 
European tragedy, that is the two world wars. The approach, however, found favour 
in studies of non European societies, particularly the colonial multiplicities that are the 
focus of this study. Theories of functionalism, social change and conflict, all regarded 
parochial values and allegiances as inimical to rational social planning and economic 
progress in the newly independent states of Africa and Asia. They held up nationalism 
as the ultimate force of social change in these states, claiming that their political 
stability and economic viability depended on their becoming nation-states in the image 
of the classical European models.
Many theories and ideas were put forward to explain the transition from ethnicity
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to nationalism. The most influential of these ideas, the modernisation school, claimed 
that the basis of nation-building and the erosion of ethnic identities was modernization. 
Processes of modernisation such as industrialization and urbanisation would 
automatically be accompanied by nationalism, that is loyalty to the state. This 
approach was largely influenced by the ideas of Karl Deutsch who attempted to 
quantify and measure nationalism by looking at the patterns of social communication. 
He claimed that the trends in the social mobilisation which accompanies the growth 
of markets, industries and towns and eventually of literacy and mass communication 
could do much to decide whether existing national trends in particular countries would 
be continued or reversed1. For him, nationality is indicated by the ‘complementarity 
or relative efficiency of communication among individuals’.2 His original contribution 
to the theory of nation-building is in calling attention to all kinds of social and economic 
factors other than language as the basis for the nation-state.
Theories of ‘pluralism’ were developed to explain the relationship between unity 
and diversity in a state. There are two traditions of thought within this school. The first 
is the pluralistic model, which is essentially a political theory, and the second is the 
plural society model developed largely by sociologists and anthropologists engaged 
in the study of the multi-ethnic societies of sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the 
Caribbean.
The plural society model was formulated by Furnivall.3 He used the term 
plural society to describe colonial Burma and Indonesia, claiming that colonial
1 Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of 
Nationality, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1966, p. 188.
2 Ibidem, p. 188.
3 J.S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, Cambridge, CUP, 1948.
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domination imposed a forced union on the different ethnic groups that socially co-exist 
within these societies without much social contact. In plural societies, there is no 
common will, and interaction is involuntary, imposed by colonial power and force of 
economic circumstance. He argued that democracy was impossible in such a society 
because it would give power to one group while leaving economic power with others. 
He suggested a federal state and the fostering of nationalist feelings as solutions to 
the problem of cultural pluralism. The problem with Furnivall’s analysis lies in the 
assumption that the European states are characterised by a common social will and 
a common culture. He overlooks the fact that in western democracies voting power is 
often controlled by one group and economic power by another.4
Fumivall’s thesis was enlarged by Smith and applied to sub-Saharan Africa.5 
For Smith, the plural society is composed of socially or culturally defined collectivities 
separated by autonomous institutional structures. The collectivities are closed 
corporations bound within a state dominated by one group for whom the state 
becomes the agency of subjugation. Integration is by force of regulation rather than 
by consensus. He argued that the transition from plural societies to pluralistic societies 
was necessary if the African states were to be transformed into cohesive national 
units. Smith’s model has limited analytical value for most African states. Sub-national 
groups in these states are not institutionally exclusive. The model may, however, be 
useful for the study of racially stratified polities like South Africa or some of the 
Caribbean states where the very rigorous conditions of pluralism stipulated by Smith
4 David Nicholls, Three Varieties of Pluralism, London, Macmillan, 1974, p. 40.
5 M.G. Smith, Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism", in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, 
(eds.), Pluralism in Africa, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971, (paperback), pp. 27-61. See 
also "Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism", pp. 415-449.
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can be approximated.6
The pluralistic model postulates two principal bases of social integration in a 
multi-ethnic state. These are accommodation and elite consensus. National integration 
is seen as consisting of a complex web of multiple affiliation, intersecting lines of group 
cleavage and shifting alignments depending on specific issues, and commitment to 
common values and to the rules of the political game. Ethnic groups are seen as 
cultural groups whose behaviour is to be analyzed within the context of assimilation 
and cultural change. Underlying this concept is the notion of the ‘melting pot’ and the 
experience of European immigrant groups in North American industrial cities in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries.
The common point of reference for both the assimilationist and the plural 
society models is the nation-state. Both assume that the nation-state is the ideal to 
strive for and that nation-building is necessary and desirable. However, the plural 
society model is strongly orientated towards the conflictual aspects of multi-ethnic 
societies while the pluralistic model takes too optimistic a view about man’s capacity 
for rationality. In short, one model is over optimistic and the other over pessimistic. 
Moreover, both models do not address the key issue of ethnic identity which is 
essential to any analysis of group conflict and integration. They believe that ethnic and 
national (state) sentiments are incompatible. It is thus a question of either ethnic 
groups being assimilated or being in conflict.
Evidence began to show in the 1960s that these theories were faulty about the 
capacity of modernization to erode parochial sentiments and identities. In the United
6 Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism, Madison, Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1977, p. 18.
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States Glazer and Moynihan questioned the idea of the melting pot with the publication 
of Beyond the Melting Pot, a study of ethnic groups of New York City which had 
appeared when in theory they were supposed to be disappearing.7 They claimed that 
Ihe notion that the intense and unprecedented mixture of ethnic and religious groups 
in American life was soon to blend into a homogeneous end product has outlived its 
usefulness, and also its credibility.’8 In post colonial African and Asian states ethnic 
divisions continued despite modernization. Agencies regarded as vehicles of 
integration became divided on ethnic lines. For example, the nationalist parties that 
fought for independence were regarded by modernization theorists like James 
Coleman and Carl Rosberg as primary vehicles for integration9 but they became 
divided on ethnic lines immediately after their attainment of independence. Anti­
colonial nationalism did not undermine ethnicity as was hoped. In Nigeria, the 
modernization process produced conflict and ethnicity rather than nationalism.10 Two 
of the most traumatic ethnic crises in Africa and Asia during the period were the civil 
war in Nigeria and the successful bid for independence by Bangladesh. Other 
evidence of ethnic conflicts from Canada, Belgium and the United Kingdom confirmed 
that the integration of the modern state into a national state could not be taken for 
granted.
As a result of this discrepancy between theory and practice nation-building
7 Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
Harvard University and MIT Press, 1963.
8 Ibidem, p. V.
9 James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), Political Parties and Political Integration in 
Tropical Africa, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1964.
10 Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe (eds.), Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of 
Communalism, Michigan, Michigan State University Press, 1971, p. 2.
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theories became discredited. Social scientists having failed to predict the pertinacity 
of ethnicity reacted by querying the arguments of nation-building theories and focused 
on ethnicity to the virtual exclusion of nation-building. Lijphart’s study of politics in 
Netherlands, carried the implicit message that ethnicity need not be detrimental to 
political stability and progress.11 He suggested that social scientists should query 
the assumption that homogeneity was necessary for democratic institutions to 
succeed. Walker Connor claimed in a very influential article on the political significance 
of ethnicity that nation-building was nothing but cultural destruction and political and 
economic manipulation and domination of ethnic minorities by superordinate groups 
within multi-ethnic polities.12 Michael Hechter described the position of ethnic 
minorities within the nation-state as that of ‘internal colonialism’.13 Connor, in 
another article, argued that ethnic groups were indeed nations.14 A major effect of 
the new theoretical alignment with ethnicity was that nation-building practice came to 
be seen as an undesirable and unnecessary activity by theorists. The shift in 
theoretical orientation also proved fortuitous for the ‘tribes’ of Africa as they came to 
be recognized as ethnic groups and nationalities.
The issue with post-modernization theories is that they have been unable to 
establish as viable theoretical alternatives to nation-building theories. They have
11 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: a Comparative Exploration, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1977.
12 Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?”, in World Politics, No. 3, April 1972, pp. 
319-355.
13 Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development 1536- 
1966, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975.
14 Walker Connor, "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic group is a...", in Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, vol. 1, No. 4, October 1978, pp. 371-400.
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partially rejected and partially accepted the ideas of nation-building theories in the 
hope that for certain areas of study these theories would still be relevant. Although 
they have disputed arguments for nation-building, they have continued some of the 
assumptions inherent in the modernization theories. One of these assumptions is that 
ethnic and national sentiments are mutually incompatible.15 Such assumptions 
generally support the contention that national sentiments are lacking in the multi-ethnic 
states of Africa and that ethnicity is the most destabilizing political factor in these 
societies. Nationalism is thus granted tacit normative value over ethnicity. Such notions 
generally define the pessimistic view that sub-Saharan Africa is doomed to a future 
of civil conflict that will severely hamper attempts to create economic, political and 
cultural development. Although it is easy to produce a list of cases of ethnic conflicts 
in Africa, it is nevertheless true that many African states have existed for decades 
without any widespread conflict. Even those states which have experienced such 
violence have normally settled down subsequently to a relatively peaceful existence. 
No post-colonial state in Africa has yet been permanently divided along ethnic lines. 
In Nigeria, when faced with the decision to break up the country as demonstrated by 
the war, many more Nigerians opted to keep it, some with their lives. In South Africa 
where the idea of the ethnic homeland has been pursued such attempts have proved 
unpopular. Multiculturalism has been preferred by the majority. This co-existence of 
state structures and ethnic identities is not adequately explicable in the terms either 
of modernization or post-modernization theories.
Both theories are problematic. Each of them takes an extreme position on 
ethnicity. One undermines the power of ethnicity and the other embellishes it. Where
15 See for example, Walker Connor; "Nation-Building Or Nation-Destroying?", op. cit., p. 321.
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nation-building theories stress the power of nationalism, anti-nation-building theories 
stress the power of ethnicity. In relation to post-colonial sub-Saharan African states, 
nation-building theories are unable to explain the continuation of ethnic divisions and 
exacerbation of ethnic conflict. Conversely, anti-nation-building theories are unable to 
explain factors such as the continuation of post-colonial state structures and the 
pursuit of nation-building policies by the governments of such states, the construction 
of ethnic political identities in relation to such states, and competition for governmental 
office and its concomitant benefits by ethnic groups. There is thus a need for a 
synthesized theory which overcomes the deficiencies of both nation-building and anti- 
nation-building theories. Such a theory should explain the form of political culture in 
post-colonial Africa, which is based upon the co-existence of nation-states and ethnic 
groups, given that both nation-building and anti-nation-building theories assume that 
ethnicity and nationalism are incompatible.
A SYNTHETIC THEORY OF ETHNICITY AND NATION-BUILDING
Ethnicity and nationalism are compatible. This is so where they are each 
functional to political stability and, therefore, to civil peace and to the ability of 
individuals to pursue their non-political goals. Where this is the case there is an 
effective rationale for people to resist any de-construction of the ‘nation-state’ along 
ethnic lines. This is the case in Nigeria.
Nationalism is functional to political stability in Nigeria because it legitimates 
state power. Popular expectations of nationalism, and the frustration of its aspirations, 
have been the major factor in legitimizing and de-legitimizing all Nigerian governments
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and, therefore in causing their downfalls.16 They have only been replaced by military 
officers or party politicians who have successfully appealed to that sense of 
nationalism. No military coup can succeed unless the public in general desire a 
change.17 ‘If Dimka, Vatsa and Orka failed in their respective disastrous bids for 
political power, it is not necessarily because they were more incompetent and 
inefficient than their successful counterparts, but because the people in general were 
not, at the time they struck, desirous of a change of administration.’18
Ethnicity is functional in Nigeria because it provides the basis for political 
socialization and for popular allegiance to political actors at the level of the central 
state. The logic of competition in the federal political arena requires that people be 
mobilised in terms of what matters to them and ethnicity definitely matters in Nigeria. 
Ethnic identity is a real matter for both social and political calculation and engineering 
in Nigeria. People use their ethnic ties and cleavages rationally, in order to attain their 
individual aims, what ever they are. Ethnicity, as identity and as pragmatic pursuit of 
economic and political advantage are, in certain contexts, the routes to the political 
centre. In that way there is an added contribution, which may be largely unintended, 
to the legitimacy of the federal political arena.
The nation-state provides the arena within which ethnic identities are 
constructed and defined, and within which political alliances may be formed and 
reformed to the mutual advantage of different ethnic and political groups. It is
16 I exempt the government of Mohammed/Obasanjo which voluntarily handed over to civilians in 
respect to popular nationalism. This government had the good judgement to resign whilst it still enjoyed 
popular legitimacy.
17 Lateef K, Jakande, "Building a New Nigeria", Newswatch, November 5, 1990, p. 6.
18 Ibidem, p. 6. Dimka, Vatsa and Orka led abortive coups.
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acknowledged that the break-up of Nigeria would not be in the interests of the 
numerous minorities who have been able to negotiate political alliances to assert their 
interests. It is also recognized that the secession of the other regions would not be in 
the economic interest of the dominant Muslim north.
Ethnicity provides the framework within which patronage is institutionalized and 
related to traditional forms of welfare within a state which is itself unable to provide 
such benefits to its subjects. The informal network of patronage which ethnicity 
provides helps to bridge the elite/mass divide, one of the two conditions which 
Rosberg and Coleman identified as necessary for integration.19 The average 
Nigerian’ (a popular term used to refer to a typical Nigerian) maintains various ethnic 
identities and associational networks which he/she and his/her patrons or the state 
appeals to at various times. These ties are important for negotiating opportunities for 
self improvement - ‘survival’ in Nigerian parlance. The type of ethnic group identity 
prevalent in Nigeria thus differs from the primordialist and the instrumentalist types 
expounded in both nation-building and anti-nation-building theories which assume that 
individuals have only one privileged ethnic identity.20
The form of ‘nation-state’ and of nationalist ideology which have developed in 
Nigeria are different from those of the European model adopted by classical nation- 
building theory. Nationalist ideology in classical nation-building theory holds that the 
political and national unit should be congruent.21 The Nigerian nation is a weaker
19 J.S. Coleman, and C.G. Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, op. 
cit., pp. 8ff.
20 Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds.), Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 19.
21 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 1. See also John 
Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1985, p. 3.
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form of ‘imagined community’ than those found in Europe because it co-exists with 
(and is often secondary to) more immediate forms of popular identity. It is generally 
the opposite of the ethnically and linguistic homogeneous entities which came to be 
seen as the standard form of nation-state in the West. It is more of a project the 
achievement of which is in progress. However, it is a project conceived in the spirit of 
Mazzini rather than of Uvarov.22
Nigeria is imagined as a homogeneous unit. The 1979 Constitution described 
Nigeria as one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation-state to be known by the 
name of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Nigerian nationalism is, then, not unlike the 
classical European model which emphasizes popular support and national unity. This 
similarity is underlined by Nigeria’s colonial legacy. However, unlike the classical 
model, Nigerian nationalism accepts that a stable and free society can be based on 
cultural pluralism, in a multinational state based on political accommodation and 
democracy. This is why the state pursues nation-building, that is planned policies that 
combine both a popular nationalist enthusiasm and the inculcation of nationalist 
ideology through the mass media, the educational system and national institutions, and 
administrative regulations. Thus, nationalist ideology in Nigeria is more appropriately 
described as a blend of the European popular and the ‘official nationalism’ of the 
Czars.23
Nigerian nationalism is a dual phenomenon. It exists as both an elite ideology 
and as a popular feeling. What distinguishes popular nationalism is that it represents
22 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
London, Verso, 1983, p. 105.
23 Ibidem, p. 104.
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the common interest against particular interests, the common good against privilege. 
Unfortunately for Nigeria, whilst nationalism is very effective as an elite ideology, it is 
very weak as a popular emotion. As an elite ideology, nationalism is used to justify the 
exercise of state power. This tends to undermine rather than strengthen the appeal 
of nationalism as a popular emotion as it alienates the vast majority of the people from 
the state, engendering friction between the people and ruling elites. Therefore despite 
the high public profile of its hyperbolic rhetoric, Nigerian nationalism largely fails as a 
means to unite the imagined nation.
Viewed as a dual phenomenon, nationalism would be seen as both integrative 
and disintegrative. This is why it is able to transform societies. The notion that ethnicity 
is the most destabilizing factor in African politics would be seen as erroneous. In 
Nigerian politics, nationalism as an elite ideology for domination of the state is the 
most destabilising factor. This stems from the close structural relationship between 
political power, the state and class formation on one hand, and political power and 
popular democracy on the other. Because the accumulation of wealth and status 
depends almost entirely on political power, both those who aspire to rule and those 
who wish to consolidate their rule need secure positions within or near the state. In 
an authoritarian state such security can be assured, whereas in a democratic state 
such as Nigeria which lacks social consensus legitimating capital accumulation, it 
cannot be assured.24 The position of ruling elites is under constant threat, especially 
during elections. Under such conditions, power elites and aspirants to power can be 
expected to use all available means to maintain or acquire power, including ethnicity,
24 Larry Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: the Failure of the First Republic, 
London, Macmillan, 1988, pp. 325-6.
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electoral fraud and brute force. Elections thus become warfare and rules of the game 
are disregarded as elites struggle for the state. Such undemocratic politics is the 
consequence of the idea of nationalism as a guise for the accumulation of capital and 
the domination of the country by a sectional elite rather than the consequence of 
ethnicity.
Nationalism must, then, be recognized as a destabilizing process. This is not 
to argue like Connor that nation-building is the destruction of distinctive cultural 
groups. The point is that nationalism is a stressful process. It tends to emphasise the 
adjustments and sacrifices that individuals and communities have to make for the sake 
of progress. Put differently, nationalism alienates large sections of the society in the 
quest for modernity. The destabilizing nature of nationalism stems from the process 
of socio-economic change which goes in tandem with it. Nineteenth century accounts 
of nationalism romanticised nationalism. In doing this, they gave the impression that 
nation-building was a smooth and unproblematic process when in fact it brought much 
suffering and pain to individuals and communities. In other words, nationalism in the 
European context was not without conflict and divisions. It was both disintegrative and 
integrative, and consequently transformative. Anthony Smith arrived at a similar 
conclusion but for him the divisive and disruptive aspect of nationalism lies in the 
confrontation between the ‘scientific state’ and traditional religion and belief 
systems.25 This process of modernization both repels and attracts the rising 
intelligentsia. The crux of the matter was that the ‘scientific state’ demanded a heavy 
price for its benefits: it demanded ineluctably the ‘privatisation’ of religion.’26 The
25 Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, London, Duckworth, 1983, p. 256.
26 Ibidem, p. 240.
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consequence is a ‘crisis of faith among the intelligentsia and the clash between reason 
and revelation, science and tradition, sons and fathers, which so agitates them’.27 
Smith, however, ignores the role of economic factors in creating the conditions for the 
intervention of the intelligentsia. In this study, it is suggested that the basis for the 
intelligentsia’s actions in Nigeria is determined by the close structural relationship 
between political power, the state and class formation on one hand, and political 
power and popular democracy on the other. The tension between common good and 
privileged interests provides the opportunity for the intelligentsia to act.
My argument is not reducible to a simple class analysis. It involves a tension 
between common and privileged interests on one hand and privileged versus 
privileged interests on another hand with ethnicity mediating on both levels. It is also 
not a matter of elites exploiting the masses by exploiting ethnic identity nor a matter 
of ‘false consciousness’ on the part of non-elites. It is rather, a matter of both elites 
and ordinary people exploiting ethnicity. They are both engaged in a reciprocal 
process in which ethnic ties are used as bargaining tools. Ethnicity, unlike wealth or 
education or machine guns, or status, is equally available to both elites and non­
elites.28 Elites employ ethnicity for electoral mobilization because it is the most 
readily available and efficient means for such purpose given the country’s social 
circumstances. Non-elites respond to ethnicity because it is the principle of 
differentiation that is least disadvantageous to them 29 Hence they too are engaged 
in the manipulation of ethnicity. Both elites and non-elites calculate the sacrifices and
27 Ibidem, p. 240.
28 Lawrence Frank, "Ideological Competition in Nigeria: Urban Populism versus Elite Nationalism", 
JMAS, 17,3,1979, p. 451.
29 Ibidem, p. 452.
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benefits to them and balance these according to circumstances which they may 
objectively or subjectively define. Such circumstances may be re-defined by the 
affected individuals and groups at any given time. Thus, it is an exchange in which 
the elite chop and the masses chop. 7 chop, you chop’ (meaning I eat, you eat, that 
is, a quid pro quo) was the name for a party proposed by Fela, a popular musician, 
for the 1979 elections. The name reflected an awareness of the mundane reality 
beneath ethnic exchanges, and the nationalist rhetoric of party politics in Nigeria. The 
key factor in this complex system is reciprocity.
The model of ethnic groups in conflict portrayed by both nation-building and 
anti-nation-building theories is misleading. It assumes that a relatively united group A 
confronts a relatively united group B with reference to a specific issue or group of 
related issues. Many sociological problematic arise from this. How can one explain the 
existence of the particular issues, the form the conflict has taken, or the particular 
balance of power that has developed? How does one predict the future outcome of 
the current situation? The analytical value of such a model of groups in conflict is 
weakened by its teleological assumptions that the achievement of broad class, 
national, or ethnic group consciousness, is a normal, ordinary event that is universal 
and permanent. Yet, the achievement of broad class or ethnic group consciousness 
is a rare event, often conflictual and even pathological in its end state, but usually 
partial and short-lived when its appears to have reached such a state.30
In Nigeria, groups in conflict are fundamentally divided within themselves. In 
each solidary group there are several sub-groups. These sub-groups have actual and 
potential interaction within and across solidary boundaries. It is thus possible for sub­
30 Paul R. Brass (ed.)f Ethnic Groups and the State, London, Croom Helm, 1985, p. 22.
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categories, for example elites or intelligentsia, from different ethnic groups, to 
collaborate in relation to common interests while retaining a strong sense of separate 
ethnic identity. Such inter-ethnic collaboration may be informal or formal. This is most 
evident in politics. For instance, the identity used by Akintola and Awolowo in their 
struggle for political leadership in the Western Region in the First Republic was not the 
pan-Yoruba identity but their Yoruba sub-group identity. In both the First and Second 
Republics elites from different ethnic groups entered into multi-lateral, bi-lateral and 
trans-ethnic alliances which alternated according to changing circumstances. The 
Hausa/Fulani-controlled National Party of Nigeria (NPN) entered into an alliance with 
the Igbo-controlled Nigerian Peoples’ Party (NPP) to form the federal government in 
the Second Republic just like they did in the First Republic. During the Second 
Republic, Governors of the five Oil Sates, belonging to three rival political parties - two 
UPN, two NPN and one NPP - bridged the bitter political divisions between their 
parties to unite in a common position over their share of the federated account.
The analytical implications of the Nigerian model are immense. This is because 
it is attentive to patterns of intersectional communication and collaboration between 
segments of separate ethnic groups, and between the state and particular sub-groups 
or groups. The relationship between the state and particular groups is very crucial as 
the state may be pursuing its nation-building to the advantage of particular groups 
within it. A major reason for the salience of ethnicity in modern and modernizing states 
is that it is often intimately related to issues of domination, hierarchy and 
stratification.31 In Nigeria, the place and role of the Hausa/Fulani in nation-building
31 A.L. Epstein, Ethos and Identity: Three Studies in Ethnicity, London, Tavistock Publications, 
1978, p. 114.
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is a crucial one. Their domination of political power in Nigeria since independence is 
a source of frustration and anger for other Nigerians and consequently it is seen as 
critical to the national question in the country.32 The domination of power by this 
group is more interesting as the group is economically backward in relation to its two 
major rivals, the Yoruba and the Igbo. It is curious that an economically disadvantaged 
group can maintain political power over its economically more progressive and 
powerful rivals that occupy contiguous geographic areas. This skewed balance of 
power has sorely affected integration in Nigeria. It was the attempt to change it that 
led to the Nigerian Civil War. Other evidence from Africa, for instance Uganda and the 
Sudan, demonstrates that alliance between the state and some sectional groups is 
strenuous for integration.
One way that Nigeria has attempted to deal with this problem since the war is 
structural, that is by establishing a more plural federation and by constitutional 
rationalism. The new political changes have largely emancipated both the minorities 
and the state from the stranglehold of the three major ethnic groups whose security 
dilemma over the state brought Nigeria to the brink of dissolution. Because of the 
break-up of the three ethno-regional political blocs into smaller political units, the 
Nigerian state is now in a much more stronger position than it was in the period before 
the war. None of the new units is in any position to challenge its authority and power 
as was the position before the war when legitimation of the state proved impossible 
to obtain. A strong Nigerian state means that the state has the capability to direct a 
positive focus of loyalty from its people to itself. As Leonard Tivey has claimed Ihe
32 Obaro Ikime, "Towards Understanding the National Question", Africa Events, April, 1987, p. 35.
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state does not merely reflect the qualities of nations, it fashions them’.33
Despite its enhanced power, the Nigerian state continues to be associated with 
Hausa/Fulani Muslim domination. However, the Hausa/Fulani threat could be 
contained by the fear that if that leads to secession on the part of other regions that 
would leave the Muslim north a rather poor state. It is thus in the economic interest 
of the Hausa/Fulani to keep Nigeria one.
The division of the country into smaller political units has given prominent 
expression to the uncommon ethnicity of the numerous minority ethnic groups who 
together make up about half of the population. Ethnic relations in Nigeria has been 
approached from a tri-polar perspective of power-conflict between Hausa/Fulani, Igbo 
and Yoruba ethnic groups. Such an approach is based on a faulty premise that the 
politics of Nigeria is the politics of ethnic majorities. It ignores the influence of the 
numerous minority ethnic groups who altogether constitute the other half of the 
population and consequently retards the understanding of the revolutionary and 
legitimation potentials of ethnic identities in nation-building. In this study, it is 
recognized that the ethnic minorities are a major force in Nigerian politics and nation- 
building. The principle of respect for ethnic difference obliges the major ethnic groups 
to consider not only each other but also their smaller neighbours. It is in the space 
between the major groups that minority cultures are able to prosper. They have 
exploited the rivalry between the major groups in order to negotiate political alliances 
to promote their interests. Keeping Nigeria one is of major interest to this group of 
uncommon ethnicity. They are therefore the strongest supporters of Nigerian unity.
33Leonard Tivey, The Nation State: the Formation of Modem Politics, Oxford, Robertson, 1981, p.
5.
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A crucial aspect of the new structural changes for nationalism and nation- 
building concerns the role of the northern minorities, that is the peoples of the middle 
belt. These groups who were subjugated and denied identity by the dominant 
Hausa/Fulani in the old Northern Region have now been freed by the creation of a 
more pluralistic federation. The uncommon ethnicity of these minorities has found 
expression in Christianity, th e  struggle between these minorities and their former 
Muslim rulers is redrawing cultural boundaries in Nigeria. The final outcome will no 
doubt have implications for nation-building in Nigeria.
In explaining ethnicity in Nigeria, I adopt both a sociological and a psychological 
position. I may stress one aspect at the expense of the other, if it is useful to do so. 
One of the advantages of this approach is that it makes it possible to show the extent 
to which both perspectives are operative rather than asking which one has more 
explanatory power. It permits ethnic groups to be treated as partially primordial and 
partially structural, acknowledging that they can simultaneously adopt solidaristic and 
exclusionistic strategies of social closure. It sharpens awareness that the processes 
of collaboration or competition with other groups lead to new identities which may be 
broader or narrower than the preceding one. Ethnic identities would thus be seen as 
variable and dynamic, especially in political forms. This approach is useful for probing 
the links, reciprocity, and exchange systems in the interaction of ethnic groups. It helps 
to locate those instrumental ties linking members of the various ethnic groups together 
at many levels. It has the additional advantage of exposing those informal bonds that 
hold an over-arching system together by exploiting the very conflict that would 
otherwise be highly explosive. This is illustrated by the increasing conflictual and 
transformative role of religion in national life in Nigeria.
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One of the basic assumptions underlying this study is that conflict is a form of 
association. It is a consistent and recurrent feature of human grouping. Traditionally, 
political competition between the constituent Nigerian groups largely took the form of 
war, with its prize as honour and wealth in slaves or land for hunting, animal 
husbandry or agriculture. Now, inter-ethnic competition continues within the boundaries 
of a state which itself claims a legitimate monopoly of the use of physical force. Such 
competition therefore seldom takes the form of war but rather centres upon 
competition for state power, the distributive source of honour and wealth. Conflict can 
be beneficial to nationalism and nation-building. Its resolution can facilitate the tackling 
of an array of ethnic obstacles to national unity which would otherwise have been 
ignored. It may therefore help improve conditions for the advance of nation-building 
projects. For example, the defeat of Biafra in the civil war ensured the supremacy of 
the federal government. It symbolized triumph for Nigerian state-building process.34 
The federal government by projecting the war as a war of national unity, sowed the 
seeds of a truly Nigerian nationalism with the slogan: To Keep Nigeria One Is A Task 
That Must Be Done’. The mass mobilization of the population for the war effort helped 
to diffuse an unprecedented sense of belonging and identity with Nigeria. The very 
task of fighting the war provided the first real national experience which was common 
to all Nigerians. For the first time, the educated elite and the unlettered masses saw 
themselves as on a single common historical course.35 The war showed how 
interwoven the destinies of Nigerians had become over the years, marking the
34 J. Isawa Elaigwu, "The Challenge of Unity in a Heterogeneous Society", in J.A. Atanda and A.Y. 
Aliyu (eds.), Proceedings of the National Conference on Nigeria since Independence : Political 
Development, (Vol. 1), Zaria, Panel on Nigeria Since Independence History Project, 1985, p. 472.
35 E. A. Ayandele, The Educated Elite in the Nigerian Society, Ibadan, University of Ibadan Press, 
1974, p. 154.
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transformation of the Nigerian state from a ‘mechanistic’ state to an ‘organic’ political 
community.36 Few people would shed their blood for a ‘mere geographical 
expression’ to which they had no commitments.37 By demonstrating the pathology 
of ethnic extremism, the experience of war mitigates the strident imperative of 
ethnicity 38 Nigeria today is more integrated because of the terrible experience of 
the War.39
Psychological factors have been emphasized in the causation of ethnic conflict, 
but seldom have they been advanced or expressed as the fear of domination. 
Although Kirk Greene proposed the ‘Angstkomplex theory’ of ethnic conflict in Nigeria, 
this intuition was not sufficiently developed.40 The pervasive significance of fears 
and anxieties about domination among the Nigerian ethnic groups suggest that 
analysts ought to be more attentive to the salience, importance and intensity of such 
fears and anxieties.
The concept of fear explains why ethnic boundaries are flexible. It stresses the 
historicity of ethnic identity and groups and explains their socialized nature. In doing 
this it acknowledges interactive variables and symbolic ethnic interests and values. 
Thus, it demonstrates that group cohesion is somehow instrumental, in other words 
that cohesion is both a function of emotions and of institutional factors. For instance,
36 Elaigwu, "The Challenge of Unity in a Heterogeneous Society", op. cit., p. 472.
37Ibidem, p. 472.
38 Anthony Kirk-Greene and Douglas Rimmer, Nigeria Since 1970: a Political and Economic 
Outline, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1981, p. 3.
39 Dov Ronen, "Alternative Patterns of Integration in African States", JMAS, 14, 4, 1976, p. 586.
40 A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, "Genesis of the Nigerian Civil War and the Theory of Fear", Research 
Report No. 27, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1975, passim.
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group integration decreases during a crisis when there is no available solution and 
increases if a likely cooperative solution is present.41 Thus, the consciousness of 
being different in relation to the wider society is of fundamental strategic importance 
to the consciousness of belonging. It thus synthesizes the instrumentalist and the 
primordialist perspectives on ethnicity, reducing the need to choose between the two 
polar models, a tendency which has damaged the proper understanding of ethnicity.
The role of fear in ethnicity makes it difficult, if not impossible for political 
engineering to produce predictable results. However, it also suggests that in those 
areas of social life where fear is blunted positive consequences for integration can be 
expected.
Critics have disputed the utility and validity of nation-building because of the 
persistence of ethnicity. Some critics have even given the impression that nation- 
building entails nothing but the destruction of distinctive ethnic cultures 42 To see 
nation-building solely in terms of its benefits as do the theorists of nation-building, or 
solely in terms of its sacrifices, as do many of their critics is to misunderstand the 
processes of nation-state formation.
Nation-building is a complex and difficult process. It involves social, cultural, 
political and economic sacrifices and benefits to the individuals and communities that 
constitute the state. The relative balance of these sacrifices and benefits varies or 
depends on circumstances, which may be objectively or subjectively defined, externally
41 Hamblin, "Group Integration during a Crisis", in Human Relations, 9, 1958, pp. 67-76, cited in 
John M.G. van der Dennen, "Ethnocentrism and In-group/Out-group Differentiation: a review and 
Interpretation of the Literature", in Vernon Reynolds et al. (eds.), The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism, 
London, Croom Helm, 1987, p. 35.
42 See for example, Walker Connor, "Nation-building or Nation-Destroying?", op. cit.
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or internally induced, and which may be redefined by the affected individuals, sub­
groups and groups, at any given time. National identification and what it is believed 
to imply, is thus flexible, changing and shifting in time, even in the course of quite 
short periods. This approach has the advantage of enabling issues like nations and 
nationalism to be discussed in terms of new and contextually meaningful models rather 
than obsolete ones. For example, it is useful for understanding the resurgence of 
ethnicity in western industrialized nation-states like Britain and the US. It rejects the 
idea that ethnic pluralism ceases to be relevant in modern industrialized nation-states 
or that nationalism and nation-state-building are delimited by industrialization and 
modernization as Gellner’s theory of nationalism implies.43 According to him, 
industrialization would obliterate deep social abysses which could be activated by 
ethnicity, and the old plethora of folk cultures are unlikely to survive except in a token 
and cellophane-packaged form.44
In this study, the nation is approached as a dual phenomenon. It is essentially 
constructed from above by the state, but it cannot be understood unless also analyzed 
from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs and interests of the 
individuals and communities that constitute the state.45 The preoccupation of both 
modernization and post-modernization theories of nation-building with the perspective 
of nation-building from above makes it difficult to pay adequate attention to the view 
from below. That view tells us more about how individuals and communities manage
43 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, op. cit.. See also Thought and Change, London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1964.
44 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, op. cit., p. 121.
45 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, 
Cambridge, CUP, 1990, p. 10.
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to maintain themselves within an ethnically-divided society, demonstrating the links, 
exchange and cooperation that goes on between ethnicity and nationalism in the 
process of nation-building. The descending approach tends to be more concerned with 
the survival of the state and those near to it. Consequently, it emphasizes privileged 
interests and the negative aspects of ethnicity in national life as ethnic elites use 
ethnic identities to struggle for the possession of state power. The complete picture 
of the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism in the nation-building process 
therefore requires that analysts pay attention to both official and popular views.
Ethnicity is not regarded as inimical to nationalism and nation-building in this 
study. The salience of ethnicity as a dynamic of societal behaviour in Nigeria lies in 
the opportunistic and socialised nature of ethnic identities. Contemporary Yoruba, Igbo, 
Tiv, Ibibio or Hausa identities are historically modern identities, the product of the 
emergence, first of the colonial state and then of independent Nigeria. This 
development is significant for nation-building in Nigeria. Until the imposition of the 
colonial state on the groups, only the sub-groups constituted meaningful socio-political 
units. Identity or similarity of language and culture did not necessarily result in 
common political action.46 In that setting, it did not make sense to speak of Hausa, 
Yoruba, Ibibio, Igbo, Tiv. It made far more sense to speak of Kano, Katsina, Zazzau, 
Awka, Onitsha, Afikpo, Ife, Ijebu, Ondo, Oyo, that is in terms of groups that regarded 
themselves as socio-political units.47 The growth of the groups to their present 
shape and size involved a degree of fusion of formerly separate ethnic and
46 Obaro Ikime, In Search of Nigerians: Changing Patterns of Inter-Group Relations in an Evolving 
Nation-state, Ibadan, Impact Publishers, for the Historical Society of Nigeria, 1985, p. 3.
47 Ibidem, p. 3.
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particularistic interests. It is, therefore, assumed in this study that non-ethnic 
allegiances or interests may now, and more so in future, intersect contemporary ethnic 
ties in Nigeria. If and when that happens, it would contribute to the process whereby 
ethnic ties adjust to other circumstances. This is presently happening with Christian 
and Muslim identities increasingly becoming more important in Nigerian politics.
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CHAPTER TWO 
NATIONALIST IDEOLOGIES IN NIGERIA 
Introduction
In this chapter, I shall elaborate on the form of ‘nation-state’ and of nationalist 
ideology which have developed in Nigeria. I shall, firstly, examine the growth and 
development of Nigerian nationalism with particular regard to the interaction of 
colonialism, nationalist politics and the military. I shall then discuss the official 
nationalist ideology, ‘Ramatism’, a more or less coherent set of beliefs and doctrines 
communicated by the government to the citizenry. The term Ramatism is derived from 
General Murtala Ramat Mohammed, the leader of the first Nigerian government to 
adopt an explicit nationalist ideology. Although Ramatism did not survive the demise 
of Mohammed’s ephemeral regime, the principal doctrines of this populist ideology 
have been retained and elaborated under subsequent regimes. I argue that this 
continuing de facto ideology motivates and legitimates official promotion of a popular 
nationalism since the 1970s.
After discussing the form and content of nationalist ideologies, I shall look at the 
national images and the actions prescribed in order to achieve these models.
NIGERIAN NATIONALISM: BACKGROUND
Nigerian nationalism developed as an unintended result of British imperial 
policy. The British had not counted on the fact that the very creation of a new political 
entity made it almost inevitable that some of the inhabitants of the new unit would 
identify with it. As James Coleman puts it, Nigerian nationalism was as much a
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fulfilment as a failure of British policy.1 Nigeria meant for the colonial administration 
a collection of ‘nations’, ruled by a government directed from abroad.2 The general 
intention of colonial policy was to promote ethnic distinctiveness. However, its 
implementation tended to promote Nigerian unity. For example, indirect rule was 
meant to preserve group consciousness, but the relatively unified administration 
fostered a new consciousness of being Nigerian. By opening up Nigeria to forces of 
modernization - literacy, monetary economy, common English language, modern legal 
and bureaucratic systems - colonialism helped to create a new class of Nigerians with 
links both in the traditional society and the wider world. This class of educated 
Nigerians became the recipients and transmitters of European nationalist ideas which 
they used to challenge the established colonial order and to create national 
communities within colonial Nigeria.
A major catalyst for Nigerian nationalism was the First World War. The mixing 
of diverse ethnic peoples in the army helped to break down ethnic barriers and replace 
them with bonds of friendship. It brought about a change in the perception of the white 
race as a monolithic and superior race. Nigerians witnessed at first hand Europeans 
fighting amongst themselves. They saw that white people were no less vulnerable than 
other men and finally understood what it meant to be colonized.3 Soon after the war, 
African professionals, most of them in Lagos, began actively to demand a 
representative legislature. The First National Congress of British West Africa held in
1 James Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of 
California Press, 1971 edition, p. 64.
2 Okoi Arikpo, The Development Of Modem Nigeria, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1967, p. 40.
3 James K. Matthews, "World War 1 and the Rise of African Nationalism: Nigerian Veterans as 
Catalysts of Change", JMAS, 20, 3, 1982, p. 501.
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Accra in 1920 championed the cause. The delegates demanded, among many things, 
a representative legislature, the abolition of racial discrimination in civil service 
appointments, and the establishment of a British West African University to promote 
African nationalism among students.4 These demands were bitterly criticised by the 
Governor, Sir Clifford, who saw it as absurd that Nigeria could be represented by a 
few ‘men born and bred in British-administered towns situated on the sea-shore, who 
in the safety of British protection, have peacefully pursued their studies under British 
teachers in British schools in order to enable them to become ministers of religion or 
learned in the laws of England.’5 Two years later the government conceded to the 
demands for an elective legislative council. The council was established in 1923. Two 
political parties were formed in Lagos to contest the elections. Most of their members 
were doctors, lawyers and prosperous businessmen from the leading Lagos families. 
They neither sought nor received popular support. Consequently, the tide of 
nationalism dwindled.
Declining economic prosperity rekindled nationalism. In 1937 European produce 
trading firms formed the West African Cocoa Pool in order to fix the price of cocoa. 
African cocoa middlemen reacted with hostility and boycotted the European firms 
involved. They sent a delegation to London to demand government protection of 
African commercial interests from the monopoly organization. The Nigerian Youth 
Movement formed in Lagos in 1934 led the agitation against the monopoly. The 
movement began as a campaign against the establishment of the Higher College, 
Yaba, which was intended to train people locally to meet the intermediate manpower
4 Arikpo, The Development of Modern Nigeria, op. cit., pp. 56-7
5 Ibidem, p. 39.
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needs of the public service. Professional elites in Lagos saw the college as a threat 
and protested forcefully against what they felt was Ihe local production of "half-baked" 
professional men to compete with them’.6 Artisans, clerical workers and non-graduate 
teachers joined in the protest because they believed that the new class of public 
servants trained at Yaba threatened their prospects of advancement in the service. 
Many Yaba graduates joined the movement in protest against the Yaba diploma which, 
in spite of its high professional standard, condemned its holder to an inferior status. 
The movement was to later transform into a political party to fight against imperialism, 
racism and economic -exploitation. Unlike its two predecessors, the movement had 
widespread support, particularly in southern Nigeria. Its leaders were educated elites 
most of whom had imbibed the idea of nationalism from Europe and America where 
they were trained. The movement was sustained by the development of an indigenous 
newspaper industry. The West African Pilot was established in 1937 in Lagos by 
Nnamdi Azikiwe and the Daily Service was established in 1938 by the National Youth 
Movement. Both newspapers daily preached against colonialism and urged the 
Nigerian youth to become politically conscious and active so as to get rid of 
imperialism.
Nationalist activity was temporarily ceased when the Second World War started 
in 1939. The newspapers and nationalist leaders supported the British war efforts and 
urged young Nigerians to enlist in the army. Nigeria itself served as a military base for 
thousands of European and American service men en route to the Middle East. This 
involvement in the war helped to create a commonality of experience that eroded 
traditional power and values. It gave Nigerians access to the publications of the Army
6 Ibidem, p. 58.
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Bureau of Current Affairs and the Fabian Society all of which extolled the virtues of 
parliamentary democracy and the principle of self-determination.7 The turning point 
for the nationalist movement was the Atlantic Charter declaration by President 
Roosevelt and Mr. Winston Churchill in August 1942. The Deputy Prime Minister of 
Britain, Clement Attlee, declared at a conference organized by the West African 
Students’ Union in London that Africans had as much right as any other nation on 
earth to the benefits of the Charter. The conference adopted a resolution demanding 
self-government for West Africa. Nigerian nationalism moved from being a protest 
movement against racial contempt and economic exploitation to a struggle for political 
independence. This struggle was based on the concept of national self-determination, 
that is the right to political self-expression for ethnic groups, an idea popularised by 
European and American nationalists.
Educated youths in Lagos formed various study groups to prepare for self- 
government. Their activities led to the inauguration of the National Council of Nigeria 
and the Cameroons (NCNC) in August 1944 to coordinate the agitation for self- 
government. By 1945, over forty organizations had joined the Council. These included 
a wide variety of interest groups - political, literary, religious, tribal, commercial, 
occupational, social, and women’s organizations. The inclusion of tribal organizations 
meant that ethnicity was used to reinforce nationalism. However, it was to become the 
bane of the Council as it introduced populist elements into the organization. Personal 
rivalry and bitterness between council leaders of different ethnic groups (who 
increasingly appealed for the support of their groups), intensified the growing ethnic 
consciousness in the country and weakened the effectiveness of the council as a front
7 Ibidem, p. 60.
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for Nigerian nationalism.
The NCNC became a political party in 1947. However, the solid support which 
it enjoyed from the Igbo Federal Union, and Nnamdi Azikiwe’s leadership (after the 
death of Herbert Macauley) were eventually to reduce it to a predominantly igbo party. 
This became more valid after the party assumed power in the Eastern Region. The 
Action Group (AG) which was launched in 1951 by Chief Awolowo later became the 
governing party in the Western Region. The last major political party to be launched 
was the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) which established hegemony in the 
Northern Region. It was founded by educated northern youths in the service of the 
government and the native authorities. Its support was largely from the Hausa/Fulani, 
many of whom were from privileged families in the north. Almost all of them had come 
into contact with nationalist ideas from the Nigerian south and from abroad. Both the 
AG and the NPC were originally tribal unions before they reorganized as political 
parties. The AG was the Egbe Omo Oduduwa (the children of Oduduwa), a Yoruba 
cultural organization named after the mythical ancestor of the Yoruba-speaking 
peoples. The NPC was the Jam’iyyar Mutanen Arewa (organization of Northern 
People), which was founded initially to combat ignorance, idleness and injustice. 
Despite the NPC’s motto, ‘One North, One People, irrespective of religion, rank or 
tribe’, the party derived its support mainly from the major ethnic and Islamic groups 
in the region, that is the Kanuri and the Hausa/Fulani rather than from ethnic minority 
groups. The affiliation of the three leading parties to the three major ethnic groups 
meant that competition between them was intense. The situation worsened towards 
the end of colonial rule. However, mutual resentment of British racism and arrogance 
proved a sufficient binding force for the success of the nationalist movement.
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Independence was achieved in October 1960. Post-independence politics 
exposed the conflicting interests of the diverse ethnic elites. However, increasing 
animosities were mediated by inter-ethnic collaboration. These alliances alternated 
according to changing circumstances. For example, the Hausa/Fulani-controlled NPC 
joined with the Igbo-controlled NCNC to form the federal government, relegating the 
Yoruba AG to the opposition. In the Western Region the NCNC joined with the United 
Peoples Party (UPP), a dissident AG group, to form a coalition government. By 1963 
the NPC/NCNC accord became strained. The NPC sought a new alliance with the 
Yoruba UPP, supporting its leader, Chief Akintola, against Chief Awolowo. This led to 
the split between the UPP and the AG. Akintola reciprocated by supporting the NPC 
in the census controversy. NCNC supporters in the western parliament decamped and 
joined Akintola to form the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). Opposition 
parties in the Northern Region, principally the Nigerian Elements Progressive Union 
(NEPU) (an ally of the NCNC) and the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) (an ally 
of the AG) combined to form the Northern Progressive Front (NPF). The NPC formed 
a formal alliance with the Akintola-led NNDP to contest the 1964 elections. They were 
joined by two ethnic minority parties from the south, the Mid-Western Democratic Front 
and the Niger Delta Congress of Eastern Nigeria. This alliance was known as the 
Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). Soon after, the NCNC, the AG and the NPF joined 
together to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). This set the stage for 
a two-party political battle based on the competing ideologies of ethno-regionalism and 
nationalism, UPGA for nationalism and NNA for ethno-regionalism.
The 1964 elections almost disintegrated Nigeria. The Northern Region 
threatened to secede. The Eastern Region also threatened to secede. The groups saw
49
each other as obstacles to the realization of their immediate goal which was the 
domination of the centre. What saved Nigeria was the ‘closed door’ agreements made 
by the regional leaders. Sir Tafawa Balewa remained as Prime Minister. This 
minimized northern fears of southern domination, which was the most critical element 
in the 1964 election crisis. If Sir Balewa was replaced by a southerner, northerners, 
in particular the Hausa/Fulani, would have construed it as a loss of power. Loyalty to 
a state ruled by a member other than the Hausa/Fulani was not tolerable.
Nigeria, thus, represented a less concrete concept than the ethnic groups. 
Loyalties were embedded in the various regions and the capture of the centre meant 
the transfer of these loyalties to central government and conversely, the withdrawal 
of support by the other regions.8 Thus there could not be a public interest other than 
the interest of a particular ethnic group or groups. The ‘national game’ was not a 
competition for more political influence but a means to dominate other groups.9
The violent overthrow of the politicians by the military in January 1966 
destroyed the illusion of a Nigerian nationalism created by the success of anti-colonial 
nationalism. The revenge coup by northern soldiers and the massacre of the Igbo in 
the north laid the foundation for secession as the solution to the challenge of ethnic 
pluralism. The massacre particularly stimulated Igbo nationalism.
The threat of secession helped to crystallize the various conflicting interests 
within the regions. It shattered the illusion promoted by the dominant ethnic groups 
that the regions were monolithic groups, exposing the centrifugal tendencies within the 
regions between the majority and the minority groups. Faced with the imminent
8 Dov Ronen, "Alternative Patterns of Integration in African States", JMAS, 14, 4, 1976, p. 584.
9Ibidem, p. 584.
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secession of the Eastern Region, General Gowon, dismantled the three-regional 
federal system and divided Nigeria into twelve States. The immediate beneficiaries 
were ethnic minorities who eagerly supported him against the secessionists. The stunt 
helped to eliminate northern fears of an alliance between the Western and Eastern 
Regions. The way was paved for the rest of Nigeria to unite against the secessionists.
War was inevitable. The forces of Nigerian unity and those of secessionist 
Eastern Region, renamed Biafra, were rigidly opposed. The issue of disintegration and 
unity were settled on the battlefield in a thirty-month long war. In January 1970, the 
secessionists capitulated and declared loyalty to Nigeria. War had enforced Nigerian 
nationalism.
Power has been held primarily by soldiers since the end of the war, except for 
the brief period of civilian rule under President Shagari. Every military government 
since the war has claimed that the ideological foundation for their rule is nationalism. 
They have all pursued nation-building policies which involve an elaborate nationalist 
justification and an attack on popular identities and loyalties which are believed to 
oppose national commitment. This official promotion of nationalism has been greatly 
influenced by ‘Ramatist’ ideology.
RAMATISM
General Murtala Ramat Mohammed was the first leader of Nigeria to adopt a 
populist style. When he came to power in 1975 after ousting the Gowon regime, he 
embarked on measures which generated immediate and popular enthusiasm for his 
government. He replaced the much hated state governors. He cancelled the 
contentious 1973 census. He purged the bureaucracy on a scale virtually unknown in
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Africa. The purge which came to be known variously as ‘Operation Deadwoods’, 
‘Operation Clean the Nation’ or just The Purge’, was country-wide and affected every 
government sector.10 It is estimated that over ten thousand public servants were 
either retired or dismissed, the overwhelming majority of whom were bureaucrats. The 
shock effect on the bureaucracy was staggering and ‘proved to be exactly what the 
new broom administration had intended’.11 Before then, it was unknown for people 
in high positions to be dismissed for corruption: at worst they were transferred. 
Although the bureaucracy was made a convenient scapegoat for the corrupt practices 
of a military regime that was controlled by both bureaucratic and military elites, Murtala 
was clearly reflecting the opinions of Nigerians in general by emphasizing the 
eradication of corruption as the most important aspect of his regime.
He used populist foreign policy to promote the image of Nigeria abroad. He 
presented the country as neither neutral nor non-aligned but independent.12 Nigeria 
under him emerged as a continental power in Africa, adopting a highly visible and 
activist policy with regard to the liberation of South Africa. Angolan independence more 
than any other factor provided the General the opportunity to develop Nigeria’s 
leadership role in African affairs. It also helped to establish the regime’s legitimacy. 
Nigeria’s initial policy on Angola had sought to encourage the three leading groups - 
MPLA, FLNA and UNITA - to work together for the benefit of the people of Angola and 
for national unity. The government was prepared to support some delay in the
10 Anthony Kirk-Greene and Douglas Rimmer, Nigeria since 1970: a Political and Economic Outline, 
London, Hodderand Stoughton, 1981, p. 12.
11 Ibidem, p. 12.
12 Billy Dudley, An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics London, Macmillan, 1982, p. 
298.
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transfer of power from Portugal to the Angolans in order to achieve its goals. When 
independence was officially declared on 11 November 1975 Nigeria, following its policy 
of neutrality, refused to recognize any of the groups competing for control of the new 
state. However, on 25 November Nigeria in a dramatic change of policy announced 
her recognition of the MPLA as truly representative of the interests of the people of 
Angola. The official explanation for the radical change in policy was attributed to South 
Africa’s intervention in Angola. However, the ultimate stimulus for the decision was 
pressure from the Nigerian public on government to recognize the MPLA. The 
decision to recognize the MPLA was also consistent with government efforts to 
assume the leading role in African affairs. Zaire, which also entertained this aspiration, 
campaigned vigorously for the recognition of the allied FILA/UNITA (and FLEA) forces.
The change of policy on Angola was also a reaction against what was seen as 
an imperialist attempt by the US to teleguide Nigeria’s policy. The new policy towards 
Angola was radically opposed to that of the USA. The Ford administration launched 
a diplomatic offensive in Africa to persuade Nigeria and other African states that had 
recognized the MPLA to change their policy and support the joint FILA and UNITA 
command. General Mohammed responded in anger to President Ford’s letter urging 
Nigeria to change policy. He made public his angry response which accused the 
United States of ‘arm-twisting’ and ‘insulting the intelligence of African nations and the 
dignity of the black man’.13 The government took over the United States Information 
Service (USIS) building in Kaduna and the radio monitoring centre in Lagos. These 
dramatic developments in the relationship of both governments generated a high
13 Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, News Release No. 16; and Hearings: Sub-Committee 
on African Affairs, March and May 1976, p. 171, cited in Bassey Ate, Decolonization and Dependence: 
the Development of Nigerian U.S. Relations, 1960-1984, London, Westview Press, 1987, p. 194.
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degree of popular nationalism. The public, particularly students, took to the street to 
demonstrate their support for Nigeria. The most populist manifestation of the regime’s 
Angolan policy was the display at a press conference of two white South African 
soldiers captured in Angola. They were brought to Nigeria by the Prime Minister of the 
MPLA government. Also strategic for nationalist sentiment was the gift of the sum of 
13.5 million naira (approximately 20 million dollars) to Angola. This was publicly 
presented to the visiting Prime Minister.14
The General attempted to discredit the notions of tribe’ and ethnicity inside 
Nigeria. He saw such sentiments as serving illegitimate factional interests that are 
damaging to Nigeria. He warned:
Sectional and selfish interests cannot serve the new and expansive patterns of 
society we aim to build nor can they serve to buttress our steadfast desire for 
modernization. Successful social re-organization ... of our Nation, built on solid 
foundations can uplift our country and all its people. The achievement of this 
goal will require the commitment of every Nigerian.15
He conceptualized the ethnic problem as that of unbalanced opportunities among the 
various ethnic groups. For him ethnicity is the effect of unequal opportunities between 
various sections, that is between the north and south, between the three major groups,
14 West Africa, London, 12 January, 1976, p. 90. A mystery surrounds this 20 million dollar gift. 
According to a report by Uzor Maxim Uzoatu entitled "Battle of the Titans", in This Week, Lagos, April 
16,1990, when the Angolans came to collect the money, it was discovered that the money had been 
paid into an account said to belong to a retired Nigerian Army Brigadier. The officer gave some 
weapons to the Angolans instead of cash.
15 Speech by the Head of State, General Murtala Ramat Mohammed, on the Occasion of the 
Festival of Eid-il-Fitr, October 6, 1975.
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between the numerous minorities and the three majority groups, and between 
Christians and Moslems. His government accordingly initiated a policy of proportional 
representation for ethnic and religious groups. The membership of the ruling Supreme 
Military Council (SMC) was carefully chosen to avoid ethnic and religious bias.
He showed concern for social issues. To fight inflation he flooded the market 
with scarce essential food items like salt, milk, sugar, and meat, which was popularly 
nicknamed ‘Murtala meat’. He set up a commission to look into the abandoned 
property issue which had made the Igbos feel alienated after the war. He started new 
health projects and reformed the judiciary. He set up panels to probe alleged corrupt 
practices by public officials. His concern for corruption led him to establish the Public 
Complaints Commission at both federal and State levels, and to mandate the 
Constitution Drafting Committee to provide for public accountability in the new 
constitution. The attack on corruption was part of a general emphasis on the ordinary 
man as against the ‘big man’. His regime thus acquired a favourable reputation as a 
poor man’s government.16
Under Mohammed, Nigerians felt their country had been given a new lease of 
life. They had regained their sense of direction and they yearned to sustain it through 
the widespread demands for a national ideology which would point the way forward 
for all to follow. The concept of Ramatism was introduced and spread by a proliferation 
of photographs, songs and gramophone records about the General’s dazzling 
leadership.17 His popularity was overpowering.
16 Martin Dent, "Corrective Government: Military Rule in Perspective", in Keith Panter-Brick (ed.), 
Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria, London, Frank Cass, 1978, p. 118.
17 Kirk-Greene and Rimmer, Nigeria Since 1970: a Political and Economic Outline, op. cit., p. 14.
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The assassination of Mohammed in an abortive coup shocked Nigerians. It was, 
nevertheless, auspicious for nationalism for it acquired a hero and a martyr to set the 
seal on its ideals. For once, there was one leader almost all Nigerians identified with. 
He bequeathed Nigeria with a sense of itself as a national and political entity. Popular 
anger against his assassins led to the coup plotters being rounded up and either 
executed or imprisoned. The ousted Nigerian leader, General Gowon, the architect of 
the new Nigerian unity, was stripped of his military rank and benefits, and declared a 
wanted person. Colonel Dimka, the coup leader, had claimed that the coup was to 
reinstate Gowon and the dismissed state governors. Before his disgrace, Gowon had 
been granted his full pension and was being supported in the UK by the government 
in recognition of his war effort to keep Nigeria one. Nationalists saw the assassination 
as an imperialist attempt to de-stabilize the country. The refusal of Britain to hand over 
Gowon to the Nigerian authorities for prosecution deepened the anti-imperialist feeling 
and led to a diplomatic rift with Britain.
Murtala Mohammed’s ten month rule is looked back upon as the period in which 
Nigeria began to find its identity. Like de Gaulle, Peron, and Nasser, Mohammed 
asserted the independence of a middle-range, regional power, inspiring its population 
with a sense of national dignity, importance and pride. Like them, he provided strong, 
decisive and charismatic leadership, and set a high standard of governmental 
responsibility. Also like them, Mohammed gave his name to a diffuse but popular and 
emotive ideology, a populist nationalism capable of inspiring and mobilizing those who 
had hitherto been apathetic and divided. Unlike de Gaulle, Peron, and Nasser, 
however, Mohammed did not lead a country with a strong historical sense of its 
national identity. Mohammed died a victim of the ethnic rivalries he tried so hard to
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overcome. The majority of those arrested for the coup were from Gowon’s region of 
the country. It was a revenge coup.
However, his vision and populist style have been claimed by his successors. 
For instance, his immediate successor, General Obasanjo used the occasion of the 
World Conference for Action Against Apartheid hosted by Nigeria in 1977 to enhance 
his own administration’s image and to boost mass nationalism. Addressing the 
conference, Obasanjo warned multinational corporations against aiding and abetting 
apartheid, ordering them to choose between Nigeria and South Africa.18 He 
proceeded to nationalize Shell-BP (Nigeria) and Barclays Bank (Nigeria) for their 
association with South Africa. The Shagari regime in 1983 cashed in on existing public 
antagonism against aliens to legitimize its rule. It suddenly announced the expulsion 
of what it termed illegal aliens, giving them 14 days notice to leave Nigeria. Illegal 
immigrants were held responsible for Nigeria’s social problems. They were particularly 
blamed for the violent religious unrest in the northern cities of Kano, Maiduguri and 
Kaduna.19 Although the expulsion issued directly from the requirement of real politik, 
it was wholly consistent with Ramatist nationalist ideology in differentiating between 
Nigerians and non-Nigerians and their interests. In 1985, the Buhari regime, which 
claimed to be an extension of the Mohammed regime, also expelled aliens, using their 
expulsion to prop up his regime against public disillusion and disappointment. The 
same regime was accused by Britain of masterminding the attempted kidnap of Umaru 
Dikko, a former top aide in the Shagari administration, in a crate from London. He
18 Address by General Obasanjo, at the opening of the World Conference for Action Against 
Apartheid, August 22-26,1977, Lagos, in A March of Progress: Collected Speeches of His Excellency, 
General Obasanjo, Lagos, Federal Ministry of Information, pp. 176-180.
19 West Africa, London, 31 January 1983, p. 245.
57
was wanted in Nigeria to face charges of political corruption. Although the bungling 
of the kidnap affair may have dented Nigeria’s image abroad, it fanned mass 
nationalism. By the kidnap attempt, the government was pandering to public pressure 
to deal harshly with corrupt politicians.
Ramatism - like Gaullism, Peronism, and Nasserism - is open to a wide range 
of interpretations and uses, it does not belong exclusively to either the right or the left, 
and it has no sacred texts or privileged interpreters. Its essential doctrines are: that 
the divisions between Nigerians and non-Nigerians are more significant than those 
factors - such as class, status or, most importantly, ethnicity - which divide Nigerians 
from each other; that the supreme purpose of government is the welfare of all 
Nigerians irrespective of class, religion or ethnicity; that governmental promises are 
meant to be fulfilled, time schedules to be kept, decisions to be implemented; that the 
government must be responsible for eliminating corruption throughout the state 
apparatus; and that the government must vigorously pursue an independent foreign 
policy.
Unlike Gaullism and Peronism, Ramatism does not inform the programme of 
any particular political party, although it does inform that of the Nigerian Council for 
National Awareness (NCNA). The NCNA is a civil association which came into being 
after the death of the General. Its principal objective is to promote the nationalist ideas 
of General Murtala Mohammed. It commemorates Mohammed each year on the 
anniversary of his assassination, and acts as a constant critic of government, 
chastising it whenever it fails to adhere to his standards or principles. The Association 
believes that Murtala Ramat Muhammad is to Nigeria what Garibaldi is to Italy, 
Napoleon to France, Ghandi to India, Castro to Cuba, Nasser to Egypt, Mao to China,
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and Atatuk to Turkey.20
Perhaps partially because of Mohammed's early death in office, the ideology 
has retained its identity with government, especially military government. It has also 
informed subsequent Nigerian Constitutions. Despite its official and, therefore, 
necessarily pragmatic character, Ramatism deserves description as an ideology, and 
it has, by Nigerian standards, been a peculiarly effective one. Nevertheless, it must 
be said that the wave of nationalist feelings that attend measures issuing from a 
populist based nationalist idealogy like Ramatism are temporary, often reminiscent of 
football stadium nationalism. The assassination of Mohammed in a sectional coup 
exposes the fragility of populism as a base for nationalism. It suggests that the rallying 
cry of nationalism needs constantly to be supplemented by an appeal for the steady 
support of those who see in the state the means of securing their own ends 21
HOW NIGERIA IS IMAGINED
Nigeria is imagined as a great and modern black nation. It is also imagined as 
a disciplined, fair, just and humane African society. These images of Nigeria were 
painted by General Obasanjo in what is now known as the Jaji Declaration 22 The 
Shagari administration articulated the same images in its Ethical Revolution 
programme while President Babangida elaborated them in a charter entitled the
20 Building a Brand New Nigeria, pamphlet produced by the NCNA, Lagos, for the 11th anniversary 
celebration of the death of General Mohammed, 1987, p. 5.
21 Panter-Brick (ed.), Soldiers and Oil, op. cit., p. 6.
22 Speech by His Excellency, General Olusegun Obasanjo, at the Opening of the Command and 
Staff College, Jaji, on Monday, September 12, 1977, pp. 5, 12, 13.
National Orientation Movement (NOM).23 The charter established the commitment 
of Nigerians as a nation:
(a) to restore and sustain discipline in our national life;
(b) to inculcate the spirit of nationalism and patriotism in all Nigerians;
(c) to restore respect for our culture and encourage its development;
(d) to instil in the populace a sense of absolute loyalty to the fatherland;
(e) to ensure and uphold leadership by example;
(f) to foster respect for constituted authority;
(g) to revamp the economy through hard work, and the intensification of 
agriculture so as to ensure self-sufficiency in food production.24
Indiscipline is consistently identified by Nigerian governments as a major 
problem affecting the country. It is manifested in corruption, dishonesty, opportunism, 
lack of patriotism, and commitment to Nigeria and it pervades all aspects of national 
life.25 Its magnitude is vividly portrayed by ex-Biafran leader, Odumegwu-Ojukwu, 
who argues that the bane of Nigerian society is the obsession of her citizenry with the 
acquisition of privilege:
We profane tradition to acquire titles; we buy degrees, we join exclusive
and sometimes secret societies...Our vehicles carry exclusive numbers.
23 Address by President Ibrahim Babangida, at the Launching of Mass Mobilization Campaign at 
National Stadium Sumlere, Lagos on Saturday, 25th July, 1987, pp. 3-8.
24 Ibidem, p. 5.
25 General Obasanjo at Jaji, op. cit., pp. 5-10.
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Each group, because of its exclusive nature, negates our social unity 
and distorts our national cohesion. The Nigerian of today is an addict of 
privilege. ...The Nigerian must wear the most expensive clothes, drive 
the most expensive cars, build the most expensive palaces, patronize 
the most expensive clubs, send their children to the most expensive 
school, drink the most expensive beverages, throw the most lavish 
parties and mate the most mercenary mistresses. The objective is to be 
recognized. The greater the assault on the eyes of the under privileged, 
the greater the satisfaction.
Indiscipline is seen as a result of the negation of traditional African culture.27 
Consequently, traditional African values will provide the cultural context for the nation­
state under construction. These values include the norm that everybody is his brother’s 
keeper, respect for age, experience and authority, ostracizing evil doers and the 
indolent and extolling of virtues and values based on service to the community, and 
the encouragement of excellence.28
Unity is the most widely pronounced ideal of Nigeria. The Nation’s motto is 
‘Unity and Faith, Peace and Progress’. The Nigerian national flag is divided into three 
equal parts. The central part which is white symbolizes unity and peace. The national
26 Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Because I am Involved, Ibadan, Spectrum Books Limited, 1989, p.
XV.
27 General Obasanjo at Jaji, op. cit., p. 12.
28 Ibidem, p. 4.
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anthem emphasizes unity with the myth of common ancestral father.29 The old 
anthem was rejected because it was seen as emphasizing the elements that divide 
rather than those that unite the country. The search for unity has been a central theme 
in Nigeria’s development. The various constitutions of the country maintain it as their 
central objective. The 1979 constitution was devoted to it. Millions of Nigerian men, 
women and children died between 1967 and 1970 in a war to defend Nigeria’s unity. 
The slogan of the Federal side during the war was To keep Nigeria One Is a Task 
That Must Be Done!’. Even the name of the head of state at the time of the war, 
Yakubu Gowon, became an acronym for "You Are Keeping Us Better United" and "Go 
On With One Nigeria".
The pursuit of unity stems from the belief that it is only when Nigeria is united, 
in an atmosphere of peace and political stability, that the social and economic 
advancement all Nigerians yearn for can be attained. For instance, Odumegwu-Ojukwu 
claims that:
Nigeria cannot make progress without unity. Nigeria cannot fulfil her 
mission to all her peoples without unity. Nigeria cannot aid effectively 
her African brothers and sisters without unity, neither can she hope to 
re-establish the black personality in all its glory, a personality to be 
respected by all humanity and recognized fully as an integral, free and
on
equal part of the human race, without unity.
29 First verse of the Nigerian national anthem. See appendix for Nigeria’s old and new national 
anthems.
30 Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Because I am Involved, op. cit., p. 55.
62
Nigeria as imagined was rationalized in the 1979 constitution.31 Its provisions 
for nation-building reflect the fundamental nationalist aspirations of Ramatist ideology. 
Addressing the inaugural meeting of the CDC, General Mohammed directed that the 
new Constitution should unequivocally be committed to a federal system, eliminate 
‘cut-throat political competition based on a system of winner-takes-alP as was 
characteristic of the First Republic, de-emphasize institutionalized opposition to 
government in power and encourage the development of consensus politics and 
government based on community interests, decentralize power and eliminate the over­
concentration of power in a few hands, provide for a free fair electoral system to 
ensure adequate representation at the centre, restrict the number of new States to be 
created, depoliticize the census, and encourage the formation of genuine and truly 
national political parties.32 He recommended the establishment of an executive 
presidential system in which the president and the vice president would be elected and 
granted clearly defined powers. Their election into office as well as their cabinet was 
to ‘reflect the federal character of the country’. His idea was that the Constitution 
should enable the effectual conversion of Nigeria from statehood to nationhood, with 
the elimination of ethnicity in its iniquitous ramifications and the sustenance of 
constitutionalism.33
In the preamble to the Constitution the people of Nigeria are held to pledge
31 The Constitution was revised in 1989.
32 Address by General Murtala Ramat Mohammed, at the Inaugural Meeting of the CDC at the 
Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, October 18, 1975.
33 N.B. Graham-Douglas, "Fundamental National Objectives and Sustenance of Nigerian 
Constitutionalism", in J.A. Atanda and A.Y. Aliyu (eds.), Proceedings of the National Conference on 
Nigeria since Independence, Zaria, March 1983, VoL1, Political Development, Panel on Nigeria since 
Independence History Project, 1985, p. 331.
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firmly and solemnly:
To live in unity and harmony as one indivisible and indissoluble Sovereign 
Nation under God dedicated to the promotion of inter African solidarity, world 
peace, international cooperation and understanding; And to provide for a 
constitution for the purpose of promoting the good government and welfare of 
all persons in our country on the principle of Freedom, Equality and Justice and 
for the purpose of consolidating the unity of our people.
According to the Constitution, the national ethic is discipline, self-reliance and 
patriotism.34 It enjoins the federal government to actively promote national 
integration and prohibit discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, 
status, ethnic or linguistic association. For this purpose, the state is to provide 
adequate facilities for and encourage free mobility of people, goods and services 
throughout the federation; secure full residence rights for every citizen in all parts of 
the federation; encourage intermarriage among persons from different places of origin 
or different religious, ethnic or linguistic associations or ties; promote or encourage the 
formation of associations that cut across ethnic, linguistic, religious or other sectional 
barriers; foster a feeling of belonging and of involvement among the various peoples, 
to the end that loyalty to the nation shall override sectional loyalties; and abolish all 
corrupt practices and abuse of power.
Imbalance between the federal centre and the periphery has often brought 
tragic results in Nigeria. During the First Republic, the Regions had so much power
34 See section on social objectives.
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that the centre was weak to the point of immobilization. When General Ironsi 
attempted to centralize political power through his unification decree in 1966 violent 
resistance and civil war resulted. In order to avoid the sad mistakes of the past, the 
Constitution provides for correcting any imbalances in the federation by enumerating 
in section 8 the procedures for the creation of more states. The federation now 
comprises three tiers of government: a single government at the centre, several 
separate State governments and local government councils in prescribed local 
government areas of a State. The powers of the central government is now greatly 
enhanced in relation to that of States. In any conflict between a State and the federal 
government, the latter will by Constitution prevail.
The Constitution provides for proportional rewards for the ethnic groups. Section 
14, subsection 3, provides for ‘ethnic arithmetic’ to be adopted in appointments to all 
state institutions. This is referred to as ‘federal character’. According to the Constitution 
Drafting Committee (CDC), federal character is Ihe distinctive desire of the peoples 
of Nigeria to promote national unity, foster national loyalty and give every citizen of 
Nigeria a sense of belonging to the nation not withstanding the diversities of ethnic 
origin, culture, language or religion which may exist and which it is their desire to 
nourish and harness to the enrichment of the Federal Republic of Nigeria’.35 It was 
especially meant to reassure groups about their various fears - fear of domination by 
the Hausa/Fulani, fear of domination by the North, fear of domination by the ethnic 
majority groups, fear of domination within States, Northern fear of Southern domination 
by skills, Christian fear of domination by Muslims, and Muslim fear of domination by 
Christians. Article 14 (sections 3 & 4) further provides that the composition of the
35 CDC Report, vol. 11, Lagos, Government Printer, p. 67.
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Government of the Federation, or any of its agencies, should reflect the federal 
character of Nigeria by ensuring that persons from a few States do not predominate. 
Sub-section 4 similarly enjoins State and local governments and their agencies to 
ensure that they are not predominantly staffed by members of any one ethnic, 
sectional or regional group to the exclusion of others. Article 135 (section 2) enjoins 
the President to include in his cabinet at least one minister from each of the 
constituent States of Nigeria. The army, civil service and other national agencies are 
required to reflect this notional federal character in their recruitment and appointments.
Determined to avoid a recurrence of the ethnic politics that produced the civil 
war, the framers of the Constitution attempted a far reaching reconstruction .of.the 
political system. Political parties were required to be pan-Nigerian. The Constitution 
emphasized the duty of the state to promote the formation of associations that cut 
across ethnic, linguistic, religious or other sectional barriers. Article 202 and 203 
required that political parties organize throughout the federation as well as reflect the 
‘federal character’ in the appointment of their officers. Membership must be open to 
every citizen irrespective of place of origin, sex, religion or ethnic grouping. Each 
registered party must have its headquarters in the federal capital. The Electoral 
Commission is empowered to grant recognition only to parties represented in at least 
two thirds of the States. The use of primordial symbols by parties is prohibited. The 
revised edition of the Constitution provides for a two party system of government, one 
to the left and the other to the right. This provision coincides with the decision by the 
incumbent leadership to register only two political parties for the Third Republic 
scheduled for 1992.
The Constitution provides for a presidential system of government. It was
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expected that a powerful and democratically elected president would provide effective 
government and become the focus of national unity. The enhanced powers of the 
President would facilitate development, national integration and stability as well as 
contributing to national identity. To avoid leadership emerging from a parochial base 
or from a single geo-ethnic region, articles 125 and 126 provided that the President 
must be elected, not merely by a simple majority of the population, but by an absolute 
majority with at least one quarter of the votes cast in each of at least two-thirds of all 
the States. A run-off follows if no candidate achieves this. These provisions were 
intended to impose additional pressures towards cross-cutting cleavages. In opting for 
the presidential system, Nigerian nation-builders reject the consociational option of a 
grand coalition of ethnic power elites and underscore their objective of unity. The 
objective of nation-building is to break down ethnic barriers, not to maintain them. The 
adoption of the executive presidential model of government is symbolic of the new 
image of Nigeria as free from the vestiges of colonialism. The system is seen as a 
modern and indigenous Nigerian development, in contrast to the Westminster 
parliamentary model which was rejected as a symbol of the colonial past.
The idea of unity-in-diversity underscores the Constitution. This idea recognizes 
that substantial ethnic and cultural differences have to be acknowledged in order to 
achieve the hopes of Nigerians for a stable and united Nigeria. Unity represents the 
ideal while diversity expresses current reality.36 The objective of Nigerian 
nationalism is then, not dissimilar to the classical European model which emphasizes 
popular support and unity. However, unlike the classical model, Nigerian nationalism 
accepts that a stable and free society can be based on cultural pluralism, in a
36 W.D. Graf, Elections 1979, Lagos, Daily Times, 1979, p. 36.
multinational state based on political accommodation and democracy. It thus tacitly 
acknowledges that ethnicity has a role to play in nation-building even while it seeks 
to undermine ethnicity.
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CHAPTER THREE 
A MORE PLURAL FEDERATION 
Introduction
Nigeria provides evidence that federalism carl either exacerbate or mitigate 
ethnic conflict. Much depends on the number of component states in a federation, their 
boundaries and their ethnic composition. Particularly important is the distribution of the 
political units. Ethnicity can be incompatible with nationalism and nation-building 
especially if the federal arrangement is that of a few number of large ethnic states or 
regions. This was the case in Nigeria in the 1960s. Legitimation of the Nigerian state 
proved impossible to obtain. It experienced a thirty month-long civil war involving a 
separatist attempt. The reason for this war was not just the existence of ethnicity. It 
was largely the fact that the central state was controlled by the economically inferior 
Muslim Hausa/Fulani by virtue of their domination of the giant Northern Region. The 
resources of the state were used by this group for its own benefit to the detriment of 
the other groups. This was particularly resented by the other two dominant groups, the 
Yoruba and Igbo, who possessed superior economic power and controlled two of the 
three regions of the federation, but who were denied political power at the centre. The 
Igbo in the east sought to wrest power from the Hausa/Fulanis but were repressed. 
They turned to secession to form a new state, Biafra, which was given considerable 
international support. Biafra was defeated in the Nigerian Civil War (1967-70). 
However, the result was not a revival of Hausa/Fulani domination.
In this chapter, I shall examine how Nigeria has managed, since the civil war, 
to prevent secession and, also to resist any attempts to impose domination by any one
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or more ethnic regions. One major attempt is structural. This is the effort to make the 
federation more pluralistic through the creation of smaller State governments. To do 
this, the military took a federal system that reinforced the tripartite ethnic divisions in 
the country and divided it first into 12, then 19, and 21, and now 30 states. In each of 
the three former ethno-regional blocks, there are now several states with different 
needs and resources, each with a separate centre of development, each imposing a 
unique line of cleavage across the once common bond of ethno-regionalism.1 The 
uncommon ethnicity of the various minority groups who control almost half of the 
states has also been given prominent expression, breaking the dominance of the 
majority groups.2 Logically, all of this should mean 'flexible shifting alliances, 
depending on issues, instead of the old, rigid, geographically defined political 
positions’.3 In particular, it means the end of overt regional power that was such a 
deep source of insecurity and tension in the First Republic.4 In short, it should 
undermine ethnicity and fears of domination by a sectional elite.
THE CREATION OF STATES: BACKGROUND
The idea of creating more states was first proposed in the 1950s by members 
of minority ethnic groups as a safeguard against domination by the three major 
groups. The proposal was rejected by the colonial government. Their Nigerian
1 Larry Diamond, "Cleavage, Conflict and Anxiety in the Second Nigerian Republic", in JMAS, 20, 
4, 1982, p. 630.
2 Ibidem, p. 630.
3 Jean Herskovits, "Dateline Nigeria: a Black power", in Foreign Policy, Washington D.C., 29, Winter 
1977-8, p. 179, in Ibidem, p. 631.
4 Ibidem, p. 631.
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successors were no more in favour of the idea than were their alien predecessors. 
What the regional governments dominated by their respective major ethnic groups 
were really against was the creation of states within their own regions. They supported 
and often instigated minority disaffection in rival regions. In 1963 the Igbo-dominated 
NCNC and Hausa/Fulani-dominated NPC conspired to carve out a fourth region, the 
Mid-West Region, from the Western Region, the territorial base of the opposition AG. 
In 1967 the four regions were reconstituted into twelve states. The Nigerian leader, 
Yakubu Gowon, announced the new federal structure a few hours before the Eastern 
Region announced its secession from Nigeria. The plan was to de-stabilize the 
Eastern Region and to provide the minorities within the region with good reason to 
dissociate themselves from the secessionists. Like in the 1963 exercise, ethnic 
differences had been exploited to create more states. Gowon, however, claimed that 
the exercise was guided by the need to achieve unity and stability in Nigeria.5 This 
claim was given further credence by the Murtala Mohammed regime which ousted 
Gowon in 1975. The Irekefe Commission appointed by Mohammed to investigate the 
issue of creating more states hailed state creation as a guarantee for political stability 
in Nigeria and recommended the reorganization of the federation into 19 states.6 
General Mohammed, while announcing the new 19 states in 1976, observed that the 
exercise was to bring government nearer to the people and ensure even development
5. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: a Documentary Source Book 1966-69, Vol. 
1, January 1966-July 67, London, Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 444-449.
6 Report of the Panel Appointed by the Federal Government to Investigate the Issue of the Creation 
of More States and Boundary Adjustments in Nigeria, Lagos, Government Press, December 1975, p. 
18.
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through out the country.7 The creation of more states therefore became justified on 
three related grounds: the need for unity, the need for peace and stability, and the 
need for even development and popular participation in government. Thus what was 
initially rejected by politicians came to be popularised by military nation-builders as the 
foundation for a new Nigeria.
The 1979 transfer of power from the military to politicians provoked an 
unprecedented number of demands for new states from nearly every existing state. 
It became evident that the agitations for more states were no longer a minority affair. 
As many as fifty four requests from both ethnic minority and majority groups had been 
received by the national assembly in 1983. The avalanche of requests led to the 
establishment of two committees in May 1983 to investigate the issue. Before the 
politicians could create any more states the military deposed them.
In 1986 the Babangida regime set up the Political Bureau to make 
recommendations to it on the political future of the country. In its report the bureau 
recommended that six more states be created in the interest of national stability. It 
made a special case for the creation of Wawa State from Anambra State, pointing out 
that Igbo land deserved another state in the interest of justice.8 The creation of at 
least one state in Igbo land should serve to reassure the Igbos that they have been 
reintegrated into the Nigerian political scene and thereby end the profound sense of 
frustration which led to strident calls for confederal arrangement by the Igbos.’9 Two
1. Daily Times, Wednesday, February 4,1976, p. 3 in Omolade Adejuyigbe, "Rationale and Effect 
of State Creation in Nigeria with Reference to the 19 States", in A.B. Akinyemi et al. (eds.), Readings 
on Federalism, Lagos, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1979, p. 192.
8 "Federal Government Views on the Political Bureau Report", in National Concord, Friday, August 
21, 1987, p. 11.
9 Ibidem, p. 11.
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of the six recommended states were created in 1987, bringing the total number of 
states to 21. In announcing the new states, President Babangida stated that the 
decision had been taken within the context of national interest, and the increasing cost 
of running state governments.10 He warned that his administration would not tolerate 
any more agitations for states. Yet, in 1991 he was persuaded by persistent agitations 
for states to create nine new ones, bringing the total to 30 states. What does the 
creation of states mean for Nigerian nationalism and nation-building?
In this chapter I shall examine how the empirical record measures up to 
expectations that it would foster unity and stability. I shall do this in relation to those 
divisive issues which the exercise was expected to redress. These are mainly the 
domination of the federal government by a sectional group and domination by ethnic 
majority groups. Demands for the creation of more states between 1954 and 1967 
were usually justified on the basis that it would ensure the unity of the country, 
particularly in relation to complaints about the practice of regionalism and the huge 
size of the old Northern Region vis-a-vis the rest of the country.11 One report 
concluded that ‘until these two threats are removed, they labour in vain who labour for 
Nigerian unity and solidarity’.12 The huge size of the Northern Region has in theory 
ceased to be a problem since the creation of 12 states in 1967. However, the related 
problem of Hausa/Fulani domination of political power is still seen as a major problem. 
By regionalism is meant the situation whereby enormous power was exercised by the 
regional governments. The power and influence of the central government was weak
10 National Concord, Lagos, Friday September 25, 1987, p. 14.
11 Adejuyigbe, "Rationale and Effect of State Creation in Nigeria with reference to the 19 States", 
op. cit., pp. 192-3.
12 Nigerian Outlook, Enugu, 14 October, 1965, p. 5, in Ibidem, p. 193.
in relation to the regions. The regional governments were therefore able to challenge 
its authority. This effectively ensured the domination of the regions by the large ethnic 
groups. To maintain and consolidate control of the regional governments, the three 
dominant ethnic groups and their respective political parties subjected their ethnic 
communities to political oppression, economic discrimination and cultural domination. 
Between 1947 and 1955 there emerged a number of minority parties that championed 
the creation of states for these communities. The proponents of the new states 
expected that their creation would end such domination and allow their areas to 
achieve greater opportunities for cultural, political and economic development and a 
greater share of federal government resources.
It might be asked why there was intense competition for the central government 
since its authority was weak vis-a-vis the regional governments? Why did control of 
the centre mean so much to the groups? The answer is crucial to an understanding 
of nationalism for it shows that nationalism is a universal feature of human societies 
not just a manifestation of industrial rationalism. For the Nigerian political elites, who 
had successfully utilized the ideology of nationalism to oust colonial rule while creating 
national communities within colonial Nigeria, what remained to be established was who 
presided over the state taken from the British. In other words, the struggle for 
independence amounted to a struggle for succession to colonial power and privilege, 
that is the right to replace one elite with another.13 National politics was therefore 
a battle for supremacy. The game was not to broaden opportunities for exercising 
power but rather to gain political domination. Political nationalism, which is essentially 
competition for power by exclusion, is a consistent and recurrent feature of human
13 William D. Graf, The Nigerian State, London, James Currey, 1988, p. 18.
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grouping. Traditionally, such nationalism among the constituent Nigerian groups largely 
took the form of war, with its prize as honour and wealth in slaves or land for hunting, 
animal husbandry or agriculture. Now, that competition continues within the boundaries 
of a state which itself claims a legitimate monopoly of the use of physical force. Such 
competition therefore seldom takes the form of war but rather centres upon 
competition for state power, the distributive source of honour and wealth.
With disunity in Nigeria perceived as the result of disparities in the relative size 
and power of the regions and ethnic groups, it remains to ask to what extent the 
creation of a more plural federation has mitigated such disparities. I shall examine its 
effect on the dominant position of the majorities and that of the Northern Region with 
its related problem of Hausa/Fulani monopoly on power.
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TABLE 1 
States by Region
Reaion States 1967 1976 1987 1991
Northern Benue Plateau Benue Benue Benue
*Kogi
Plateau Plateau Plateau
\Jigawa
Kano Kano Kano Kano
Kwara Kwara Kwara Kwara
North Central Kaduna Kaduna Kaduna
Katsina Katsina
North Eastern Borno Borno Borno
*Yobe
Bauchi Bauchi Bauchi
Gongola Gongola Gongola
*Tarabe
North Western Sokoto Sokoto Sokoto
*Kebbi
Niger Niger Niger
Western Mid-western Bendel Bendel Edo
* Delta
Western Oyo Oyo Oyo
*Osun
Ondo Ondo Ondo
Ogun Ogun Ogun
Lagos Lagos Lagos Lagos
Eastern East Central Anambra Anambra Anambra
*Enugu
Imo Imo Imo
*Abia
Rivers Rivers Rivers Rivers
Southeastern Cross River Cross River Cross Riv
Akwa Ibom Akwa Ibom
* New states created in 1991
NORTHERN DOMINATION
The area of the former Northern Region formed six of the 12 states created in 
1967. It contained 10 of the 19 states created in 1976, and 11 of the 21 states created 
in 1987. These states have different needs and resources as well as separate centres 
of development. This should impose new lines of cleavage across the once common
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bond of regionalism. Such a condition should be favourable for undermining ethno- 
regional bonds. Murtala Mohammed in his inaugural address to the Constitutional 
Drafting Committee stated that the fear of the predominance of one Region’ had been 
largely removed by the creation of more states.14 The empirical record controverts 
this assumption. Nigerians still complain bitterly about northern domination. Why?
Structurally, it makes sense to talk about northern domination. The share of the 
north in the ‘national cake’ is still greater than that of the south because of the 
principle of equality of states (adopted together with the creation of states) for the 
share out of national resources. As Table 2 shows, on the basis of equality of states, 
the Northern Region would have been entitled to 33.3 percent on independence and 
25 percent in 1963 when the Mid-West region was created. In 1967 when it contained 
six states, it was entitled to 50 percent. In 1976, when it contained 10 of the 19 states 
created it gained 52.6 percent. With 11 of the 21 states it still retained its advantage 
with 52.4 percent.
TABLE 2
% of Total Share of National Resources on the Basis of Equality of States
REGION 1954-1963 1963
Northern 33.3 25%
Western 33.3 25%
Eastern 33.3 25%
Mid-Western15 25%
Total 100 100
Other criteria used in the share-out of federated resources, in addition to 
equality, include population needs, the number of local government areas, and school
14 Address by the Head of State, General Murtala Mohammed, on 18 October 1975, reproduced 
in Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee containing the Draft Constitution, vol. 1, Lagos, 
Government Printer, 1976, pp. x1-x1iii.
15 Mid-Westem Region was carved out of the Western Region after a referendum was held in the 
Benin and Delta provinces of the region in 1963.
enrolment. However, of all the distributive principles, two - equality and population - 
have been elevated to the virtual exclusion of the others. What the federal government 
invariably does is to allocate 50 percent equally and 50 percent according to relative 
population among states.16 Table 3 shows that when the two principles of equality 
and population are applied the north has gained from the south.
TABLE 3
State Share of Distributable Federal Resources (19 States) 
Based on 50% Equality and 50% Population
Reaion State Pop. %Total 50% 50% Total
Northern Benue 2,427,018 4.36 2.631 2.180 4.811
Plateau 2,016,657 3.64 2.631 1.820 5.451
Bauchi 2,431,296 4.37 2.631 2.185 4.816
Borno 2,952,187 5.30 2.631 2.650 5.281
Gongola 2,650,573 4.76 2.631 2.380 5.011
Kwara 1,714,485 3.08 2.631 1.540 4.171
Kaduna 4,098,305 7.36 2.631 3.680 6.311
Kano 5,774,842 10.37 2.631 5.185 7.816
Niger 1,194,508 2.15 2.631 1.075 3.706
Sokoto 4,538,788 8.15 2.631 4.075 6.706
Western Lagos 1,443,567 2.59 2.631 1.295 3.926
Ogun 1,550,966 2.79 2.631 1.395 4.025
Oyo 5,208,884 9.36 2.631 4.680 7.311
Ondo 2,727,675 4.90 2.631 2.450 5.081
Bendel 2,533,067 4.55 2.631 2.275 4.906
Eastern Anambra 3,571,072 6.41 2.631 3.205 5.836
Imo 3,706,820 6.66 2.631 3.330 5.961
Rivers 1,585,125 2.85 2.631 1.425 4.056
Cross-River 3,534,217 6.35 2.631 3.175 5.806
Total 19 55,679,052 100 50.00 50.00 100
Source: O. Adejuyigbe, "Rationale and Effect of State Creation in Nigeria with 
Reference to the 19 States", op. cit., p. 211. Population based on 1963 census.
In the distribution of parliamentary seats the same pattern is maintained. In the 
First Republic, the north had the same number of senators as the other regions.
16 J.l. Elaigwu, The Military and State Building: Federal-State Relations in Nigeria’s ‘Military 
Federalism’ 1966-1976", in Akinyemi et al., op. cit., p. 178.
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However, in the federal parliament it had 174 out of the 312 seats, that is, 55.8 
percent. In 1963, when the Mid-West Region was created, its representation dropped 
slightly to 167 out of the 312 seats. During the Second Republic it had 50 out of the 
95 senators in the Senate on the basis of 5 senators per State. Seats in the Federal 
House of Assembly were allocated according to population size. Consequently, the 
share out of assembly seats reflected the number of local government areas in the 
country. The northern states together had 240 seats out of a total of 445 making 53.9 
percent. In the Third Republic scheduled for 1993, the northern states with about 53 
percent majority (11 of 21 states and 16 of the 30 created in 1991) would still be 
entitled to more seats in the two national assemblies. The numerical power of the 
north in the parliament was as a result of its population. Today, nobody knows exactly 
what the population of Nigeria is or how it is distributed.17
With development projects the north still predominates. On the basis of equality 
of states, the northern states together would still be entitled to a greater share than 
all the southern states put together. Not much has changed. In the First Republic there 
were complaints that most developments in the 1962-68 development plan were 
concentrated in the Northern Region.18
A recent development project that has caused much ethnic disaffection is the
17 This statement remains valid even though a census was conducted late in 1991. The census 
figures showed that Nigeria is not as large as it had previously claimed, contradicting internationally 
accepted trends in demographic data. The total figure of 88.5 million people suggested that Nigeria’s 
population is shrinking rather than growing at the UN verified yearly population growth rate of over 3.0 
percent. However the greatest criticism has been elicited by the figures for the states. While some 
states showed an unprecedented increase of 293.5 percent, some increased by a mere 9.21 percent. 
Most states are challenging their population figures at the census tribunal set up in 1992 by 
government. The new figures have not however been reflected in the distribution of parliamentary seats.
18 B.J. Dudley, "Federalism and the Balance of Political Power in Nigeria", Journal of 
Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. IV, 1966, pp. 16-29, in Adejuyigbe, op. cit., p. 203.
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relocation of the capital from Lagos to Abuja. The site for the new federal capital about 
400 square miles right in the middle of the country was chosen by government for its 
national symbolism. Its central position was expected to reassure the various groups 
of its neutral ethnic status. But it is still seen by some groups, particularly the Yoruba, 
as a symbol of northern domination due to its location in the area of the old northern 
region. During the 1979 elections it was made a crucial political issue with the 
Awolowo-led UPN leading the anti-Abuja campaign. It was in order to avoid this sort 
of interpretation that the government chose a majority of Yorubas to serve on the 
relocation committee.19
Politically, it makes sense to talk about the north in the context of contemporary 
Nigeria. Northern elites, in particular, the Hausa/Fulani, have deliberately ensured that 
the idea of 'One North, One people, irrespective of religion, rank or tribe’, promoted 
by the defunct NPC is not forgotten despite the creation of states. The group interests 
of this elite, especially Islam and the maintenance of political power, has compelled 
them to seek to preserve the status quo. Between 1966 and 1979 they 
consolidated their power under the banner of 'northern interests’ in contradistinction 
to ‘Islamic interests’ which they championed in the First Republic.
Many institutions have helped to guard, defend and consolidate northern 
interests from encroachment. Prominent among them are the New Nigeria 
Newspapers and the Federal Radio Corporation Kaduna, originally established by the 
Northern Region to champion its interest. Under the 12-state structure the idea of one
19 Hotline, Kaduna, March 31, 1987, p. 13.
20 Obaro Ikime, "Towards Understanding the National Question", in Africa Events, London, April, 
1987, p. 35.
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north was advanced through the Interim Common Service Agency for the Northern 
States. Murtala Mohammed abolished the agency and nationalized the New Nigerian 
(jointly owned by the northern states) in an attempt to create a more conducive basis 
for national integration.21 Despite its nationalization, the New Nigerian still 
champions northern interests albeit within the wider context of national unity. Under 
Shagari, in 1982, Kaduna Polytechnic, jointly owned by the northern states, introduced 
new fees discriminating against southerners 22 Under the corrective military regime 
of Muhammadu Buhari representatives of northern states met regularly to discuss 
matters of northern interest23 These meetings were subsequently stopped by the 
government after complaints that they were inimical to national unity.24 The idea of 
the north as one solidary unit is still maintained through newspaper and magazine 
campaigns. The Hotline magazine was established in 1985 to articulate and promote 
northern view points on national issues. One of its editorials defended its ethno- 
regional stance thus:
We see no need to dismantle our solidarity or weaken our power base. 
Effective compromise or collaboration is based on positions of strength.
And we must be strong to participate in meeting the challenge of a 
viable one Nigeria We therefore disclaim the attempt... to dismantle
21 Elaigwu, The  Military and State Building: Federal-State Relations in Nigeria’s ‘Military 
Federalism’ 1966-1976", op. cit., p. 180.
22 E. Osaghae, "Do Ethnic Minorities Still Exist?" in Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative 
Politics, Vol. XXIV, no 2, July, 1986, p. 164.
23 Ibidem, p. 162.
24 States in the old Western and Eastern Regions also held similar meetings.
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Northern solidarities and create the impression of disunity to facilitate 
dubious Southern incursions into Northern political strong holds.25
The continued use of former geo-regional formations, and the reference to the north 
as a corporate group with common interests that had to be championed, attest to the 
inability of many Nigerians to transcend parochial loyalties.
It is important to point out that northern solidarity is only a euphemism for 
Islamic solidarity. Non-Muslims in the region have been politically insignificant, being 
used by the muslim ruling group as mere pawns. There has never been a solidary 
north. The minorities within the north have always opposed the Hausa /Fulani rulers 
as evidenced by the Tiv rebellions between 1960 and 64. Although the term south is 
used to refer to the area south of the old Northern Region, it is not meant to convey 
a solidary region. It is only a short hand term for the old Western and Eastern 
Regions. Because of the rivalry between the elites of the two large ethnic groups that 
respectively occupy these two regions - Yoruba and Igbo - the south has never been 
united. This has facilitated the situation in which the Hausa/Fulani has been able to 
monopolize power.
HAUSA/FULANI MONOPOLY OF POWER
The Hausa/Fulani have continued to monopolize power in Nigeria despite the 
creation of more states. Of the eight executive heads of state that Nigeria has had 
since independence, six of them have come from the north and two from the south. 
Of the six from the north, four are Hausa/Fulani, one is a Muslim from Minna (Niger
25 Hotline, Kaduna, April, 1987, pp. 6-7.
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State). The sixth, Gowon, an Angas man and a Christian, was chosen by the 
Hausa/Fulani coup plotters in 1966 to succeed the Igbo military leader whom they 
assassinated. The only Yoruba, Obasanjo, is believed to have held power due to  the 
magnanimity of the majority of northern military officer corps’.26
TABLE 4
Ethnic Origins of Nigeria’s Heads of State
President Ethnicitv Reaion Yrs. in office
Balewa Fulani North 6 years
Aguiyi-lronsi Igbo East 6 months
Gowon Angas North 9 years
Murtala Fulani North 13 months
Obasanjo Yoruba West 4 years
Shagari Fulani North 4 years
Buhari Fulani North 19 months
Babangida Minna (Muslim) North 7 years
The Hausa/Fulani control of power in the First Republic derived from the 
group’s control of the NPC, the governing party in the Northern Region. Together with 
the Hausa/Fulani were several other groups such as the Kanuri, Tiv, Idoma, Angas, 
Jukun, Nupe and Igala that occupied the region. Thus, Hausa/Fulani control of the 
centre could not have been without the support of some of these groups despite its 
majority status in the region. However, the electoral system and the federal structure 
in the First Republic facilitated the repression and coercion of minority groups within 
the region. In contrast, the new federal structure facilitates the expression of northern 
heterogeneity more accurately than the previous regional structure had permitted. The 
minority groups in the north have separate states of their own now. As Table 6 shows, 
the Hausa/Fulani dominate in four of the 19 states: Sokoto, Kano, Bauchi and Katsina. 
They control traditional power in the new Kaduna State although they are numerically
26 A.M. Mainasara, "Obasanjo’s Northern Phobia", Hotline, Kaduna, March 31, 1987, p. 22.
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in the minority. In the new 30-state structure, Kebbi State carved out of Sokoto State 
gives them control of five states.27 The degree to which the Hausa/Fulani can 
control Nigeria through a democratically elected government still depends on 
cooperation from other areas. In the Second Republic their attempt to maintain power 
by rallying the old north failed. Northern minority states exercised their new influence 
by voting against the Hausa/Fulani-dominated NPN. The group however captured 
power at the centre with others across Nigeria, particularly the eastern minority states, 
as junior partners. Thus, the creation of states has not solved the problem of 
Hausa/Fulani domination of the central government. It has, however, reduced the 
overall power of the Hausa/Fulani, so that it is no longer plausible for them to think of
O Q
dominating the whole country.
The new system acted as a kind of electoral reform. It replaced the former 
winner-take-all formula, which gave unlimited power to the largest regional party and 
the largest ethnic group supporting the party, with a kind of proportional 
representation29 Thus, although the ruling party had a core support in the 
Hausa/Fulani areas in the Second Republic, it could not use the resources of the 
federal state to the exclusive benefit of those areas as it did in the First Republic. The 
support it enjoyed outside the Hausa/Fulani areas would have eroded. That extra- 
regional support was more important than it was for the predecessor NPC in the First 
Republic.30 Although there are still threats from the Muslim north to dominate
27 The Yoruba and Igbo control five and four states respectively.
28 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985, p. 
612.
29 Ibidem, p. 612.
30 Ibidem, p. 638.
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Nigeria as a whole, this could be contained by the fear that if that leads to secession 
on the part of other regions the north would be left in a rather poor state. Furthermore, 
the Hausa/Fulani threat to dominate Nigeria is mitigated by the liberation of the 
numerous ethnic minority groups in the middle belt of the old Northern Region from 
their former Hausa/Fulani rulers. These ethnic groups whose identities were subsumed 
under the dominant Muslim Hausa/Fulani identity have now adopted an overarching 
Christian identity in their revolt against their former rulers. This competition between 
previous rulers and subjects is redrawing cultural boundaries in Nigeria. The final 
outcome of the contest no doubt has far reaching implications for the future of Nigeria 
as a nation.
TABLE 5
Ethnic Control of the 12-State Federation
STATE ETHNIC GROUPS CONTROL
Benue Plateau Tiv/ldoma/Angas/others minority
Kano Hausa/Fulani majority
Kwara Yoruba/lgbira/others majority
North Central Hausa/Fulani/others majority
North Eastern Kanuri/Fulani/Marghi/Mumuye/Chamba minority
North Western Hausa/Fulani/others majority
Mid-Western Edo/Urhobo/lgbo minority
Western Yoruba majority
Lagos Yoruba/others majority
East Central Igbo majority
Rivers Ijaw/lgbo/others minority
South Eastern Efik/lbibio/Anang/Ekoi minority
TABLE 6
Ethnic Control of the 21 -State Federation
STATE ETHNICITY % of POPULATION CONTROL
Benue Tiv 48.58 minority
Igala 23.15
Idoma 18.52
Plateau Angas 39.98 minority
Birom 11.11
Hausa 10.24
Fulani 6.97
others 25.68
Kano Hausa 69.24 majority
Fulani 25.00
others 5.76
Kaduna Hausa * minority
Fulani *
(non-Muslims) *
*Katsina Hausa * majority
Fulani *
others *
Niger Nupe 39.13 minority
Gwari 25.43
others 35.44
Kwara Yoruba 60.31 majority
Igbira 19.89
Nupe 7.69
others 12.11
Bauchi Fulani 40.11 majority
Hausa 24.55
others 35.34
Sokoto Hausa 82.72 majority
Fulani 12.31
others 4.97
Gongola Marghi 16.86 minority
Fulani 15.98
Mumuye 13.64
Chamba 10.27
others 43.25
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Borno Kanuri
Fulani
Marghi
Others
52.04
9.66
9.59
28.71
minority
Lagos Yoruba
others
76.18
23.18
majority
Ondo Yoruba
others
90.92
9.08
majority
Oyo Yoruba 98.92 majority
Ogun Yoruba 96.22 majority
Bendel Edo +
Urhobo
Igbo
Ijaw
others
60.88
24.16
9.00
5.96
minority
Anambra Igbo 97.15 majority
Imo Igbo 96.53 majority
Rivers Ijaw
Igbo
Ogoni
others
48.29
34.11
12.61
4.99
minority
Cross
River
Efik
Ekoi
lyalla
Anang
others
*
★
★
*
*
minority
*Akwa
Ibom
Ibibio
others
* minority31
31 Figures for FCT Abuja not available. Source: Adapted from Adejuyigbe, op. cit., p. 207.
*ln Kaduna State the southern Zaria peoples (the many minority non-Muslim groups south of the Zaria 
Emirate) are in the majority, while in Katsina State the Hausa form the majority. Katsina State was 
carved out Kaduna State whose population was as follows: Hausa 61.12, Fulani 18.82, and others 
20.00. These others form the majority in the new Kaduna State created in 1987. In Cross River there 
is no dominant majority whereas in Akwa Ibom the Ibibio are clearly dominant. Akwa Ibom was carved 
out of Cross River whose population before restructuring was as follows: Ibibio 76.78, Ekoi 12.33, and 
others 10.89.
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The dominant role and place of the Hausa/Fulani in Nigerian politics is a crucial 
issue for Nigerian nationalism.32 It is seen as the fundamental cause of instability 
in the country.33 The Yoruba-based newspaper, Nigerian Tribune, observed that it 
‘has resulted in unjust government policies about the share of the nation’s resources, 
unequal opportunity, injustices and inequities’.34 Headships of certain key ministries 
are reserved for members of the group and polls are rigged to ensure that the group 
maintains its monopoly on power35 In the Second Republic, many company owners 
in the south felt that unless they brought in northerners to their Boards they would 
have insurmountable difficulties in obtaining needed import licenses.36 Some 
southerners, particularly Igbos, have adopted Hausa names or Islam in order to ‘get 
on’. ‘In any ministry, or any where if you call yourself "Alhaji" you’re accepted, you’re 
welcome, the doors open’ 37 Such perceptions have provoked calls for a rotation of 
power to re-assure Nigerians that they belong to Nigeria’.38 As one report observed, 
the clamour for confederation by some groups should not be construed as a lack of 
love for Nigeria:
It is not necessarily for their love of little republics in every corner of the
32 Ikime, "Towards Understanding the National Question", op. cit., p. 35.
33 Editorial, Nigerian Tribune, Ibadan, Friday, February, 27, 1987, p. 9.
34 Ibidem, p. 9.
35 Ibidem, p. 9.
36 Ikime, op. cit., p. 41.
37 Interview with Brigadier Adekunle in Vanguard, Lagos, Wednesday, October 1, 1986, p. 6.
38 D.A. Ejoor, "A Philosophy Of Government for the Future", paper presented at the National 
Seminar on the National Question, at Abuja, August 4, 1986, p. 6.
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administration, and thus, it became further entrenched. As a result Hausa came to be 
widely spoken even in the non-Hausa areas of the region. It thus makes sense to refer 
to them as Hausa-Fulani but such reference does not imply a merger of both groups. 
They are each distinguishable. Those who control power are the Fulani.
DOMINATION BY ETHNIC MAJORITY GROUPS
The creation of states has mitigated minority fear of domination by the three 
major ethnic groups. It has given prominence to the uncommon ethnicity of the 
minority groups and granted their elites access to power. This has added to the 
legitimacy of the federal centre. The break-up of Nigeria would not be in the interests 
of the many minorities who have been able to negotiate political alliances to assert 
and pursue their interests. During the war, it was the minorities who contributed most 
to the win-the-war efforts.
The new federal structure has not, however, affected the possibility of the three 
groups being influential in the affairs of the country. Given the new criteria for the 
sharing of federated resources, viz. equality and population, they will still predominate. 
The three major ethnic groups form the majority in more than half of the total number 
of states. The total population of the three groups - Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo - by 
the 1963 census was 36,904,008, which is 66 percent of the total for the country.
The proliferation of states has, however, reduced the overall power of the 
majority groups. It is no longer plausible for them to think they can challenge the 
power of central government. In this fundamental sense the new federal structure has 
been beneficial to Nigerian unity. It has restored the authority and influence of the 
state which was weakened by the former formula in which the federal units controlled
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by the three major groups were more powerful than the centre. This means that 
secession is an unlikely option for ethnic pluralism in Nigeria. No group is now in a 
position to relegate the federal government to the background. Because the states are 
now dependent on the central government for their maintenance, they are more likely 
to combine in order to put more pressure on the federal government to allocate funds 
to them rather than to challenge its authority. Thus, the ‘Nigerian state has come to 
stay’ because of the new federal formula.44 Its authority and legitimacy is no longer 
in question 45 This is auspicious for nationalism.
Rivalry between-the three major groups is still intense despite the creation of 
states. This rivalry is, however, mitigated by two factors. One, some of the inter-ethnic 
conflict between the groups has been dispersed into more parochial forums by their 
division into smaller political units. The other factor is that the minorities hold the 
balance of power between the majority groups. The space created by majority rivalry 
has allowed the minorities to prosper. They have been able to exploit this space to 
negotiate political alliances to assert their economic and political interests. Their 
support is essential for any of the major groups to gain power at the centre. They 
exploited this factor to bargain for a share in the country’s top political offices during 
the Second Republic. For instance, they used the fact that they were the deciding 
factor in the NPN’s success in the 1979 elections to get the presidency of the senate. 
In return for their continued support, the NPN minority caucus of politicians wanted the 
development of minority areas, more Federal patronage for minority contractors, more
^ J . Isawa Elaigwu, "The Military and State Building: the Federal-State Relations in Nigeria’s 
‘Military Federalism’ 1966-1976", op. cit., p. 169
45 Ibidem, p. 169.
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distributorships, more investments in the minority areas and more commission agents. 
In short, they wanted economic power to rival, or even better, that of the majorities. 
Despite their enhanced position, the minorities still accuse the majorities of 
domination.46 Minority politics is thus not dissimilar to majority politics.
The issue of state creation is no longer a palliative for ethnic minority fear of 
domination. But, fear of domination remains the major justification for agitations for 
new states. For instance, the demand for an Anioma State from Bendel State in 1987 
was motivated by the ‘desire to counter oppression, denigration, denial of opportunities 
to develop, peripheralization and burgeoning monarchism’ 47 Burgeoning 
monarchism means political and cultural domination by the Bini (Edo) majority in the 
state. The movement for the creation of Delta State from Bendel State was marred by 
accusations of Urhobo domination by the Itsekiri group. A group speaking for the 
Itsekiris called for talks to agree on ‘an accord on non-domination anchored upon the 
permanent protection of the permanent interest of all the minorities in Delta State in 
general and the Itsekiris in particular viz: the inviolability of the person and title of the 
Olu of Warri’.48
The politics of state creation has added a new dimension to the categories of 
domination. In each state created there is now a new majority and minority groups 
which continue to agitate for the creation of even more states. Sometimes the concern 
is not a majority/minority one but ethnic incompatibility or environmental differences. 
In the Rivers State, which is itself a minority state, the division is between fresh water
46 See for instance Ken Saro-Wiwa, Nigeria: the Brink of Disaster, Lagos, Saros Publishers, 1991, 
p. 35.
47 National Concord, Lagos, Friday, August 21,1987, p. 16.
48 Advert entitled "Itsekiris and Delta State", Vanguard, Lagos, Thursday, August 13,1987, p. 14.
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and salt water areas. In Anambra, an all-lgbo state, it is north/south dichotomy. In 
Bendel State, despite the fact that the colonial provinces have been dismantled a long 
time ago, there is a dichotomy based on the former colonial Benin and Delta 
provinces.49 In the Second Republic accusations of ethnic domination and 
incompatibility were frequently used by the more homogeneous Igbo and Yoruba 
groups in their demands for more states. For instance, proponents of Ijebu State 
complained of being isolated and rejected by the other Yorubas. Proponents of Aba 
and Onitsha States (both Igbo groups) claimed that they had no cultural affinity binding 
them. The new federal framework has thus provided arenas in which intra-ethnic 
conflict can occur. This is good for conflict reduction at the all-Nigeria level. However, 
in view of the recurring demands for more states, a cynic might well wonder how much 
state creation is a project for national unity, a general project of the ruling elite, or a 
series of particularistic, special interest ploys for access to political power and its 
benefits.
As a strategy for unity, state creation has been based on the exploitation rather 
than amelioration of ethnic differences. The 1967 exercise was primarily intended to 
undermine the impending secession of the Eastern Region. Once the need for creating 
states in the east was established, states had to be created elsewhere.50 In spite 
of this limitation, the 1967 exercise effectively tackled the problem of the huge size of 
the Northern Region. It had the added advantage of promoting political stability as it 
granted both the north and south equal number of states. But, the 1976 exercise 
recreated the old imbalance. Igbo apologists condemned it as a conspiracy between
49 Ikime, op. cit., p. 41
50 Ibidem, p. 39.
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the Hausa/Fulani and the Yoruba against the Igbo.51 The 1987 exercise created two 
new states, one in the north and the other in the east. It was the Hausa/Fulani and the 
northern and eastern minorities that gained. Igbo apologists did not like it because it 
effectively made the Igbo a minority group in a Region where they were once 
dominant.52 The Igbo campaign for more states led to the creation of nine new 
states in 1991. This exercise favoured the Igbo who gained two new states. In 
addition, the capital of Delta State, comprising the Igbo on the west bank of the Niger, 
the Urhobo, the Itsekiri and the Ijaw, was sited in an Igbo town.
The recurring demands for states is understandable. Under the present 
arrangement for the allocation to individual states of about 90 percent of their revenue 
from federal resources, ownership of a state is seen as the greatest amenity an ethnic 
group can achieve. Moreover, since state creation offered the development of state 
capitals outside the traditional centres of development, the idea is reinforced that the 
creation of states leads to the development of growth centres. The election of the 
president is also a major consideration by both majority and minority groups in making 
demands for more states. The more states an ethnic group has the more likely it is to 
produce the president and thereby control the federal government. The constitution 
stipulates that the president elect must have at least one quarter of the votes cast in 
two-thirds of the states. These ethnocentric justifications for states can only mean that 
ethnicity is still a vigorous concept.
However, the fact that the groups are demanding more states within Nigeria can
51 F.J. Ellah, Nigeria and States Creation, Port Harcourt, Chief J.W. Ellah, Sons & Co., 1983, pp. 
76-77. See also Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria, London, Heinemann, 1983, p. 49.
52 Newswave, December, 14, 1988, p. 9.
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be taken to demonstrate a desire for a Nigerian nation-state. What is therefore seen 
by the ethnic groups to be at stake is equal access to the ‘national cake’. Ethnicity, as 
identity and as pragmatic pursuit of economic and political advantage, is therefore, in 
the context of state creation, the route to the political centre. In that way ethnicity 
largely contributes, albeit in an unintended manner, to the legitimacy of the federal 
political arena.
The proliferation of states has then, not undermined ethnicity. But it has 
provided Nigeria with a politics of conciliation. Although images of the old regional 
structure still remain firmly rooted in the minds of many Nigerians and accusations of 
majority domination are still rife, some of the ethnic conflict has been dispersed into 
more parochial forums. New arenas for intra-ethnic conflict to occur have been created 
by the division of the large ethnic states and the increase in the number of the 
constituent units of the federation. There are now incentives for political cooperation 
which were not there in the First Republic. Domination by one ethnic group is no 
longer plausible. Groups not well represented at the federal level have now more 
opportunities to participate in government through their state or local governments. 
This should enable disparities between the groups to reduce so that dissatisfaction can 
decline, thereby promoting nationalism. The more groups participate in the political 
centre, and the more effects that has on regional and communal interests and 
pursuits, the stronger will be the perception of Nigeria as an entity commanding loyalty 
from its people. The Nigerian experience thus provides evidence that political 
engineering can alter ethnic balances and alignments so that ethnicity, nationalism and 
nation-building are made more compatible.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
‘ETHNIC ARITHMETIC* IN NIGERIA 
Introduction
Fear of domination is characteristic of Nigerian ethnic behaviour. The majority 
ethnic groups fear being dominated by each other. The minority groups fear being 
dominated by the majority groups, especially those contiguous to them. Sub-groups 
and religious groups replicate these fears which increasingly become translated into 
resentment and discontent and subsequently protest and conflict. The salience of 
ethnicity for conflict in the country is, thus, conditioned by these fears. To deal with 
these fears, Nigeria adopted a policy of proportional representation and rewards for 
the ethnic groups. This idea of 'ethnic arithmetic’ is enshrined in the constitution as the 
Federal Character principle, henceforth referred to as FC. With this principle Nigerians, 
at least their leaders and representatives, recognize that national cohesion cannot 
occur without their coming to terms with the durability of ethnicity of one sort or 
another.
FC provides a scale against which political actions, decisions and motives are 
popularly assessed. It influences the formation of political parties and the election of 
the president, the allocation of senatorial seats in the congress, the appointment of 
federal ministers and state commissioners, the recruitment and promotion of personnel 
into the armed forces, the police, the bureaucracy and its agencies, the location of 
universities and other institutions of higher learning, admission into universities and 
federal government secondary schools, share-out of federated revenues, the siting of 
industries and economic ventures, and appointments to federal commissions, boards,
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and councils. Methods of applying the principle vary. It could take the form of either 
the quota system or positive discrimination.
In this chapter, I shall examine the policy in relation to specific issues which 
have tended to divide the groups. These are political parties and elections, admissions 
into federal government schools and universities, revenue allocation, ministerial and 
bureaucratic appointments.
FC AND POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS
Five political parties were registered by the Federal Electoral Commission 
(FEDECO) to participate in the 1979 elections. These were the National Party of 
Nigeria (NPN), the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Nigerian Peoples’ Party (NPP), 
the Peoples’ Redemption Party (PRP) and the Great Nigerian Peoples’ Party (GNPP). 
The parties were careful to balance their nominees for the presidency with deputies 
from regions other than that of the presidential candidate, even though this is not a 
constitutional requirement (see Table 1). For instance, the NPN nominated Shehu 
Shagari, a Fulani and a northerner from Sokoto State, with Dr. Alex Ekwueme, an Igbo 
from Anambra State, as his running mate. It is interesting that all the deputies are 
Igbo, except in the one instance where the presidential candidate is Igbo. The fact that 
the three important positions of power were shared by the NPN and the NPP on the 
basis of the old three-regional structure of the federation demonstrates that the bogey 
of the three regions still exists.
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TABLE 1
State and Ethnic Identity of Presidential Candidates, 
their Deputies and Party Chairmen
PARTY CANDIDATE STATE & ETHNIC ORIGIN
NPN Alhaji Shehu Shagari Sokoto Fulani
UPN Chief Obafemi Awolowo Ogun Yoruba
NPP Chief Nnamdi Azikiwe Anambra Igbo
PRP Alhaji Aminu Kano Kano Hausa/Fulani
GNPP Alhaji Ibrahim Waziri Borno Kanuri
PARTY DEPUTY STATE & ETHNIC ORIGIN
NPN Dr. Alex Ekwueme Anambra Igbo
UPN Chief Umeadi Anambra Igbo
NPP Dr. Ishaya Audu Kaduna Hausa
PRP Mr. Ikoku Imo Igbo
GNPP Dr. Nzeribe Imo Igbo
PARTY CHAIRMAN STATE & ETHNIC ORIGIN
NPN Chief Akinloye Oyo Yoruba
UPN Chief Obafemi Awolowo Ogun Yoruba
NPP Chief Akinfosile Ondo Yoruba
PRP Alhaji Aminu Kano Kano Hausa/Fulani
GNPP Alhaji Ibrahim Waziri Borno Kanuri
Some of the parties employed an informal ‘zoning’ arrangement to prevent any 
monopolisation of power within them by any single group. The NPN went a step 
further and entrenched its zoning policy in its constitution. It divided the country into 
four zones: the north, west, east and minorities. It further divided the zones into official 
spheres. The presidency, party secretaryship and some minor offices went to the 
northern zone. The posts of party chairman, legal adviser, treasurer and other minor 
offices went to the western zone. The eastern zone got the vice-presidency, deputy 
secretaryship and other minor offices while the minorities got the senate presidency 
and national assembly leadership. Rotation of official spheres between zones was to 
occur every four years at a general election. This rotational policy attracted most 
people to the party and consequently, it got the most national spread of votes.
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The 1979 presidential election was controversial. Shehu Shagari, who got the 
most votes, did not satisfy the other electoral requirement. He got a quarter of the 
votes in 12 of the 19 states, whereas two-thirds of the 19 states was popularly 
interpreted to mean 13 states. The presidency was eventually awarded to him after 
a series of litigation. In the 1983 election, Shagari won at least 25 percent of the votes 
in 16 states but some of the results were doubtful.
Analysis of the electoral pattern in 1979 shows that the attempt to reflect FC 
in politics helped to give politics a national orientation. For instance, the UPN, which 
was viewed by opponents as a purely ethnic Yoruba movement, was able to capture 
as many as 19 seats in Gongola State, 35 in Bendel State and 8 in Cross River State, 
all non-Yoruba states. The UPN did well enough to lose the presidential election to the 
NPN by only 4 percent. The success of the GNPP in the northern states of Borno and 
Gongola, and the serious challenge it posed to the NPN in Sokoto and Niger states, 
helped to puncture the image of the north as politically monolithic. The success of the 
PRP in two northern states, Kano and Kaduna, and the challenge in Sokoto and Niger 
by the GNPP, brought out forcefully the class conflict between the subject Hausa and 
their Fulani rulers.1 It is significant that the Hausa/Fulani votes were much more split 
with the NPN in the Second Republic than with the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) 
in the First Republic. This is partly the consequence of the new federal framework 
which allowed a more accurate expression of northern heterogeneity than the old 
regional structure permitted.
The system did not eliminate ethnic voting. For instance, in the presidential
1 Ibrahim Tahir, "Political Party Organisation", in Ukwu I. Ukwu (ed.), Federal Character and 
National Integration in Nigeria, Kuru, National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, 1987, p. 80.
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election, the party whose candidate was a member of the ethnic majority group in 
eight states, won overwhelming support of the voters. Only the NPN candidate, 
Shagari, had the lowest support from his home state, Sokoto, largely because of the 
quasi-class conflict between the subject Hausa and their Fulani rulers. Shagari is 
Fulani. The pattern in the gubernatorial election was almost the same as in the 
presidential election, except that the margin of ethnic support was a little lower. 
Elections into the House of Representatives in the states showed a definite 
relationship between ethnicity and voting. NPP support was almost one quarter lower 
than at the presidential election in the two Igbo states, Imo and Anambra. The NPN 
did not have a majority in Bauchi State House of Assembly, demonstrating the conflict 
between the Hausa/Fulani rulers and the ethnic minority groups within that state. In 
Sokoto, the support for the NPN was about the same as in the presidential election. 
In the Yoruba states the same strong support that was shown for the UPN during the 
presidential election was shown in both the state assembly and gubernatorial 
elections.2 Elections into the senate and the national assembly in Lagos also showed 
a definite relationship to ethnicity. This is to be expected as the members were elected 
on the basis of first-past-the post formula in constituencies that were largely ethnically 
homogeneous or had a majority or large plurality ethnic group.
There was continuity in the voting pattern of the minorities in the Second 
Republic. They voted for leaders outside of their old regions, just as they were inclined 
to do in the First Republic until they were coerced by the majority-ruled parties. 
However, because of the freedom granted them by the new federal system, they could
2 Oyeleye Oyediran, "Parties and Politics", in Ukwu I. Ukwu (ed.), Federal Character and National 
Integration in Nigeria, op. cit., p. 84.
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no longer be coerced since they now had bargaining power over the majorities. This 
allowed political expression of old resentments, in particular against Hausa/Fulani rule 
by the electorate in Plateau and Benue States, and against the Igbo by the eastern 
minorities in Rivers and Cross River States. Interestingly, the UPN won much more 
comprehensive Yoruba support than had the Action Group in the First Republic.
In general, the 1979-83 experiment produced mixed results. It produced a kind 
of democracy of the rich. Money determined who got nominated and elected into 
offices. These plutocratic abuses demonstrated that the system was inherently faulty.
The experiment was further handicapped by its newness. Politicians still thought 
they were working on the old parliamentary model. Some state governors tried to 
reduce the status of delegates to the National Assembly to that of state delegates in 
defence of parochial interests. In particular, the experiment was handicapped by 
parties’ assumptions that the election of their members meant the election of the party, 
and justified their control of representatives’ actions and opinions. Divisive tendencies 
were still strongly present. The striking continuities in the bases and leadership of the 
political parties to those of the First Republic suggest that a stronger force than 
constitutional regulations, that is ethnicity, has remained constant in the organisational 
imperative of mass politics in Nigeria.3 However, the small changes and shifts of 
groups in party support were of considerable national importance. They helped to take 
the bite off ethnic politics, removing the possibility of the parties re-aligning on the 
basis of a north/south dichotomy.
Electoral engineering did not go far enough. It only modified the ethnic bases
3 Lawrence P. Frank, "Ideological Competition in Nigeria: Urban Populism versus Elite Nationalism", 
in JMAS, 17, 3 (1979), p. 451.
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of the party system. The engineers went to work only on the election of the 
president.4 The presidential electoral formula required national support but elections 
into the national legislature did not require national support. Ethnic support was 
sufficient to elect delegates and thus the legislature in Lagos became a forum for the 
expression of ethnic demands rather than a forum for debate on national issues. The 
two national level elections thus pulled in two different directions: the presidential 
election towards nationalism and the national assemblies towards ethnicity.
The constitution framers aimed at producing national parties but they did not 
succeed. No national party emerged. Even the NPN which had the most national 
spread had too much of the old NPC in it. President Shagari got himself renominated 
without the primaries in a farce called a convention and with complete disregard for 
the party’s rotational policy. The proliferation of states made it possible for ethnic 
minority parties in the old north to control states in that region. This ensured the 
proliferation of ethnic based parties which is the opposite of the effect intended. Thus 
the two political innovations, the proliferation of states and the new political system 
pulled the electoral system in two opposite directions: one towards a multi-ethnic party 
system, the other towards ethnic parties. However, the experiment did succeed in 
something which was not intended, that is the preservation of the fluidity of ethnic 
parties against the danger of North/South divide.
The 1979 election was remarkable by Nigerian standards. It produced what 
seemed to be a satisfactory result for the operation of the new presidential system and 
offered encouragement to all parties that they could compete peacefully and benefit
4 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985, p. 
638.
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from the system. The results showed a tilt to the party with the most national spread. 
This entailed the breaking down of some of the old ethnic and regional blocks. All the 
parties and major ethnic groups enjoyed power through the election of governors in 
different states unlike in the First Republic where only the ruling party enjoyed power.
The 1983 elections was, however, different. The fundamental urge to power and 
the distrust it breeds propelled all parties to excesses and those with greater power 
made greater use of it. Politicians refused to play the game by the rules just like in the 
First Republic. Rigging and thuggery were the order. These abuses demonstrated that 
constitutional rationalism could not succeed without the necessary social foundations. 
Where parties and politicians are determined to win and retain power at all costs, no 
written constitution can protect democratic institutions. The return of the military three 
months after that election attests to the fact that constitutional reform and FC are not 
enough protection against problems caused by political parties and elections in 
Nigeria.
The conflict that plagues Nigerian politics is to a significant extent the product 
of the process of class formation.5 State power - control over government contracts, 
jobs, development projects, import licenses and so forth, and the coercive machinery 
to preserve that control - remains the primary locus of national wealth and the primary 
arena of class formation.6 ‘As a result, the premium on political power remains as 
high as ever and a desperate struggle to win control of state power ensues since this 
control means for all practical purposes being all powerful and owning everything.’7
5 Larry Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria, London, Macmillan, 1988, p. 326.
6 Ibidem, p. 327.
7 Ibidem, p. 327.
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FC IN EDUCATION: UNITY SCHOOLS
FC has caused the most controversy in education. The placement of school 
children in federal government secondary/grammar schools now known as Unity 
Schools has been a particularly delicate issue. The idea of establishing Unity Schools 
is to represent pupils from all the states of the federation in each college in order to 
promote unity. The schools are meant to foster Nigerian unity by bringing students 
from all the states of the federation, to live, learn and play together throughout the 
secondary school course, and to provide the type of education that will help develop 
in Nigerian youths a sense of unity and patriotism.
During the first civilian administration four unity secondary schools were 
established, one in each of the four regions. Lagos which was then the Federal Capital 
Territory, retained the two colleges - Kings and Queens - which were built by the 
colonial government. With the creation of states in 1967, the number of unity schools 
increased correspondingly to the new 12-state structure. At the time all the schools 
were co-educational, excluding Kings and Queens. The disparity between the 
enrolment of boys and girls was such that the military government decided to increase 
access to education for girls. In 1972 an all-girls college was established in each of 
the twelve states. With the subdivision of Nigeria into 19,21 and 30 states the number 
of these schools have also been increased.
In 1987 there were 41 unity schools, and 6,000 vacancies available for the year. 
The number of pupils that qualified for interview was 20,635.8 This number was 
subsequently increased to 24,000 following the decision of the Federal Ministry of 
Education headed by a northerner, to lower the cut-off mark for two northern states -
8 Daily Times, Lagos, Friday, August 21, 1987, p. 1.
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Bauchi and Borno.9 Parents from other states protested against this decision and 
standards were subsequently lowered for all the states by five percent. Table 2 shows 
the old and new cut-off points for the interviews.
TABLE 2
CUT-OFF MARKS FOR ADMISSION INTO UNITY SCHOOLS BY STATES
FORMER CUT-OFF MARKS
STATE REGION OLD NEW
Anambra East 310/306 305/301
Cross Rivers East 281/280 276/275
Gongola North 291/287 286/282
Imo East 312/309 307/304
Kaduna North 255/247 251/242
Kano i t 235/203 230/198
Kwara i i 295/289 290/284
Lagos West 306/303 301/298
Niger North 293/281 288/276
Ogun West 312/311 307/306
Ondo t i 305/300 300/295
Oyo n 314/309 309/304
Plateau North 261/256 256/245
Rivers East 265/263 260/258
Sokoto North 262/229 257/224
Abuja (FCT) i« 248/223 243/218
Bendel i i 330/315 315/301
Bauchi t i 321/313 316/313
Borno » 306/300 301/295
Benue i i 272/265 267/260
Source: Compiled from figures in Daily Times, Lagos, Friday, August 21,1987, pp. 1,
14
On the average, 1,200 pupils attended the interviews from each state. The 
admission formula was: 50 percent equal state quota, 35 percent area of location and
15 percent merit. The proportion for merit seems to have decreased by five percent 
since the Second Republic when it was 20 percent with 30 percent for area of location. 
This suggests that there has been a tilt towards area of location. The balance is
9 Ibidem, p. 1.
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therefore now heavily weighted in favour of place and circumstances of birth rather 
than on merit. This means that children with lower marks are given preference in 
admission policy whereas those with higher marks are discriminated against because 
they come from educationally advantaged areas. Issues such as this impose strain on 
unity.
One major problem is how to determine the state of origin of the children who 
take the entrance examinations. 'If Chukwuma, son of an Imo State father resident in 
Maiduguri, was born in Maiduguri and went to the same school with Jibril, also born 
in Maiduguri of Kanuri parents, and took the examination to a federal government 
college, does he receive the same treatment as Jibril or has he to score 75 percent 
to gain entry while Jibril can get it [sic] with 45 percent?’10
Another major problem is the effect on the children. ‘What is the impact on a 
12 year old Egba boy born in Kano who having scored 60 percent at an entrance 
examination, while his Kanawe school mate scored 45 percent, finds that he cannot 
gain admission while his friend can?11 At what point in his growing up process does 
the Kanawe friend realise that the key for success is hard work and excellence and 
not a given by birth?12 Unless issues like these are resolved FC is likely to have the 
opposite effect of entrenching disunity by inculcating in the young ones conflicts and 
frustration which prevent them from developing loyalty to Nigeria.
10 Obaro Ikime, "Towards Understanding the National Question", in Africa Events, April 1987, p.
41.
11 Ibidem, p. 41.
12 Ibidem, p. 41.
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FC IN EDUCATION: UNIVERSITIES
FC in university institutions is concerned with the equitable distribution of 
student admissions, academic, technical and administrative staff as well as location 
of universities. Until 1975, there were only six universities in Nigeria. These are the 
Universities of Ibadan, Nigeria (Nsukka), Ife, Lagos, Benin and the Ahmadu Bello 
University, Zaria. The universities at Ibadan, Nsukka and Zaria had satellite campuses 
respectively at Jos, Calabar, and Kano. These were up-graded in 1975 to autonomous 
universities. The federal government then acquired control over all the existing 
universities and further established four new universities at llorin, Maiduguri, Port- 
Harcourt and Sokoto. In the context of the 12-state structure, this increase satisfied 
the political aspect of FC but not its geographical aspect.13 The restructure of the 
federation into 19 states in 1976 re-opened the question of imbalance in the geo­
political spread of universities with seven states without their own universities. 
Advocates of FC turned this into a political issue and more federal universities were 
established. With the creation of more states in 1987, more universities were further 
established to satisfy FC and more are still being considered to reflect the new 30- 
state structure.
The result has been the ‘over-development’ of institutions of higher learning. By 
1985, there were 18 federal universities, six state universities and about 60 polytechnic 
and colleges of education. Total university enrolment soared to about 100,000 
students. Today, there are 21 federal, one military and nine state universities in the 
country. The federal universities at Calabar, Maiduguri, Kano and Sokoto were
13 Benoni Briggs, "The University System", in Ukwu I. Ukwu (ed.), Federal Character and National 
Integration in Nigeria, op. cit., p. 144.
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established to enable more people from these areas pursue higher education but 
those based at Port Harcourt, Jos, llorin, Owerri, Akure, Makurdi, Abeokuta, Bauchi, 
Minna and Yola were all established to satisfy the FC. The unintended consequences 
of this policy has been a reduction in student mobility, a general lowering of 
educational standards and a fall in student enrolment.
The application of FC in relation to geographical spread of universities is 
therefore problematic. It is wasteful and imposes strain on socio-economic planning. 
This is much more visible in relation to staffing and student enrolment. In the new 
universities, many science-based courses could not continue because of serious staff 
shortage. Student enrolment in these universities accordingly fell below the envisaged 
targets. Student enrolment would have been facilitated if available funds and staff had 
been fully utilised for the expansion of facilities in the older universities.14
Theoretically, the admission policy is to make university education accessible 
to as many people as need to benefit from higher education. This policy is to be 
balanced between the need for high-level manpower development, the need to 
maintain academic excellence and the need to reflect FC. The federal government 
directed the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB) to waive some of the 
academic requirements in favour of the educationally disadvantaged states to facilitate 
the reflection of FC in admissions.
In practice, a quota system in favour of locality is preferred. Each university 
tends to draw the bulk of its students from states in which they are based or states 
nearest to their location. For instance, in 1983/84,1,058 students from Anambra State 
were placed for first degree courses by JAMB into the University of Nigeria, Nsukka
14 C.C. Okoye, The Effective Utilisation of Manpower", in Ukwu I. Ukwu (ed.)f op. cit., p. 161.
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in Anambra. In the same year, 642 students from the neighbouring Imo State, also an 
Igbo State, were admitted while 114 students from Bendel State (with an Igbo minority) 
were admitted. In contrast, those states farthest from the location of the university had 
from only one to 28 students admitted. This pattern of admission is the norm for all the 
universities (see Tables 3 and 4). Thus the balance is, again, in favour of locality 
rather than equality of states. In addition, many states impose discriminatory fees for 
indigens and non-indigens.15 This has encouraged many non-indigens to bear false 
names in order to enjoy the benefits granted to indigens. In 1986 many non-indigens 
who bore false names in Sokoto State were caught when they sought to revert to their 
real names to register for their final examinations.16 In the Second Republic, non- 
indigens of UPN-controlled states of Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo and Bendel were 
precluded from enjoying the party’s free education programme. Such ethno-state 
practices promote ethnicity and ethnic xenophobia. The consequence is that it is now 
possible for some individuals to get all their education without having gone outside 
their states. This is the opposite of the effect intended.
15 Eghosa E. Osaghae, "The Problems of Citizenship in Nigeria", in Stephen Olugbemi (ed.)f 
Alternative Political Futures for Nigeria, Lagos, Nigerian Political Science Association, 1987, p. 73.
16 Ibidem, p. 73.
TABLE 3
University Piacements bv States for First Degree Courses bv JAMB 1983-1984
State A.B.U . F.U.T. 
Abeokuta
Bavero Benin Calabar Ibadan
Anambra 56 7 3 158 217 58
Bauchi 175 na 41 na na na
Bendel 88 24 4 1045 84 301
Benue 315 na 36 21 27 24
Borno 131 1 9 1 na 1
Cross 47 6 7 42 1083 72
Gongoia 237 na 10 1 na na
Imo 45 27 1 136 460 114
Kaduna 599 na 198 1 1 4
Kano 204 1 208 na na na
Kwara 360 4 20 11 4 148
Lagos 25 15 1 27 16 79
Niger 202 na 43 1 2 1
Ogun 43 77 na 32 11 329
Ondo 44 24 2 104 24 423
Oyo 51 43 2 63 20 237
Plateau 221 na 6 na na 1
Rivers 31 5 1 19 25 28
Sokoto 107 na 21 na na 2
Foreign 31 na 3 10 8 36
Total 3012 234 616 1672 1994 2357
State Jfe llorin Jos Laaos Maiduauri F.U.T.
Makid
Anambra 48 35 998 120 38 25
Bauchi 2 1 35 3 55 1
Bendel 155 38 61 245 12 17
Benue 7 44 210 18 27 65
Cross na na 6 7 150 na
Gongoia 40 30 75 37 13 12
Imo 1 5 32 1 110 2
Kaduna 57 38 62 132 18 22
Kano 1 2 22 na 20 6
Kwara 1 1 8 2 10 1
Lagos 29 493 34 83 13 4
Niger 127 48 16 338 5 4
Ogun 2 4 8 5 12 2
Ondo 306 85 12 465 11 13
Oyo 539 241 27 394 13 22
Plateau 2 2 194 2 14 4
Rivers 24 9 20 47 6 3
Sokoto 2 na 1 1 4 na
Foreign 16 3 10 31 11 6
Total 2,250 1,339 925 2,360 549 223
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State F.U.T
Owerri
P/Harcourt Sokoto U.N.N. Yola Total
Anambra 23 65 na 1,058 6 2,015
Bauchi na na na 1 na 312
Bendel 14 62 na 114 5 2,272
Borno 2 5 na 27 2 852
Cross na na na 2 na 308
Gongoia 12 56 na 67 3 1,615
Imo na 1 na 6 6 412
Kaduna 74 . 119 na 642 13 1,960
Kano na na na 1 na 855
Kwara na 1 na 4 na 441
Lagos 1 1 na 9 na 1,214
Niger na 4 na 7 na 712
Ogun na - na 2 na 284
Ondo 3 3 na 9 na 1,398
Oyo 5 8 na 28 1 1,899
Plateau 5 5 na 24 2 2,533
Rivers na 1 na 4 2 463
Sokoto 1 237 na 29 na 138
Foreign 1 3 na 15 na 184
Total 141 571 2,049 43 20,335
TABLE 4
Applications to JAMB for First Degree Courses 1984-1985
STATE A.B.U. AKURE ANAMBRA BAYERO BENIN CALABAR
Anambra 412 11 179 22 3417 1871
Bauchi 529 3 - 99 27 17
Bendel 542 40 3 32 15493 753
Benue 868 10 - 66 289 295
Borno 282 1 - 57 13 1
Cross 318 12 4 27 698 4590
Gongoia 518 2 1 24 23 5
Imo 490 19 65 19 3664 3701
Kaduna 1432 1 - 370 30 11
Kano 439 - - 453 19 4
Kwara 1257 13 - 84 344 53
Lagos 132 9 - 10 714 113
Niger 432 1 - 73 36 10
Ogun 247 40 4 12 1866 196
Ondo 302 96 1 13 2506 252
Oyo 385 58 - 21 1951 213
Plateau 709 2 - 27 31 27
Rivers 196 5 1 12 522 528
Sokoto 261 - - 33 12 2
Foreign 120 - - 7 68 41
Total 9866 323 258 1461 31723 12584
STATE IBADAN IFE ILORIN IMO JOS LAGOS
Anambra 402 1023 498 496 1994 878
Bauchi 24 125 24 - 214 17
Bendel 1162 2110 818 26 1013 745
Benue 168 172 220 - 1323 132
Borno 304 421 190 14 506 478
Cross 35 18 32 1 199 20
Gongoia 772 1629 643 5569 2201 1492
Imo 30 46 35 1 244 26
Kaduna 13 7 22 - 82 25
Kano 636 622 4026 2 490 533
Kwara 405 1558 660 8 311 2211
Lagos 31 17 66 - 148 20
Niger 1768 4445 1703 12 619 3387
Ogun 1500 4905 2268 4 508 2170
Ondo 3731 10305 3713 8 688 2987
Oyo 38 51 34 - 1011 14
Plateau 133. 371 139 23 161 258
Rivers 16 27 39 - 122 16
Sokoto 175 95 35 1 70 128
Foreign 175 95 35 1 7 47
Total 11365 27810 15184 6165 121782 15551
STATE MAIDUGURI MINNA P./H. SOKOTO U.N.N. TOTAL
Anambra 1093 9 1164 22 12823 26314
Bauchi 321 - 1 29 28 1358
Bendel 734 4 809 15 1890 26189
Benue 531 2 77 49 253 4355
Borno 668 - - 8 16 1180
Cross 361 3 549 27 764 9266
Gongoia 422 - 2 21 52 1375
Imo 1631 4 2083 14 9742 33738
Kaduna 160 1 4 135 45 2571
Kano 115 - 3 35 17 1234
Kwara 364 2 35 72 193 8728
Lagos 285 - 55 8 359 6838
Niger 122 5 8 122 27 1113
Ogun 546 2 81 13 893 15835
Ondo 391 - 88 8 877 15889
Oyo 481 1 83 22 947 25594
Plateau 217 - 12 24 57 2454
Rivers 283 1 4121 12 454 7370
Sokoto 181 5 - 279 14 1007
Foreign 47 1 19 7 85 899
Total 8953 40 9194 922 29536 193107
na: figures not available. Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Annual Abstract of 
Statistics 1986, pp. 97-98.
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FC AND REVENUE ALLOCATION
Revenue sharing has been the dominant method used to deal with the financial 
needs of the states. The issue of criteria for revenue allocation from the federated 
account to the states has been one of the most intractable in the Nigerian unity 
process. The Okigbo Commission established in 1980 was the eight in 35 years to try 
and devise a fair and national system. There have been a few more attempts since 
then. Until the mid-1960’s when the revenue from petroleum increased sharply, federal 
finance in Nigeria was predominantly perceived as a horizontal fiscal balance among 
the regional governments. The principle of derivation was elevated to the virtual 
exclusion of others which included balanced growth, population, and needs. This 
increased imbalances between regions. Besides, there was more money for the 
regional governments than for the federal government. Since the regions got the 
revenues derived from them as of statutory right, there was only a little revenue, 
largely from particular taxes, available to the federal government for sharing via the 
Distributable Pool Account (DPA). The principle of derivation therefore greatly helped 
to undermine the federal government and weaken its authority and influence.
The period from 1952 to 1956 demonstrated the serious negative implications 
of heavy reliance on derivation for national unity and stability. Regional interest 
overrode national interest. Each regional government accepted only those principles 
of revenue sharing which were most beneficial to itself. The governments of Northern 
and Western Regions favoured the principle of derivation from 1946 to after 1960, 
because groundnuts (from the North) and cocoa (from the West) were the dominant 
sources of export revenue. With the increase in petroleum revenues from 1958 and 
the realisation that there was little prospect of oil being found in these Regions, the
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two governments reversed their stance on derivation. When it became apparent that 
they wished to change the ‘rules of the game’ the Eastern Region moved toward 
secession.17
After the war, the military introduced the principle of equality for sharing 50 
percent of the federation account and 50 percent based on other criteria. The two oil 
states, Rivers and Bendel, received a disproportionately large share of the revenues 
on the basis of derivation and became the envy of the other states. The formula was 
then amended to 50 percent on the basis of equality and 50 percent on the basis of 
relative population of states.
The federal government acquired effective control of the off-share oil revenue 
by 1971. This removed the possibility that the major and fastest growing source of 
revenues might be allocated to states on the basis of derivation. By 1975 a revised 
revenue sharing system further reduced the importance of derivation. This was 
indicated by a few changes. For example, all revenue from import duties on motor fuel 
and tobacco was to go to the DPA instead of to the state where consumption 
occurred. All export duty revenue from produce, hides and skins was to go to the DPA 
instead of to the state of production. 80 percent of on-shore mining rents and royalties 
was to go to the DPA instead of the previous 50 percent. The share to the state of 
derivation was decreased from 45 percent to 20 percent.18 In addition all mining 
rents and royalties from off-share production were to go to the DPA rather than being 
exclusive to the federal government.19
17 Lawrence A. Rupley, "Revenue Sharing in the Nigerian Federation", in JMAS, 19, 2 (1981), p. 
261.
18 Ibidem, p. 266.
19 Ibidem, p. 266.
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The revenue sharing system adopted in 1979 relied relatively less on 
geographic derivation and more on equality of states. In October, 1979 after the 
resumption of civil rule, a Presidential Commission on Revenue allocation under the 
chairmanship of Dr. Pius Okigbo was appointed to consider revenue sharing criteria 
such as derivation, population, national coherence, even development, equitable 
distribution and equality of states. The commission recommended as follows for the 
share out of the DPA:
Derivation was therefore further decreased while equality and population were 
elevated. The federal government, however, makes sectoral allocations on the basis 
of 50 percent equality and 50 percent population among states.20
The decreased reliance on derivation since the 1970s is a desirable 
development for Nigerian unity. Heavy reliance on the principle has been an important 
cause of imbalances between state governments and between the state and federal 
governments. A revenue weak central government cannot effectively intervene to 
prevent instability and disintegration if its component parts are financially so strong that 
they can challenge its authority.
A major consequence of the new revenue allocation policy is that it emphasises 
cross-group interests. The biggest and poorest states favour a heavier emphasis on 
population and equality whereas the oil producers resent the reduction of their share
population
minimum responsibility 
primary-school enrolment 
revenue collected by state
40%
40%
15%
5%
20 J.l. Elaigwu, The Military and State Building: Federal-State Relations in Nigeria’s ‘Military 
Federalism’ 1966-1976", in Akinyemi et al., Readings in Federalism, Lagos, Nigerian Institute of 
International Affairs, 1979, p. 178.
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as a result of the de-emphasis on derivation. The oil states claim that federal funds 
are being used to develop other parts of the federation at their own expense and 
consequently demand that more states be created from them.21 The use of equality 
and population as bases for allocation has therefore created incentives for political 
actors to see a few all-Nigeria level issues in terms of competition among states rather 
than among ethnic groups. During the Second Republic, Governors of the five oil 
states, belonging to three rival political parties - two UPN, Two NPN, and one NPP - 
bridged the bitter political divisions between their parties to unite on a common 
position over revenue allocation. Together they took the NPN-controlled federal 
government to court over their share of the federated funds, demonstrating that the 
new Nigerian federal structure has the capacity to impose truly fresh sources of 
cleavage. However, the emphasis on population puts a strain on unity as it tends to 
make census taking a very sensitive and volatile issue.
FC AND CABINET APPOINTMENTS
Section 135 of the constitution enjoins the president to reflect FC in his 
ministerial appointments. To this effect he should appoint at least one minister from 
each state, who should be an indigen of such state. This is to eliminate the 
consequences of winner-take-all behaviour inherent in First Republican politics. The 
federal cabinet in 1965 comprised 13 ministers from the north and four from the 
south 22 Appendix IV-VII shows the distribution of ministerial appointments by state
21 See for instance, New Nigerian, Kaduna, Saturday, August 22,1987 p. 7, and also, "Statement 
by Concerned Indigens of the Proposed Anioma State", National Concord, Lagos, Friday August 21, 
1987, p. 16.
22 Concord Weekly, 28 January 1985, p. 8.
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and Region under three different regimes. The ethnic groups of the appointees are 
stated where known.
Analysis of ministerial appointments since independence show that certain 
ministries like defence and internal affairs have gone to northerners. To a lesser extent 
the ministry of trade and industry have also been the exclusive preserve of northerners 
except under Obasanjo when two Yoruba men from Kwara State held the portfolio. 
However, in the Second Republic when import licences became a crucial element of 
Nigeria’s economic activities no southerner held the trade portfolio.23 Southerners 
have also had their areas of monopoly. These are the ministries of justice, information 
and labour.
The pattern of distribution shows that sectors emphasized by the incumbent 
regime as key sectors tend to go to 'kinsmen' of the man in power. In short, heads of 
state have tended to put their own men in ministries where there is money to be 
‘chopped’. During the Obasanjo regime when the emphasis was on the new federal 
capital and agriculture, Operation Feed the Nation (OFN), both portfolios went to 
Yoruba men. Obasanjo’s appointment of a Yoruba man (from Lagos) as minister in­
charge of the Federal Capital Territory was resented by some northerners who saw 
it as a conspiracy against the north 24 During the Shagari era, in addition to defence 
and internal affairs, the key ministries of agriculture (Shagari’s Green Revolution) and 
the federal territory went to Hausa/Fulanis.
President Shagari in keeping with the constitution appointed at least one 
minister from each of the states. However, six states - Sokoto, Benue, Bauchi,
23 Obaro Ikime, "Towards Understanding the National Question", op. cit., p. 40.
24 A.M. Mainasara, "Obasanjo’s Northern Phobia", Hotline, Kaduna, No. 11, March 31,1987, p. 22.
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Kaduna, Rivers and Cross Rivers, - had three ministers each. Benue, Rivers and 
Cross Rivers were the minority states that enabled Shagari to win the presidency. 
Sokoto is Shagari’s home state. Bauchi and Kaduna states have core Fulani 
population. Ten other states had two ministers each and Plateau and Ondo states 
where he got the least number of votes had one minister each. In his second term in 
office, the size of the cabinet was smaller than in the first term and there was a more 
consistent attempt to reflect FC. However, key ministries were again reserved for 
kinsmen.
FC tends to be overlooked by the military. When they do apply it, it is at the 
pleasure of the man in power and his cronies. For instance in 1987 Babangida 
appointed key members of his cabinet from the Langtang Local Government of 
Plateau State. The population of Langtang is approximately 30,000. The prominence 
of such a minority group gave rise to their being described by the press as the 
‘Langtang Mafia’.25
Similarly, the appointment of state governors has depended on the pleasure of 
President Babangida rather than on FC. For instance, Benue State had six governors 
in four years of military rule. Five of them were appointed by Babangida. Yohanna 
Madaki, one of the five was in office for barely three weeks and Idris Garba for seven 
months. These exigencies of military rule ‘have the undesirable effect of helping to 
reinforce the collective belief that public office is a basket of ripe fruits’ and ‘every so 
often, new people must be allowed their presumed access to it’ 26
In general, appointments are manipulated so that members of one sectional
25 Newswatch, Lagos, January 22, 1990, p. 15.
26 Newswatch, August 8, 1988, p. 4.
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group occupy key posts. This is the case at both state and federal levels. For 
example, in Rivers State members of the majority Ijaw group occupied the posts of 
state governor, speaker of the state assembly, and chief justice, thus controlling all 
three branches of government.27 In Anambra State, the governor, the secretary to 
the government, and chairman of the civil service commission were all from the same 
village group.28 In 1987, at the federal ministry of education, the minister, the 
permanent secretary, the director of education, the chairman of national universities 
commission and the executive secretary of that commission were all northerners 
despite the principle of FC.29
There is no formula for checking on how equitable of ethnic origin state 
representation is at federal level. The federal authorities are content once it can be 
shown that there is some sort of state representation. The result is that within each 
state there are ethnic groups that are consistently alienated in federal appointments 
or else they are considered when the positions are peripheral to power. Conversely, 
some ethnic groups are consistently over-represented in powerful federal 
appointments. For instance, the Fulanis who are scattered all over the northern states 
seem to get a disproportionate share of these appointments.
The application of FC in positions of influence can, at best, only produce and 
perpetuate a segmental nationalism of the privileged classes. These classes alone 
stand to benefit from the policy which has been primarily used to balance the narrowly- 
defined interests of the various factions of the country’s elites. Besides, the policy
27 F.J. Ellah, Nigeria and States Creation, Port Harcourt, Chief J.W.EIIah, Sons & Co., 1983, p. 74.
28 James O. Ojiako, First Four Years of Nigeria’s Executive Presidency: Success or Failure, 
Onitsha, Africana Educational Publishers, 1983, pp. 59-61.
29 Ikime, op. cit., p. 40.
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tends to perpetuate the disconcerting image that those elites appointed to positions 
of power are there to represent their states or places of origin. The logic being that 
once they have secured access to power by FC they could only maintain that power 
by working to the benefit of the indigens of their state. In that way, it facilitates and 
entrenches elite manipulation of ethnicity. As a result, the elite remain divided on 
ethnic lines despite their common political and socio-economic interests.
FC AND THE CIVIL SERVICE
FC in the federal civil service entails the reservation of all new vacancies for 
some sectional groups which are under-represented in federal institutions. Officers in 
the service of under-represented states are then transferred to the vacant federal 
positions. These transfers are horizontal, that is from grade at state level to the 
equivalent federal level. The transfers occur at all grade levels but the optimum levels 
are the entry grade levels 08-09, and the training grade levels 12-13 for senior 
management. In the professional cadres FC entails the filling of available vacancies 
with people from under-represented areas. Furthermore, at least one permanent 
secretary must be appointed from each state. No one state or group of states should 
have a monopoly of the permanent secretary posts. Promotions to key administrative 
positions in the service, that is grade levels 15-17 are based on the pattern of 
distribution of staff by states. Merit is only considered when there are surplus positions 
after the interests of all the states have been satisfied.30
The application of FC in the federal service has been one of the most divisive 
issues in Nigeria. It has fostered disaffection at both group and individual levels.
30 Okoye, "The Effective Utilisation of Manpower", op. cit., p. 160.
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Persons who have lower qualifications, less experience, and less expertise have, 
because they come from areas regarded as deprived or disadvantaged areas, been 
appointed to positions in which they boss those with superior educational qualification 
and more experience. This breeds frustration in the better qualified. Transfers from 
states that are educationally disadvantaged is not only causing disaffection and 
resentment in the educationally advanced states but also in disadvantaged areas. 
Officers from the latter areas who rose through the normal procedure, but joined the 
federal service at the beginning of their career, become subordinated to their juniors 
who transferred or were seconded from their own states of origin. This tends to lend 
credence to claims that FC is promoting disunity, reverse domination and corruption. 
But such abuse of FC has been more at the state rather than at the federal level. For 
example, in 1979 the governor of Anambra State appointed 18 new permanent 
secretaries in addition to the existing 15. Fourteen of the new secretaries were from 
the more backward northern parts of the state. Most of them were young and 
inexperienced. The exercise was painful for the deputy permanent secretaries and 
other top senior civil servants who had served the state faithfully for many years.31 
It encouraged the overdevelopment of the state bureaucracy, exerting pressure on the 
already poor resources of the state.
The controversy overthe application of the FC in the federal service has divided 
the country into northerners and southerners. Northerners campaign for it while 
southerners campaign against it:
To those from the northern parts of the country (along with citizens of
31 Ojiako, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
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Rivers and Cross River States) federal character is synonymous with 
quota system and means therefore a proportional absorption into federal 
institutions and establishments. To those from the southern parts of the 
country, it means an attempt by the "North” to infiltrate into areas which 
they hitherto regarded as "theirs" by right.32
The major reason why southerners are against FC is that its application in the civil 
service would help the Hausa/Fulani to consolidate power by fusing bureaucratic and 
political power.33 There is presently a quasi kind of equity in the distribution and 
balance of political and bureaucratic power between the north and the south. There 
are more administrative officers from the southern states in the federal civil service 
than there are from the northern states. In so far as the three major ethnic groups are 
concerned, the Yoruba are the most represented followed by the Igbo. The Igbo lost 
their first position to the Yoruba as a result of the civil war. The least represented is 
the Hausa/Fulani group. The minority ethnic groups are more represented than the 
Hausa/Fulani.34 Thus the group that controls political power, and also benefits most 
from government allocation of resources is the least represented in the federal service. 
Northerners accuse southerners of deliberately keeping them away from the federal 
service.35 Southerners counter that it is inconceivable that they could keep 
northerners away without the anomaly being corrected given the northern bias of
32 Hotline, April 15, 1987, p. 13.
33 Bola Dauda, Federal Character and the Bureaucracy in Nigeria, Ph.D. Thesis, Liverpool, 
University of Liverpool, 1988, p. 365.
34 See appendix V for ethnic staffing of some federal corporations.
35 See for instance the New Nigerian, December 17,1984, p. 1.
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leadership at the Federal Public Service Commission and the central government. 
What is clear is that diminishing opportunities in the north has made the federal 
service attractive to northern graduates who in the past preferred employment with 
their state governments.36
FC in the federal civil service imposes strain on unity. It has introduced 
dysfunctional factors into the present discursive equation in the balance of power 
between the north and south. Southern domination of the bureaucracy is a form of 
insurance against northern control of political power. The removal of this insurance can 
lead to a negative reaction from the south.
The mixed reactions to FC demonstrate that political engineering may 
undermine ethnicity in some circumstances and exacerbate it in others. It tends to 
emphasise cross-group interests in some circumstances such as in party politics and 
elections, revenue allocation and even cabinet appointments while in school and 
university admissions and in federal service recruitment and promotions it tends to 
emphasise ethnic identities. There is a certain irony that the need to reflect FC in 
university intake of students and the appointment of teaching staff has made some of 
the universities less national and more particularistic than they were during the First 
Republic when two-thirds of them were statutorily non-federal institutions.37
FC has tended to increase corruption and chaos, both of which are already 
endemic in the society. It has been largely used to balance the narrowly-defined
36 Concord Weekly, 28 January, 1985, p. 8.
37 A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, "Ethnic Engineering and the ‘Federal Character1 of Nigeria: Boon of 
Contentment or Bone of Contention?", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, October 1983, p. 469.
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interests of the various factions of the country’s ruling elites. It is too expensive and 
puts a strain on Nigeria’s already impoverished economy. The full extension of the 
principle to all major national institutions would generate a greater threat to the 
efficacy, and hence, the stability of the federation.
However, FC promises the long term advantage of engendering national loyalty. 
Its explicit acknowledgement of the essentially plural nature of the country is an 
improvement on the practice during the 1960s. The covert application of the quota 
system by the Hausa/Fulani controlled government for the benefit of the group was a 
deep source of tension and frustration in the First Republic. The concept of FC is 
accepted by many Nigerians as good. It is only its method of application that is 
disputed. This is the dilemma for ethnic arithmetic in Nigeria: whether it can be applied 
without prejudice to the criteria of merit, justice, excellence and achievement, or 
without converting present historical disadvantages into permanent advantages. On 
the other hand, Nigeria cannot afford to meet the principles of equity and balance 
which is inherent in the logic of FC. This would mean putting lesser sectional loyalties 
above the greater loyalty to the nation. It is however curious that there is no official 
agency, such as an equal opportunities commission, to monitor the application of FC. 
The establishment of a similar organization would help to mitigate the negative effects 
of the policy.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SOCIAL ENGINEERING
Introduction
Socialization is generally regarded as the main key to nation-building. According 
to Gellner, it is the means by which state and culture are linked to bring about key 
traits of nationalism, that is homogeneity, literacy, anonymity.1 It consists of planned 
attempts to undermine local and sectional loyalties and replace them with an 
overriding sense of nationalism. This is achieved mainly through the educational 
system.
Socialization institutions in Nigeria have included both modem and traditional 
institutions. The federal government has used not only modern social institutions, such 
as the school system and the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), but also 
traditional institutions, notably traditional rulership. Although the Nigerian nation and 
its nationalist ideology are themselves eminently modem institutions, successive 
military heads of state have recognized the crucial role of ethnically-based rulership 
in constructing a national identity, describing such traditional rulers as ‘fathers of the 
nation’ or ‘highways to unity’. They have at the same time kept traditional rulers in line 
with redundant powers.2 Ethnicity has thus been utilized as a resource by military 
nation-builders to promote their ideological and political objectives. This is so even 
though a traditional ruler does not generally have jurisdiction over the whole of an 
ethnic group, his domain being merely a part of it. He is nevertheless often seen as
1 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 138.
2 The 1977 local government reforms effectively stripped them of any real power.
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holding a key position in matters concerning ethnicity.3 His position as king of his 
people is an approved one of brokerage between government and the people since 
it is sanctioned by government.
Nationalism in Nigeria appeals to this traditional feature of the society because 
the society is not yet a literate one. The vast majority of Nigerians including the literate 
are still traditional in their approach to life and believe in traditional leadership. The 
political and military elite that have ruled Nigeria know that if they get the allegiance 
of traditional rulers, Ihe fathers of their people’, they get the people.4 They therefore 
rationally use the institution to legitimate their rule. The military nation-builders, like the 
colonial administrators, have re-established traditional rulership in areas where it had 
disappeared and political, bureaucratic and military elites have been initiated into the 
institution by their assumption of chieftaincy titles from traditional rulers. The Nigerian 
experience thus controverts the functionalist claim that nation-building is inherently 
hostile to traditional culture. Such analyses retard the understanding of the 
transformative as well as legitimating potentials of tradition in the process of nation- 
building.
In the rest of this chapter, I shall concentrate on socialization through the 
educational system and the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), an institution 
established by government to foster nationalism.
3 Onigu Otite, Ethnic Pluralism and Ethnicity in Nigeria, Ibadan, Shaneson Limited, 1990, p. 130.
4 Saburi Biobaku, "Political Leadership and National Development: Traditional Leaders and their 
Contemporary Relevance", in Eniola O. Adeniyi and Sunday O. Titilola (eds.), Leadership and National 
Development: Proceedings of a National Conference, Ibadan, NISER, 1985, p. 20.
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SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
The federal government’s belief in the production of a homogeneous society 
through education is absolutely expressed in the Second and Third National 
Development Plans. The 1979 Constitution further underscored the idea, stipulating 
that the state should ensure that there are equal and adequate opportunities at all 
levels of education for all Nigerians. The idea that the provision of education for all 
would unify the country has its origins in the belief that the problem of disunity is partly 
the result of the educational imbalance between the north and the south.
This imbalance is a real problem for Nigeria. In 1975 students from three 
southern States viz, the West, Mid-West and East Central States, made up 65 percent 
of the total student body in the six federal universities then in existence.5 Western 
European education became rooted in southern Nigeria because the Christian 
missions were not initially allowed to operate in the Muslim areas. The British 
administration had pledged to the Fulani rulers that they would protect Islamic practice 
in those areas. By the time these areas were opened up to western influence the 
southerners were already ahead of their northern counterparts in education and 
technological progress.
The National Policy on Education (NPE) adopted in 1974 was the first 
comprehensive attempt to address the country’s educational problems.6 To promote 
unity, the policy advocated the provision of equal educational opportunities for all 
citizens at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels and the development of an
5 Sanya Onabamiro, "Education in Nigeria since Independence", in M.O. Kayode and Y.B. Usman 
(eds.), The Economic and Social Development of Nigeria: Proceedings of the National Conference on 
Nigeria since Independence, Vol. II, March, 1983, Zaria, Panel on Nigeria since Independence History 
Project, 1985, p. 221.
6 This policy was later reformulated in 1977 and revised in 1981.
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TABLE 1
NUMBER OF PRIMARY SCHOOL PUPILS BY STATE
STATE 19-80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85
ANAMBRA 983274 1005467 853452 838470 928738
BAUCHI 394703 370349 434153 326472 284120
BENDEL 878951 818975 859922 927708 878640
BENUE 881183 903213 975720 953568 441641
BORNO 388230 397451 404320 445999 444360
CR.RIVER 808825 835827 868484 872370 845745
GONGOLA 486943 521119 470198 518369 359552
IMO 1183000 854836 826584 793867 849703
KADUNA 1015177 1060196 1070459 1134475 1284548
KANO 1026430 1200342 1214920 752278 762593
KWARA 740247 591340 620907 865972 882864
LAGOS 522236 565190 570921 637778 650937
NIGER 419076 426167 450765 462034 460182
OGUN 353495 400522 426294 445168 359515
ONDO 628939 674128 691898 693997 567612
OYO 1463516 1877880 1971774 1070362 182525
PLATEAU 526039 600892 565020 524305 545502
RIVERS 495337 513731 585238 369363 320935
SOKOTO 564129 644657 684030 705777 717898
FCT ABUJA NA 23155 29462 45155 45155
TOTAL 13760030 14285437 14524523 14383487 13612765
Source: Federal Ministry of Education.10 NA: not available
The National Pledge of Loyalty was introduced along with the UPE. Children in 
primary and secondary schools were to make the pledge at the beginning and at the 
end of every school day and at every major assembly or congregation. Also the nation 
symbolized by the hoisted National Flag is to be saluted every morning by pupils in 
primary and secondary schools and the National Anthem sung at the same time.11 
It is difficult to assess the extent to which the recitation of the Pledge or the salute to
10 Annual Abstract of Statistics, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, 1986, p. 85.
11 See Appendix I for the National Pledge of Loyalty, the National Anthem and the National
Colours.
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building but it has only produced a minority of segmental national elites.
The UPE scheme has been plagued with immense logistical problems from its 
inception. These include the underestimation of enrollment and of financing, and the 
shortage of qualified teachers. Considering the country’s poor economic conditions, 
UPE is unlikely to be provided free and compulsory as was originally planned. In fact, 
by 1978 parents’ contribution to the scheme had become necessary because of the 
inability of government to meet the financial requirements involved. This belies the 
reference to it as free.
A major psychological problem for the scheme is how to change parental 
attitudes. Because rural people in the Muslim areas of the north regard western 
education as conversion to Christianity, they tend to hide their children from 
registration.13 A survey of parents in Niger State showed that over half of those 
interviewed favoured sending some of their children to school, while keeping some at 
home to help with everyday work and to ensure that the traditional way of life on the 
farm would continue.14 In both farming and trading communities sending a child to 
school was perceived as a loss of income. The children of the Bororoje, nomadic 
Fulani, also present a problem. Of the 150 Bororoje parents interviewed none had 
children at school.15 Many of them had not heard of the scheme and they wanted 
their children to be educated only in the traditional ways of nomadic life. Furthermore,
13 A. Mohammed, "The Problems that are facing UPE Scheme in Gumel Local Government", M.A. 
Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, 1979, cited in Marg Csapo, "Universal Primary education in 
Nigeria", op. cit., p. 101.
14 S. Abara, "Attitudes of Nigerian Parents Towards Western Education and U.P.E.: A Case Study 
of Gussoro", M.A. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1979, cited in Csapo, op. cit., p. 101.
15 C. Tabwassa, "A Survey of the Attitudes of the Nomadic Fulani Parents toward the Universal 
Primary Education Scheme in Song Local Government area in Gongola State", M.A. Thesis, Ahmadu 
Bello University, Zaria, 1977, cited in Csapo, op. cit., p. 101.
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education of females is perceived as a threat to traditional way of life and to Koranic 
teachings.16 UPE, without addressing these problems, is unlikely to reduce 
substantively the inequalities in educational advancement between the north and the 
south.
The scheme has, however, one major advantage for nation-building. It has 
made education accessible to a greater number of people. The fact, that depending 
on the region of the country, 60-95 percent of the children enrolled under the scheme 
came from families with no previous school experience makes children pioneers in the 
creation of a new Nigeria.17
At the secondary and tertiary levels of education, the NPE advocated the 
institution of student mobility schemes to promote better understanding among the 
ethnic groups. To achieve this, the idea of ‘unity schools’ were recommended. This 
entails the institution of student exchange programmes in state schools. In other 
words, a state would invite children from other states to attend its secondary schools. 
So far, only the federal government has established unity schools. If the idea is to be 
achieved, it has to be practiced at all levels of government from the community to the 
local government through the state government to the federal government level. It is 
not enough for the federal government to implement the policy while state 
governments which control the bulk of the educational institutions at the secondary 
level are left to their own devices. In 1978/79 school year, for example, the federal 
government owned 75 out of about 38,000 educational institutions in Nigeria. In the 
same year, out of a total enrollment of thirteen million Nigerian students only thirty two
16 Ibidem, p. 102.
17 Csapo, op. cit., p. 104.
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thousand were enrolled in federal institutions.18
At the university level, a number of tactics of socialization were designed. New 
universities were to be established in educationally backward areas to rectify the 
problem posed by the uneven development of educational institutions. To this effect 
the universities of Maiduguri, Calabar, Sokoto and Kano were established in 1975. 
New students were to be encouraged to go to universities outside of their home state. 
Admission procedure for students seeking to enter universities outside of their home 
state was to be made easier. This was to be made possible by the application of the 
federal character principle. However, the application of federal character in the location 
of new universities has had the opposite effect of reducing student mobility. All first- 
year undergraduates are required to take a course in the social organization, customs, 
culture, and history of the various peoples of Nigeria. In addition, graduates of 
institutions of higher learning are required to spend a compulsory year of national 
service in states other than their own to develop common ties among the youth and 
provide opportunities for them to learn about the needs and ways of life of Nigerians 
in other parts of the country. This requirement for national service embodies quite a 
pessimistic view of the effects of higher education or rather its non-effects.19 It 
suggests that the government does not entirely trust the university system to foster 
unity. However, as it is now increasingly possible for one to obtain all his formal 
education, even up to doctoral level, without leaving his state of origin (and thus 
without interacting with a large number of other Nigerians), the one year national
18 J.S. Attah, "National Education Policy", in Ukwu I. Ukwu (ed.), Federal Character and National 
Integration in Nigeria, Kuru, Nigeria, National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, 1987, p. 137.
19 Otwin Marenin, "National Service and National Consciousness in Nigeria", in JMAS, 17, 4,1979, 
P. 641.
service makes a major contribution to Nigerian unity.
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THE NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE CORPS (NYSC)
The National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) scheme is designed as a broker 
institution for nationalism.20 its major objectives are to endow Nigerian youths with 
a spirit of selfless service to the nation, to emphasize the spirit of oneness of all 
Nigerians, and to build a united and prosperous nation. At its inception in 1974 it 
included only those graduates of Nigerian universities under the age of thirty. It 
excluded the medically unfit, members of the armed forces and the police, and part- 
time students already in employment. Graduates of law, medicine, pharmacy and 
engineering and those recommended by their Vice-Chancellors could defer their 
service year for a maximum of three years. The scheme was expanded in 1976 to 
include the over 30s, graduates from the polytechnic and advanced teacher training 
colleges, and Nigerian graduates from overseas institutions. This resulted in a massive 
increase of enrollment from its initial 2,400 in 1974/75 to 6,107 in 1976/77. By 1984/85 
total enrollment was 42,530 (see Table 2 ).
20 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Official Gazette (Lagos), Decree No. 24 of May 23, 1973. See also 
Directorate Headquarters, Act and Amendments, NYSC, Lagos.
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TABLE 2
NYSC DEPLOYMENT OF CORPERS BY STATE AND SEX 
1976/77 1977/78 1978/79
STATE MALE/FEMALE MALE/FEMALE MALE/FEMALE
ANAMBRA 240 52 469 117 579 189
BAUCHI 198 35 353 37 486 81
BENDEL 324 92 616 103 768 216
BENUE 211 37 375 51 542 98
BORNO 217 24 377 42 484 94
CR. RIVER 274 25 466 82 558 160
GONGOLA 224 14 367 46 424 94
IMO 193 29 435 93 582 145
KADUNA 329 75 508 122 761 234
KANO 267 128 457 114 663 265
KWARA 309 68 532 135 735 187
LAGOS 502 168 686 230 1150 825
NIGER 201 33 431 70 473 107
OGUN 222 40 527 77 683 91
ONDO 219 48 490 110 717 116
OYO 312 108 596 201 819 296
PLATEAU 263 57 471 117 560 193
RIVERS 278 40 422 58 544 102
SOKOTO 220 31 366 65 506 106
TOTAL 5003 1104 8944 1870 12033 3599
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82
STATE MALE/FEMALE MALE/FEMALE MALE/FEMALE
ANAMBRA 731 226 893 316 971 375
BAUCHI 448 182 793 102 815 174
BENDEL 827 245 1035 345 1156 400
BENUE 682 153 817 175 734 182
BORNO 600 77 721 107 722 158
CR. RIVER 558 96 799 233 777 241
GONGOLA 561 64 604 98 655 118
IMO 832 169 865 184 846 312
KADUNA 854 339 945 404 947 232
KANO 1055 291 888 370 1119 232
KWARA 702 210 1145 354 1320 388
LAGOS 1529 619 1572 944 2275 1165
NIGER 537 113 772 98 710 248
OGUN 928 127 1011 194 1086 249
ONDO 769 155 1038 211 1133 286
OYO 1069 407 1562 504 1905 752
PLATEAU 717 137 708 304 1247 348
RIVERS 773 142 920 198 1228 281
SOKOTO 588 88 734 76 863 176
TOTAL 14789 3840 17822 5217 20509 6394
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1982/83 1983/84 1984/85
STATE MALE/FEMALE MALE/FEMALE MALE/FEMALE
ANAMBRA 1193 503 1803 589 1572 801
BAUCHI 1160 206 1471 289 1183 346
BENDEL 2043 1264 2421 1077 2117 1128
BENUE 1115 229 1520 340 1150 424
BORNO 960 193 1429 242 1094 282
CR. RIVER 1052 254 1335 353 1163 406
GONGOLA 902 146 1170 151 875 254
IMO 1093 424 1555 585 1845 749
KADUNA 1071 595 2061 858 1842 870
KANO 1409 307 1781 457 1807 548
KWARA 1994 621 2108 645 1793 703
LAGOS 3197 1708 2944 1750 2663 2068
NIGER 746 184 1145 294 861 268
OGUN 1371 326 1680 532 1461 527
ONDO 1457 329 1881 529 1533 591
OYO 2346 1022 2549 1171 2402 1317
PLATEAU 1301 339 1644 520 1520 514
RIVERS 1331 348 1487 443 1465 477
SOKOTO 817 91 1276 251 1027 277
ABUJA 416 85 458 149
TOTAL 27206 9089 33676 11161 29831 1269921
The organizational structure of the NYSC reflects the federal system. The 
national directorate is in charge of formulating general policies, collecting data from 
universities and colleges on the number of prospective graduates, potential deferments 
and exemptions. The state directorates administer and supervise the corps members. 
The states are supposed to be assigned an approximate equal number of participants. 
However, as Table 2 shows this is not strictly followed.
The scheme lasts for 12 months. Students in Nigerian institutions sign up early 
in their last year of study. Overseas graduates sign up on their return to Nigeria. 
Participants can express a preference for posting by job or location but the policy is 
that they are not to be sent to their home States except in extremely unusual
21 Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, 1986, p. 108.
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circumstances. Married women with children are posted near their families.
The programme starts with an orientation course of 5-6 weeks in the state of 
assignment. This course includes a schedule of early morning physical activities and 
military drills, followed by classes for about 3-4 hours. Later in the day, the participants 
attend seminars and other leisure activities. The orientation ends with a tour of the 
state during which they are shown local sights and hosted by local dignitaries and 
traditional rulers. After the tour they report for their primary duties. Usually about 70 
percent are assigned to teach in schools. A month into primary assignment, work is 
started on various community development projects to which the youth corpers have 
been assigned. These projects mainly involve manual labour, such as building bridges 
and culverts, abattoirs, hospitals, mosques and digging drainage ditches. They work 
side by side with members of the community who look upon them as a source of 
welcome free labour. This community work is done one day in the week until about 
two weeks to the end of their primary assignments. Until 1985, the community 
development work was not combined with the primary assignments. A period of about 
three weeks was devoted solely to community work in the spring. Each corper is 
expected to work on the NYSC commercial farms at least once. The idea of the 
commercial farm was introduced in 1986 by the Babangida administration to acquaint 
Corps members with the tools of agricultural management and entrepreneurship in 
order for them to be able to embark on viable self-employment projects at the end of 
their service’.22 They pass out of the scheme during a final 1-2 week period in camp 
in July/August when they are presented with certificates without which they cannot be
22 Bassey Ita (ed.)f Collected Speeches of the President, Major General Ibrahim B. Babangida, 
Lagos, Ministry of Information and Culture, 1986, p. 266.
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employed in Nigeria. Merit awards are given at both state and national levels as 
incentives to the corpers to work hard during the service period. Recipients of these 
awards are guaranteed employment with the federal government. In the present 
climate of high unemployment, this has no doubt helped the productivity level of the 
NYSC.
Impact on National Loyalty & Unity
Generally, assessments of the scheme have been positive about its contribution 
to national unity. According to the NYSC national directorate, its contribution to 
national unity is implicit in its principles and practice of deployment.23 Between 75 
and 83 percent of corps members are annually posted to states other than their home 
states to live and work for twelve months and thus they, and their friends and relatives 
who feel obliged to visit them during the service year, are given the opportunity to 
interact with Nigerians of other ethnic groups and learn about them at first hand. The 
scheme has therefore helped to reduce ethnic tensions and to eliminate stereotypical 
views about other peoples, regions and customs by enabling the participants to see 
parts of the country they might not otherwise have visited on their own and by giving 
them first hand knowledge about other groups as well as fostering inter-ethnic 
marriages among the youths.24
Many commentators support the directorate’s claims about the scheme’s 
contribution to national unity. For example, Margaret Peil observed that it has helped
23 NYSC, A Compendium of the NYSC Scheme: Ten Years of Service to the Nation, Lagos, Super 
Colour Productions for NYSC National Directorate, 1983?, p. 131.
24 Ibidem, pp. 131-132.
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to break down prejudice among the elites.25 Amaechi Nweze described it as the 
greatest achievement of the military, observing that it has promoted inter-ethnic 
marriages, led to the formation of friendships across ethnic boundaries, and to the 
appreciation of the affinities in ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversities in the country. 
He, however, concluded that the scheme was most successful at its initial stages, 
especially for government post-civil-war reconciliation and rehabilitation 
programmes.26 President Babangida described the scheme as the bedrock of 
Nigeria’s nation-building efforts, pointing out that it has promoted cordial relationship 
amongst Nigerians and helped to minimize the negative stereotype conception by the 
various communities about each other by bringing youths from diverse ethnic 
backgrounds together in states other than their own.27
These general assessments are further supported by the NYSC national 
directorate’s own surveys and research. An evaluation of the scheme at the end of its 
first year, showed that 30 percent of the members were ready to stay and work in the 
state where they had done their service, while for almost two-thirds this was their first 
visit to that particular state.28 According to the NYSC handbook for 1975/76, the 
orientation camps produced the following changes in attitudes: 83 percent of the 
participants appreciated more the culture and way of life of others, 68 percent 
understood better the problems of the state to which they were deployed, 58 percent
25 Peil M., Nigerian Politics: the People’s View, Cassells London, 1976, pp. 84-85.
26 Amaechi Nweze, "Higher Education Manpower Resources and Citizenship", in M.O. Kayode and 
Y.B. Usman (eds.), The Economic and Social Development of Nigeria, op. cit., p. 207.
27 Bassey Ita, Collected Speeches of the President, Major General Ibrahim B. Babangida, op. cit. 
p. 272.
28 Anthony Kirk-Greene and Douglas Rimmer, Nigeria since 1970: a Political and Economic Outline, 
London, Hodderand Stoughton, 1981, p. 53-54.
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agreed that all Nigerians were basically similar in several respects, 62 percent had 
never been to their state deployment before and for the East Central State, the figure 
was as high as 91 percent.29 An opinion survey conducted by the directorate in 1980 
showed that 80 to 85 percent of participants felt that the scheme gave them the 
opportunity to know other regions and peoples of the country.30 An average of 31 
percent strongly agreed, and 52 percent fairly agreed that the scheme positively 
influenced national understanding and integration. Only about 9 percent disagreed. 
Another 9 percent were indifferent. The survey of 1982/83 corps members indicated 
that 70 percent of them had developed more positive attitudes towards their host 
communities, 16 percent more negative attitudes while 14 percent reported no change 
in attitude either way.31
These figures are doubtful. They are based on loose sampling methods with no 
account taken of other factors that influence attitude change.32 For example the 
figures for self reliance and patriotism were based on 100 questionnaires sent by the 
national headquarters to each state with an average return rate of 30.6 percent for the 
Western areas and zero percent for Lagos state.33 Nor is it known who was sampled 
in each state, who answered the questionnaires and why the response rate differed 
so widely.
29 NYSC, National Youth Service Corps Handbook, Lagos, National Directorate, 1975-6, pp. 24-25.
30 Augustine Ikein, "Nigeria: Nation Building through the National Youth Service Corps", in Donald 
Eberly and Michael Sherraden (eds.), The Moral Equivalent of War?, a study of Non-Military Service 
in Nine Nations, New York, GreenWood Press, 1990, p. 107.
31 NYSC, A Compendium of the NYSC Scheme, op. cit., p. 131.
32 Marenin, "National Service and National Consciousness in Nigeria", op. cit., p. 640.
33 Ibidem, p. 640.
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An informal interview with eight graduates of the scheme in 1988 suggest that 
the expressed positive opinion by individuals, and the directorate’s own evaluations 
on the scheme’s effect on national loyalty and unity are too optimistic. Six of those 
interviewed thought that the NYSC was a waste of their time, a waste of government 
funds, and a means by which some Nigerians enrich themselves. According to them, 
corpers are under-utilized. Local officials do not trust them with anything worthwhile 
or important to do. Formally, they are on secondment. Their salaries are paid by the 
NYSC Directorate. They are not as directly under the supervision and disciplinary 
powers of heads and superiors as are the regular employees. Regular employees 
resent them and this causes friction and disaffection. One of my informants, Miss 
Ukachi Ekeh, from Imo State, claimed that she was persecuted at her primary 
assignment in Ogun State. According to Miss Eke her troubles started when she was 
assigned teaching as her primary assignment. By training, she is a lawyer and had 
never had any teaching experience. Neither was she given any sort of training by the 
NYSC to prepare her for the classroom. She was not a good teacher and the pupils 
laughed at her. The school principal treated her complaints with contempt. She asked 
for transfer and eventually was transferred to Lagos State. Abuse of corpers is as old 
as the scheme. In 1977, there was concern that corpers ‘who serve as tools in this 
medium of achieving national goal were ill treated and nicknamed horrible and 
unbearable appellations’.34 During my service year in Bomu State, some of my 
colleagues complained of being badly treated at their place of primary assignment but 
these were in the minority.
34 G. Omotola, "National Youth Slaves", in Daily Times, January 29,1977, cited in Marenin, op. cit., 
p. 639.
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Those interviewed wondered why the government spent so much money on 
them and the institution, if they were not to be utilized responsibly. Paradoxically, they 
all saw their under- utilization as advantageous because it allowed them time to 'do 
their own thing’. This perception of their under-utilization as both a waste of their time 
and a waste of government funds can be interpreted to mean a negative assessment 
of the contribution of the scheme to national unity. Yet, it also demonstrates the 
existence of some form of national loyalty. In one sense it suggests that they lack 
faith in their role as corpers to effect a change in attitude towards unity and loyalty. 
Yet, the concern for their under utilization and for government funds suggests some 
sort of public-mindedness. This cognitive dissonance is further compounded by their 
general acceptance of the scheme as some sort of guaranteed holiday.
Complaints about under utilization are not general. It is common only amongst 
those youth corpers assigned to ministries. This may be a reflection of the general 
level of efficiency at the civil service. Those deployed in health, legal aid and 
education (which has the largest number, about 70-80 percent), complain of being 
over worked. Their contributions to national development are the basis for the general 
positive evaluation of the scheme as an agency for manpower distribution since it 
supplies states with educated personnel they would not normally be able to attract.
My informants were split on the contact thesis of the scheme. Half of them 
thought that their knowledge of people from other ethnic groups had increased as a 
result of the scheme. The negative and indifferent attitudes of the other half is 
understandable. The group comprised those whose homes were in Lagos or who had 
gone to school in Lagos, which was their state of assignment. For this group there was 
no need to make new friends or contacts. This demonstrates that certain rules of the
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scheme are being subverted.
All of them thought that it was absurd to suggest that the scheme had 
increased their sense of loyalty to Nigeria in any form. The reaction to the question 
is quite interesting. There was a general pause and exchanges of looks of 
bewilderment followed by Miss Eke’s exclamation ‘Odiegwu’ meaning literally ‘it is 
fearful’ which made everyone laugh. Granted that this assessment is anecdotal, it is 
still indicative of the feelings of those whose attitudes are supposed to be changed. 
The interpretation of the scheme as a huge joke in so far as the attainment of national 
loyalty is concerned also presents an unresolved ambivalence towards the scheme. 
It may either suggest that the scheme is incapable of effecting a change of attitude 
towards national loyalty or that my informants are unaware of the need for a change 
in attitude or perhaps, the desirability of such a change. From their explanation the 
latter seemed to be the general opinion. They pointed out that they were not the ones 
who needed to be changed but the ‘big men’ who rule Nigeria. The story of Miss 
Marie-Therese Shotunde, a Yoruba, is both interesting and instructive on this issue. 
On her return to Nigeria from the United Kingdom where she was educated, she 
registered for the scheme and was deployed in Lagos State where she was born and 
bred. The person in charge of her posting was an old family friend who thought he 
was doing her a favour and posted her to the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. 
There again, another family friend was in charge. The friend reasoned that what she 
needed was a ‘holiday’ and assigned her to read newspapers in the institute’s library. 
She complained of boredom and was reassigned. At the new place, again, an old 
family friend was in charge. He ‘ordered’ her to go home and put her time to better 
use. She was not to bother to come to work but that her salary would be paid. After
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a few weeks at home doing nothing, she applied to be re-posted and was assigned 
to teach economics at a school. She enjoyed the teaching experience immensely 
because she felt she was at least serving some purpose. Before her experience of the 
NYSC, she had a favourable image of the scheme based on the experience of an 
older cousin who was a member of the first group of youth corpers enrolled in 
1974/75. She concluded that the entire NYSC experience conspired 1o put me off 
Nigeria for it opened my eyes to all sorts of atrocities’.35
The group observed that the only way in which it could have helped national 
unity is in the amelioration of unemployment among young graduates. They agreed 
that it assures new graduates of some form of employment. Since under-utilization 
was identified by them as a major obstacle in the achievement of the scheme’s 
objectives, it will be wrong to assume that employment here means being of service 
to the nation. It seems more of an evaluation motivated by personal calculation of 
material gain rather than of national service. This conclusion seems reasonable as 
they seemed to be more concerned with their remunerations which are quite generous 
considering the general poor economic climate. The monthly housekeeping money 
paid out to the corpers by the directorate has increased from 125 naira in 1974 
through 180 naira by 1978 to 250 naira in 1990. The employers to whom they are 
assigned pay them an additional sum that ranges from 30 naira a month in the 
ministries to up to about 300 naira in the Customs and Excise Department. Employers 
in the oil business, for example, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and 
Shell, give them added perks such as free lunches while others may give them free 
accommodation.
35 Interview with Miss M. F. Shotunde.
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The cognitive dissonance between service to nation and service to self may be 
understood properly in the broader context of the group image of Nigerian students 
of higher learning. They believe that they are the most nationalistic and yet the most 
oppressed group of the elite groups in Nigeria. It is therefore not they who need a 
lesson in national loyalty but the leaders. Ironically, under-utilized as my informants 
claimed to have been, they did not consider that their salaries were too high for the 
little work they did.
The scheme has considerably shifted some of its emphasis from the objective 
of producing ‘new Nigerians’ to that of providing manpower. This manpower is 
increasingly allocated to match the skills of the participants and to meet the needs of 
the nation.36 For instance, the expansion of the NYSC in 1976/77 to include holders 
of HND and NCE from the polytechnic and advanced teacher training college was to 
use the NYSC to operationalize the UPE.37 Several health centres, clinics and 
hospitals, notably those in rural areas, and particularly in areas with difficult terrain, 
would have been left unmanned and unattended except for the presence of youth 
corps doctors and other health personnel.38 In 1986 the NYSC community 
development scheme was overhauled in order to use the corpers ‘in the monitoring 
of Government projects at the local government level’ and 1o generate more 
employment opportunities by creating jobs at the grassroots’.39 Critics of the scheme 
argue that the conscription of graduates into the NYSC conceals much of graduate
36 Marenin, op. cit., p. 634.
37 New Nigerian, Kaduna, August 14,1976, p. 11.
38 President Babangida, "NYSC and National Integration" in Bassey Ita (ed.), Collected Speeches 
of the President, op. cit., p. 265.
39 Ibidem, p. 266.
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unemployment.40 They regard the perception of the NYSC as a source of 
employment in an environment of high graduate unemployment as a mark of false 
consciousness.41 According to my informants, the scheme is not a mask for 
unemployment. Rather, it serves as an ‘unofficial unemployment benefit scheme’. 
Owing to high levels of graduate unemployment, NYSC graduates who find 
themselves without work bribe officials at the national directorate to re-insert their 
names into the current service year. Thus, they are assured of some income while 
searching for a more permanent employment. In some cases, it is not for fear of 
unemployment but the fact that they feel that the NYSC offers better conditions than 
certain types of employment, for example teaching in remote areas. At the end of the 
orientation month youth corpers can collect up to 600 naira. This includes the 250 
naira monthly stipend, and the bicycle, housing and transport allowances. This is more 
than the 400 naira or so a month a first time graduate is likely to earn on level 08 step 
two, the salary grade at which he would start off in the civil service. After orientation, 
depending on where he is posted, he can earn more than this in a month. Besides, 
in full time employment, much will be expected of him by both family and society, 
whereas as a youth corper he is excused certain responsibilities. There are other 
perks that accompany being a corper not the least of which is the ‘employment of 
someone to double for you while you put your time to better use’.42 Miss Ekeh told 
me that three of her friends had paid people to stand in for them at the orientation 
camp so that the four of them could holiday abroad together. Also, during community
40 See for instance, Fide Osuntoku, "Expansion of University Education in Nigeria", in Kayode and 
Usman (eds.), op. cit. p 148.
41 Ibidem, p. 148.
42 Interview with Miss U. Ekeh.
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project period, some corpers use their daily allowance to employ outside labour to do 
their manual jobs for them. In its first year 1973/74 some corps members revealed that 
they spent part of their daily allowance on hiring labourers to carry out the community 
projects and just stood by while the labourers worked.43 Four of my informants did 
not do the compulsory farm work. Miss Ekeh claimed that for five naira (about 20 
pence), the farm inspector would let a corper register as having done his/her farm 
work.
There is need to treat with caution these anecdotal and impressionistic 
assessments from my discussion group. However, these views do not differ 
remarkably from those expressed in a survey of incoming and outgoing corpers in 
Kaduna State in 1976 by students of the Ahmadu Bello University Zaria.44 Marenin 
deduced three general observations from that survey. Firstly, the levels of national 
identification and public spiritedness were low, especially on questions of overcoming 
the elite-mass gap and of reducing cultural salience and stereotyping. Secondly, the 
NYSC seemed relatively ineffective as a vehicle for attitude change. Thirdly, the data 
showed considerable inconsistency in the attitudes of the respondents as regards their 
personal fates. Professed commitment to Nigeria, to serve the nation at the cost of 
personal gain, exists side by side with refusal of specific means such as slashing the 
incomes of the elite to which the participants belonged by virtue of their university 
education. He observed that the evaluation of specific aspects of the programme were 
negative, while evaluation of the effect of interaction was positive. The frequency of
43 National Youth Service Corps, "Report on the Post-Orientation Course, Service Year, 1973-74., 
p. 22 quoted in Marenin, op. cit. p. 636.
44 Marenin, op. cit., pp. 649-651.
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social contact showed a strong correlation with both general and specific evaluations 
of the programme. Orientation training was judged sufficient by three quarters of the 
respondents who experienced much contact and less than half who reported little 
interaction.
Another survey by Akinade Sanda of the University of Ibadan also supports the 
views expressed by my informants.45 He concluded that the programme was effective 
in accomplishing its goals to a very limited extent and that the changes in attitudes 
envisaged in the scheme were contingent on factors outside the scheme. Most of the 
youths under survey indicated that the idea that they needed to be instilled with 
discipline was absurd. It was rather the leaders of the nation that needed to be 
disciplined. They advocated economic, political and socio-cultural independence but 
very few of them were prepared to make the necessary sacrifice to achieve such 
autonomy. Most of them appreciated the opportunity provided by the scheme for new 
experiences and enhanced awareness of other groups and the country’s problems 
while at the same time condemning it for wasting their time by under-utilizing them. 
The greatest achievement of the scheme for national unity was in connection with 
increasing youth mobility, enhancing their national awareness and social interaction.
Theoretically, the scheme is based on the assumption that ethnicity is the result 
of cultural differences and historical animosities between the different ethnic groups. 
Implicit in this approach is the belief that ethnicity is the result of cultural isolation and 
distance of the groups and hence, conflict resolution is only possible if the groups can 
be brought into contact with other. It is much more the case that ethnicity is the result
45 A.O. Sanda, Problems and Prospects of the National Youth Sen/ice Corps in Nigeria, Ibadan, 
Academy Press for NISER, 1976, pp. 63-106.
148
of contact rather than cultural or geographical distance. It is in contact with other 
groups that groups find the need to define themselves. However, the temporary nature 
of the scheme mitigates this factor of situational ethnicity. Thus, the programme has 
the potential to facilitate increased national unity through increased interaction and 
redistribution of manpower. Increased interaction among peoples may reinforce ethnic 
distinctions, when it results in negative experiences. However, if interactions are 
perceived as friendly or cordial it goes without saying that the result will be positive 
and lead to the belief that cultural distinctions are not necessarily detrimental to 
national unity. Thus, it has the capacity to create favourable circumstances for mutual 
understanding and trust. However, the fact that only a limited number of Nigerian 
youths have the opportunity to experience the socialization afforded by the scheme 
limits the impact of the programme in promoting national unity. For the majority of 
other youths who are not polytechnic or university graduates and the masses of 
Nigerians, the functional consequences of NYSC do not apply.46
The scheme’s contributions to manpower redistribution is quite immense. This 
is especially so if considered within the context of the regional imbalances in 
educational and technological advancement which have tended to breed fear and 
insecurities of ‘domination by skills’ among northerners. The fact that both participants 
in the scheme and officials share positive, if divergent, perceptions of its manpower 
utility is auspicious for the programme’s achievement of its national goals. While corps 
members see the scheme as a source of employment, the government sees it as a 
source of ready labour to be mobilized for the needs of the state. The scheme today 
remains an important institution for redirecting and utilizing our abundant material
46 Ibidem, p. 83.
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resources towards better and positive nation-building’.47 This functional perception 
of the NYSC by both participants and government makes it a useful tool for national 
unity, that is, if national unity is defined as government need. In other words, the 
scheme’s potential for unity would be realized in so far as unity is systematically 
pursued as a ’need’ by government.
However, the goal of national unity has been pushed to the background. The 
programme is now a ready, if temporary, source of educated manpower rather than 
a year of service and learning to be a Nigerian. The considerable resources which are 
being invested in the NYSC in salaries alone, about 50 million naira in 1977/78, seem 
to require that the government must point to specific concrete and more substantial 
achievements rather than claim a harder-to-prove national consciousness and loyalty 
spirit.48 The general low commitment to service by participants and the corresponding 
poor organizational quality and supervision by NYSC officials suggest that national 
loyalty as an objective of the scheme is not considered a serious goal. Also, the 
enforced nature of the scheme renders it useless as a vehicle for inculcating national 
loyalty. It is perhaps not incorrect to draw the conclusion that the NYSC programme 
seems relatively ineffective as a vehicle for attitude change since attitudes remain 
governed by self interest rather than national interest, despite protestations to the 
contrary.
Despite its limitations, the scheme has come to stay. Many Nigerians regard it 
as a national edifice which can only be modified but not totally abrogated 49 It is for
47 Babangida, "NYSC and National Integration", op. cit. p. 265.
48 Marenin, op. cit., p. 634.
49 P.A.I. Obanya, "Growth and Development in Nigerian Education since Independence” in Kayode 
and Usman (eds.), op. cit., p. 195.
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CHAPTER SIX 
INDIGENIZATION AND MASS MOBILIZATION 
Introduction
One aspect of socialization in Nigeria involves mass campaigns to erode ethnic 
loyalties and to generate a popular sense of a homogenous national identity and 
interest. These campaigns aim to change attitudes and also bring about socio­
economic growth. Thus, nationalist ideology is conjured as the means through which 
attitudes are changed for the benefit of the society.
Until recently mass campaigns in Nigeria were optional. They were devised by 
individual regimes to legitimize their rule. However, they are now legally binding on 
both the government and the governed. Their nationalist aims have been incorporated 
into the revised 1989 Constitution in an entirely new civic section, which some 
members of the Constitution Review Committee (CRC) jokingly described as ‘a new 
Ten Commandments’. That section (24, Chapter Two) requires Nigerians to obey the 
constitution, respect the national flag, national anthem, and national pledge, to defend 
the country and render national service, live in harmony and unity, respect the religion 
of other citizens, pay tax, maintain law and order and ensure the good upbringing of 
the Nigerian child. The CRC recommended that the subject of civics, where these 
obligations are taught, be reintroduced in schools. By these provisions loyalty to the 
state is no longer voluntary; it is obligatory. Just as Nigerians demand their rights 
under the constitution the state also demands obligations, especially loyalty and 
service, from its citizens under the same constitution. In this sense, Nigerian 
nationalism fulfils the classical nationalist principle which implies the duty of Ruritarians
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to the state which encompasses and represents the Ruritarian nation.1
In this chapter I shall, firstly, discuss the efforts to Nigerianize the economy with 
particular reference to the indigenization policy. I shall then examine mass campaigns 
to ‘breed new Nigerians’. These include the Operation Feed the Nation (OFN), the 
Green Revolution, the War Against Indiscipline (WAI), the Mass Mobilization for Social 
Justice, Self Reliance and Economic Recovery (MAMSER), and the Better Life 
Programme for women. Such campaigns are the most concrete manifestation of 
governmental desire to imbue the citizenry with a sense of common purpose and, 
thereby, to secure popular legitimacy for the Nigerian state and for their own rule.
INDIGENIZATION: NIGERIA FOR NIGERIANS CAMPAIGN
Nigeria in 1960 attained political independence but not economic independence. 
Most of the businesses and economic enterprises were controlled by foreigners. By 
1970 the hold of multinational and foreign owned companies on the society was total.2 
Such a situation was not only damaging to Nigeria’s political independence, it 
conflicted with, ‘and indeed made a mockery of two dominant ideologies of the rulers - 
the ideology of nationalism and Nigerianization’.3 The 1970 National Development 
Plan decried the situation, observing that:
Political independence without economic independence is but an empty 
shell... the interest of foreign private investors cannot be expected to
1 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge, CUP, 1990, p. 9.
2 Akinade O. Sanda, The Challenge of Nigeria’s Indigenization, Ibadan, NISER, 1982, p. 16.
3 Ibidem, p. 17.
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and poultry farming. Control of capital intensive enterprises was to be shared between 
Nigerians and foreigners with a minimum of 40 percent control to Nigerians. The list 
of such enterprises included beer brewing, basic iron and steel manufacturing, internal 
air transport, insurance, paper conversion, construction and cement manufacturing. 
Because of fraudulent practices by multi-nationals and foreign owners of companies 
and their Nigerian collaborators, the decree was revised in 1977.
The new decree enlarged the list of enterprises reserved exclusively for 
Nigerians. Sixty percent equity control was granted to Nigerians in enterprises listed 
under a second category. The banking industry which was excluded in the old decree 
was included in this category. The government desired to have controlling interests in 
the three big banks - Barclays Bank, First Bank, and the United Bank for Africa. A third 
category, comprising thirty-nine enterprises, required a minimum of forty percent equity 
participation by Nigerians. These included distilleries, manufacturers of photographic 
and optical goods, electronics, rail equipment and clocks, and all other private sector 
enterprises not included in the first and second categories. A foreigner was to remain 
owner of an enterprise only if his company had an annual turn-over of not less than 
25, 000,000 naira, branches in at least half of the states of the federation, and sixty 
percent equity participation by Nigerians. No Nigerian was to hold more than 5 percent 
of the shares of a business.
Nigerians did not readily take advantage of the business and investment 
opportunities opened up by the decree. Most of them were uninformed about the 
details of the policy, its implications and the requirements for participation. The federal 
and state governments, in an effort to redeem the situation, bought shares on behalf 
of the people. This has facilitated the development of a Nigerian style state capitalism
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which serves as an effective instrument for privatizing public wealth.
Furthermore, very few Nigerians could afford to buy the shares. Credit and 
other financial facilities were not equally accessible to most of the interested 
applicants. The banks, including the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries which 
was established by government to provide loans to people to buy shares, would lend 
only to the already rich and top civil servants. This resulted in the concentration of 
wealth in a few individuals.6 Eight Nigerian families were reported to have bought 15 
percent of the companies indigenized.7
Foreign investors were unwilling to relinquish their control of the companies. 
They therefore exploited loopholes in the decree to undermine the campaign. For 
instance, the 60 percent shares allocated to Nigerians were distributed among 
thousands of shareholders. The remaining 40 percent foreign equity was held by a 
single foreign partner who thus had more control and power than any Nigerian 
director. By sponsoring the acquisition of shares by Nigerians, multi-nationals fortified 
their alliance with Nigerian capitalism and consequently their hold on the economy. 
Most of the affected companies did not comply with the indigenization provisions. Of 
the over 45,000 foreign owned businesses in the country only 2,450 were registered 
by the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board by 1985.®
Nigeria’s underdevelopment status was a major handicap to the exercise. 
Business conditions in the country were not developed enough for the indigenization
6 O. Teriba et al., "Some Aspects of Ownership and Control Structure of Business Enterprise in a 
Developing Economy: the Nigerian Case", Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 14, March 
1, 1974, pp. 3-26.
7 Newswatch, Lagos, October 5, 1987, p. 41.
8 Ibidem, p. 41.
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of the economy. Nigerians lacked both the technical and administrative expertise to 
sustain the operations of the indigenized enterprises. However, the transfer of 
administrative expertise has been less problematic than technology transfer which has 
proved a most intractable problem for less developed countries such as Nigeria.
The reversal of Nigeria’s economic fortunes further undermined the campaign. 
The global fall in oil prices in the 1980s plunged Nigeria into a recession from which 
it is still battling to recover. Under such a condition, the decree became an added 
disadvantage to the economy. It stifled the flow of much needed foreign investment. 
As a result, its provisions were greatly modified. Today, virtually no key industry is 
reserved exclusively for Nigerians. Foreigners are now actively being wooed to come 
to Nigeria and invest.
The greatest damage to the exercise was by Nigerians. For money they were 
willing to function as fronts for foreign owners of companies or to support them in 
other forms of circumventing the provisions of the decree. Self interest rather than 
national interest was the primary motivation. They were more interested in 
dispossessing foreign capitalists on whom they were dependent than in the idea of 
Nigerianization.9 Rich Nigerians used multiple applications and other devices to 
ensure that the pattern of share acquisition was uneven and thus subverted the goal 
of achieving an egalitarian society.10
Nevertheless, the indigenization decree was beneficial to nation-building in 
certain respects. It gave Nigerians the opportunity to take charge of their affairs. It
9 Gavin Williams, "Nigeria: the Neo-Colonial Political Economy", in Dennis L. Cohen and John 
Daniel (eds.), Political Economy of Africa, Essex, Longman, 1982, p. 49.
10 Sanda, op. cit., p. 68.
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sharpened the desire of many people to participate in the economic life of the nation 
as it made them aware of new economic opportunities, especially in the manufacturing 
sector.11 Because of the exercise, enterprises like road haulage, transportation and 
distribution are firmly in the hands of Nigerians. This is a radical departure from the 
period before indigenization when there were hardly any Nigerian controlled 
enterprises. However, the exercise did not emancipate the economy from foreign 
control, underscoring the fact that the success or failure of nationalism and nation- 
building is often determined by international relations and the structure of the 
international society.
The Nigerian experience provides evidence that economic opportunities matter 
more than attitudes. In other words, nationalism aimed at changing attitudes and 
behaviour in ways which will assist socio-economic development has only limited 
effects. The oil boom in the 1970s generated a popular awareness of being part of 
development and therefore, of being Nigerian. At the same time, it exacerbated 
Nigeria’s economic dependency, encouraging profligacy and frivolous spending. The 
government and people went on a spending spree abroad, confident that money was 
no problem. The Head of State, General Gowon, told reporters in 1974 that Nigeria’s 
problem was not money but how to spend it. Nigeria became a dumping ground for 
imported goods which were sold at exorbitant prices. It was more prestigious to buy 
foreign-made goods than to buy made-in-Nigeria goods. Locally manufactured goods 
were referred to in derogatory terms such as ’Igbo-made’, ‘Aba-made’, ‘Ijebu-made’,
11 Ibidem, p. 88.
158
and ‘Ochanja’ or ‘Ochanja-market-made’.12 Items that were so labelled were bought 
only as a last resort. Some Nigerian manufacturers employed desperate tactics, such 
as sticking bogus made-in-England labels on their goods, in orderto attract patronage. 
However, economic recession is changing the situation and promoting some sort of 
economic nationalism. Nigerians are being forced by poverty to patronize made-in- 
Nigeria goods where before such goods would have been derided as inferior. An 
opinion poll by a national daily showed that most Nigerians now buy Nigerian 
products.13 Majority of the respondents agreed that it was necessary to encourage 
local manufacturers and conserve foreign exchange. One respondent argued that the 
fact that people from other West African countries bought Nigerian goods ‘goes to 
show that we produce the best products in West Africa.’14 Another was incredulous 
about the rate of appreciation of Nigerian goods. ‘If I was told ten years ago that made 
in Nigeria goods would be competing favourably with foreign ones I would have 
doubted it’.15 There is now a new attitude of pride towards Nigerian food which is 
reflected in the inclusion of Nigerian food and cuisine in the art festivals and the trade 
fairs which were formerly dominated by western cuisine.
The greatest achievement in economic self-sufficiency has been made in 
textiles and dress making. The Nigerian adire (tie-and-dye) cloth has broken new 
grounds in the Nigerian fashion scene previously dominated by foreign materials and
12 A.F. Uduigwomen, "Philosophy, Ethics and National Development", in J.U. Obot, (ed.), Nigeria: 
the People and their Heritage, Calabar, Wusen Press, 1987, p. 165.
13 "People Talk: What do you Think about Made-in-Nigeria Goods?", in Vanguard, Lagos, Thursday, 
August 13, 1987, p. 5.
14 Ibidem, p. 5.
15 Ibidem, p. 5
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fashions. Today there is a booming market in adire and other native cloths. This has 
been particularly beneficial for women because of the access to cottage industries 
which it has given them.
MASS MOBILIZATION CAMPAIGNS 
Operation Feed the Nation (OFN)
The oil boom greatly undermined agricultural production. It made food 
production a wasted effort. Oil money brought in exotic foods - frozen food and meat, 
baked beans, canned salads, champagne etc.. These food items were cheaper and 
more prestigious than home-produced ones. Rice and bread, formerly secondary food 
items, became staples. Increased rural-urban migration worsened the food situation 
as those left behind in the rural areas could not meet the growing needs of the country 
for food. The government relied heavily on food imports to meet the food requirements 
of the country. It imported increasing quantities of a variety of food items, in particular 
rice and wheat flour for bread. Food importation reached an all time high in 1981. The 
stark reality in terms of food availability was that one out of every six Nigerian was ‘fed 
wholly year-in-year out on imported food’.16
The Obasanjo regime decided to reverse the trend and launched the Operation 
Feed the Nation (OFN) campaign.17 OFN was designed to bring home to Nigerians 
the dignity of labour through mass participation. In particular, it was to revive people’s 
interest in farming. Every Nigerian was urged to cultivate any available land and make
16 P.N.C. Okigbo, Essays in the Public Philosophy of Development, Vol. 1, Enugu, Fourth 
Dimension, 1987, pp. 162-163.
17 Speech by the Head of State at the formal launching of the OFN, in Federal Government of 
Nigeria, A March of Progress, Collected Speeches of His Excellency, General Olusegun Obasanjo, 
Lagos, Federal Ministry of Information, no date, p. 41.
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farming a vocation. Schools, colleges, universities and the armed forces were all urged 
to grow part, if not all, of their own food. Perhaps its more revolutionary objective was 
to encourage public officers, who had either been dismissed or retired in the great 
purge under Mohammed, to engage in agriculture. Apologists for the programme 
claimed that it achieved some increase in food production. However, it did not bring 
about self sufficiency in food or a change in attitudes as foreign goods continued to 
be preferred.
In 1980 the programme was re-named Green Revolution by the Shagari 
administration. Its aims were essentially the same as those of OFN. The two 
campaigns differed only in implementation. While the OFN discouraged massive 
importation of food (through prohibition of luxury consumer items like water, beer and 
champagne), the Green Revolution tended to encourage it. In 1978, for instance, 
Nigeria spent 1,0004.2 million naira to import food whereas in 1981, two years after 
OFN became Green Revolution, the import bill was in excess of two billion naira.18 
Such an increase in food importation contradicted the short term objective of the 
programme to turn the country side green with cash and food crops by 1985.19 The 
revolution failed with more than one billion naira in wasted funds. It succeeded only 
in enriching members of Shagari’s party.
The Babangida administration also launched its own campaign to grow more 
food. The catch phrase of the campaign was 'Grow what you eat and eat what you 
grow'. A major weapon used by the administration to achieve self-reliance in food 
production is prohibition. To compel local industries to use local substitutes for
18 Newswatch, Lagos, October 5, 1987, p. 12.
19 Ibidem, p. 12.
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imported raw materials, the President prohibited the importation of items such as rice, 
corn and maize, wheat, flour and barley.
The affected enterprises did not like the ban on imports because it was 
detrimental to their interests. They therefore initiated campaigns to undermine local 
production of the items. ‘Instead of growing and using our corn, poultry farmers 
launched a campaign saying that corn grown in Nigeria would poison our chicken!’20 
A similar campaign was launched against locally produced wheat and rice which were 
alleged to be detrimental to health. Uncle Ben’s rice from America was said to be 
preferable.21 These campaigns against locally produced foods were spearheaded by 
foreign interest groups, especially US citizens who owned large shares in Nigerian 
flour mills. The ban on wheat importation was most detrimental to US wheat farmers 
who in 1986 supplied over 90 percent of the wheat requirement of Nigeria. Aided by 
their government, they spared no expense to regain their coveted position. For 
instance, the Agricultural Attache at the American Embassy in Nigeria, Thomas 
Pomeroy, in March 1988 circulated information deriding Nigerian produced wheat. He 
claimed that ‘Nigeria, would be better off with the American hard wheat variety’ even 
though Nigerian millers complained that hard wheat was too hard on their 
machinery.22 This foreign opposition to programmes for national self-reliance in food 
production further underlines the impact of the international society on nationalism and 
nation-building.
20 A letter to Nigerians by the Information Minister, Tony Momoh, entitled "Nigeria: Yesterday, Today 
and Tomorrow," in The African Guardian, Lagos, May 9, 1988, p. 13.
21 Ibidem, p. 13.
22 The African Guardian, May 9,1988, p. 20.
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War Against Indiscipline (WAI)
WAI was instituted under the military regime of Muhammadu Buhari. The aim 
of WAI was to bring back sanity to the Nigerian society. The crusade was against all 
forms of social malady - corruption, ethnicity, degeneracy. It extolled the virtues of 
honesty, patriotism, nationalism, hard work, sanitation, queuing, family life and the 
good society. The campaign was planned in 35 phases. An average of three phases 
was to be launched each year. Its objectives were therefore conceived to be 
accomplished in 12 years. By August 27 1985 when the regime was toppled it had 
launched only five phases.
The first phase launched was aimed at instilling in Nigerians the queuing 
culture. People were exhorted to wait patiently for their turn whether at bus stops, post 
offices, football stadia, banks, airports etc.. The second phase launched in May 1984 
dealt with work ethics. The aim was to inculcate the conventions of hard work, 
punctuality and accountability. Any employee found not at work by 7:30 a.m. was 
summarily dismissed. Absenteeism and truancy were denounced. Many workers 
complied for fear of losing their jobs.
The third phase launched in August 1984 was to inculcate in Nigerians a spirit 
of nationalism and patriotism. Jingles were used to urge people to be patriotic and 
nationalistic. One of them was as follows:
Me, I like my country,
I like the land and people,
Everything dey for Nigeria,
Make you join hands to make Nigeria better,
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I like am, I like am
O Yes, who no like better thing?
Adverts on television and posters extolled the qualities of a good Nigerian. One 
television advert about Andrew, who decided to quit Nigeria for the United States, has 
promoted the popular use of the term Andrew to refer to an unpatriotic person. 
Another television advert featured a map of Nigeria full of cracks and falling apart on 
all sides with Nigerians of all ages and creeds hard at work to hold the pieces 
together. The caption underneath was, ‘We all have to strive to keep this country 
together again’.
Big and small enterprises were made to hoist the Nigerian flag outside their 
places of business. Job seekers were required to recite the national anthem and the 
national pledge as part of their interview. Those in employment were required to know 
and recite them when asked or they lost their jobs. Legal sanction for the campaign 
was provided by Decree No. 2 which conferred special powers on the Chief of Staff 
Supreme Military Headquarters to detain persons for acts prejudicial to state security.
The fourth phase was the anti-corruption and economic sabotage campaign 
launched in May 1985. Death penalties were imposed on a range of economic, violent 
and anti-social crimes which gave Nigeria a bad image both at home and abroad. 
Smuggling of Nigerian currency for sale abroad was regarded as sabotage. The 
Recovery of Public Property Decree No. 3 was promulgated to give the campaign legal 
sanction. The decree gave the Assets Investigation Panel the authority to probe into 
the assets of public officers. In the first few months of sitting more than 40 public 
executives in the Shagari regime were jailed for various charges of official corruption.
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Among them were ex-governors of Oyo, Ogun, Kano, Plateau, Imo, Anambra, Rivers, 
Bendel, Benue and Kwara States.
The fifth phase launched in July 1985 was the environmental sanitation phase. 
This campaign was aimed at stopping insanitary habits like spitting and urinating in 
public places, noise making, street trading, food hawking, random refuse disposal etc.. 
The cleanest state in the federation was awarded 1 million naira, the runner-up 
600,000, while the third got 400,000.
Many Nigerians liked the idea behind WAI. They expected that it would lead to 
the new Nigeria which the new regime had promised them after ousting the corrupt 
civilian regime of Shagari. However, it failed to live up to the hope which General 
Buhari had held out to the people in his maiden speech when, with patriotic zeal, he 
observed that this generation of Nigerians, and indeed, future generations have no 
other country than Nigeria’ and pledged to work with the people to salvage the 
country.23
The campaign was very wasteful. The environmental sanitation programme was 
particularly extravagant. Most state governments closed offices at noon to enable civil 
servants to clear refuse dumps and clean roads and drains. Millions of petty 
businesses were ruined as market stalls and homes were destroyed. The government 
acknowledged afterwards that many of the demolished houses, particularly in Lagos, 
were demolished in error24
The greatest indictment against WAI was that its manner of implementation 
was too authoritarian. It created public hostility and popular disquiet. People complied
23 Newswatch, September 9,1985, p. 26.
24 Ibidem, p. 24.
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out of fear rather than conviction. It gave the impression that one needed to police 
Nigerians crudely in order to mobilize them.25 The various decrees were seen as too 
coercive. Decree No. 4 which protected public officers aganst false accusation was 
seen as a denial of the fundamental right of individuals to freedom of expression. 
According to the decree, lectures, symposia, student rallies and meetings were 
subversive activities. Many journalists were imprisoned under the decree.26
The campaign for nationalism and patriotism was regarded by many Nigerians 
as a disguise for tyranny. The Nigerian Security Organization (NSO) which was the 
enforcing arm of the campaign was alleged to have been used by the head of the 
organization, Lawal Rafindadi, to deal with his perceived enemies.27
The programme was further criticized for discriminating in favour of some ethnic 
groups. One often cited example of discrimination is the decision to keep ex-President 
Shehu Shagari, a Fulani like Buhari, under house arrest while his deputy, Dr. Alex 
Ekwueme, an Igbo, was held in prison. Another popular example concerns the 
permanent secretary in the Federal Ministry of Finance, Alhaji Abubakar Alhaji. He lost 
several thousands of pounds of his personal money to thieves in Austria while on 
official trip in 1984. He could not explain how he came by the money. By law civil 
servants are not allowed to keep foreign accounts. Both Melford Okilo and Sam 
Mbakwe, ex-governors of Rivers and I mo States respectively, were jailed for a similar 
offence. The punitive measure against Abubakar Alhaji was a change of post from the 
Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of National Planning with a Nigerian National
25 Bassey Ita, Collected Speeches of the President, Major General Ibrahim B. Babangida, Lagos, 
Federal Ministry of Information and Culture, p. 53.
26 Newswatch, September 9, 1985, p. 22.
27 Ibidem, p. 13.
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Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) board membership to the bargain.28
Another example is the case of the 53 suitcases. During the currency exchange 
programme in 1984 tight security was mounted at all ports of entry into Nigeria. Any 
body found carrying the old currencies was arrested and detained under Decree no 
2. However, a retired ambassador, D.A. Waziri, and the Emir of Gwandu, both Fulani, 
brought in 53 suitcases popularly suspected of containing the illegal currencies. The 
53 suitcases were forcibly cleared without being checked. This was done in full view 
of everyone at the Murtala Mohammed Airport, Lagos. The soldier who organized the 
clearance was Major Jokolo, Buhari’s aide-de-camp.29 Such discriminatory practices 
‘drove wedges between the different sections of the community and led to 
impassioned calls for confederation, occasioned by a sense of alienation felt by certain 
sections of the country’.30
In a sense, WAI suggests that the masses are to blame for the indiscipline in 
the society. In other words, indiscipline is a problem only at the mass level; all is well 
at the top. What remains therefore to be achieved is mass nationalism since elite 
nationalism has already been achieved. Viewed like this, WAI was needless. Example 
rather than crude policing would have been the best teacher of discipline. However, 
indiscipline among the Nigerian leaders is more the problem rather than indiscipline 
among the masses.31 Mr. X’s testimony at the sitting of the Miscellaneous Offenses
28 Ibidem, p. 24.
29 Ibidem, p. 24.
30 Ibidem, p. 24.
31 See for instance, Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria, London, Heinemann, 1983, passim.
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Tribunal In Lagos in 1988 underscores this point.32 In his defence, Mr. X stated that 
he saw no reason for being brought before the tribunal for vandalizing and 
appropriating the property of the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), viz. 
electrical cables and wires. As a former employee of NEPA, he was bitter that the 
unlawful activities of those in senior positions within the company had gone 
unpunished. In particular, he was very aware of the fact that senior managers had 
over the years accepted bribes from contractors seeking mandates from NEPA by 
approving only those tender bids which had built into them a ‘mobilization fee’ 
representing a sum which ended up in the pockets of these senior officials. It was this 
type of activity which he felt had led to the deficit in NEPA’s accounts and to the 
redundancy policy that caused his unemployed status.
I found out in an interview with ten residents of a Lagos suburb, Isolo, that only 
one of them had actually paid an electricity bill within eight months in 1988. The 
general feeling was that since those in power were able to benefit from the national 
wealth by virtue of their indiscriminate theft from the treasury, the masses should also 
be able to share in the national wealth. They can only do this by enjoying basic 
amenities free of charge since not everyone is lucky enough to have a key to the 
treasury.
Mass Mobilization for Social Justice and Self Reliance 
and Economic Recovery (MAMSER)
MAMSER was launched by the Babangida administration in 1986. Its main 
objective is to develop a politically conscious and disciplined citizenry that would be
32 Proceedings of the Miscellaneous Offenses Tribunal, Lagos, 1988.
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proud to be Nigerian. Its ultimate aim is to inculcate in Nigerians a new set of 
attitudes, ideas and principles. MAMSER is therefore not different from WAI. The 
major difference has been in the manner of implementation. MAMSER’s major strategy 
has been awareness rallies. To attract crowds the directorate employs the services of 
musicians.
The organizational structure of MAMSER reflects the federal structure. Its 
programmes and strategies are devised by the federal directorate which is divided into 
specialist units. These are publicity, mass mobilization, mass education, mobilization 
of special groups (such as the elite, rural people, aged, youth, women and 
handicapped), engineering and technology, food and agriculture, and monitoring and 
evaluation. This means that some, if not all, its activities inevitably encroach upon 
policy areas controlled by conventional government departments. To underscore the 
importance of MAMSER and avoid resistance from conventional departments, 
MAMSER directorate was made a part of President Babangida’s office.
The programme’s first test was mobilizing people for the local government 
elections in December 1987. Mobile film units went from village to village preaching 
Ihe gospel of awareness’. Community leaders were made to address their peoples 
in local languages about their obligations and responsibilities. The chairman of the 
directorate, Jerry Gana, claims that the huge turn-out of voters for the local 
government elections was largely due to the programme’s awareness initiative.33
MAMSER, like WAI, has been criticized for being wasteful. Barely six months 
after its inception 20.5 million naira was spent on it. This is more than the 7.5 million 
naira spent by the Buhari regime on WAI in twice as much time. MAMSER is
33 Newswatch, February 15, 1988, p. 26.
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estimated to have spent one billion naira in two years and is projected to spend 
another 1.5 billion by 1S92.34 Yet Buhari’s WAI was considered wasteful by President 
Babangida.35 Critics of MAMSER argue that since economic recession has made 
most Nigerians ‘hungry’, money should be used, not to mobilize but, to feed them.36
MAMSER has also been criticised for being at variance with Nigeria’s capitalist 
ideology.37 The political Bureau, which recommended the setting up of MAMSER, 
conceived it as the political arm of a socialist state structure but the government 
rejected the idea of a socialist state and accepted the idea of mass mobilization. The 
fact that a majority of the people appointed to MAMSER’s National Directorate are 
self-professed socialists has encouraged the view that these appointments are a ploy 
by the president to pacify Nigerian socialists.38 A socialist member of the directorate, 
Dr. X, informed me that he and the other socialist members of the directorate saw 
their appointment as a step towards the formation of a national socialist organization 
to contest elections for the Third Republic scheduled for 1992/93.39
MAMSER, like its predecessors WAI and Shagari’s paper Ethical Revolution, 
has laudable objectives.40 However, its ability to deliver what it promises is in doubt. 
It is overloaded with diverse responsibilities. From its inception it has been charged
34 Newswatch, May 28,1990, p. 12.
35 Babangida’s Maiden Address, August 27, 1985, in Bassey Ita (ed.), Collected Speeches of the 
President, op. cit., p. 15.
36 Newswatch, February 15,1988, p. 26.
37 Ibidem, p. 25.
38 Opinion expressed by a participant at the seminar on MAMSER held at the Anthropology 
Department, University College, London, Friday, January 27, 1989.
39 Conversation with Dr. X, member of the National Directorate of MAMSER.
40 The Ethical Revolution under Shagari was only a revolution in intent. It was not operationalised.
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with pursuing no less than 16 different objectives. Decisions as to what objectives are 
to be pursued at a local level are quite arbitrary. Many Nigerians believe that it is one 
of those programmes invented by government functionaries to enrich themselves. 
Given the bad record of all similar programmes in the past - Obasanjo’s OFN, 
Shagari’s Green and Ethical Revolutions, Buhari’s WAI and the National Orientation 
Movement (NOM) of the incumbent administration - public cynicism and misgivings 
about it can hardly be regarded as misplaced.41 The objectives of government can 
best be served by spending the money wasted on these campaigns on the provision 
of social welfare programmes such as free education and health care. Such welfare 
programmes are more effective in instilling nationalism and patriotism because they 
help to redistribute wealth and thereby enable the majority of the people to enjoy the 
benefits of modernity. Nationalism and patriotism will not be inculcated simply by 
making people sing the national anthem or recite the national pledge. Neither can it 
be instilled by jingles on radio and television. True patriotism means a genuine 
commitment to the state. No one is going to be committed to a state that does not 
promote his interest and over-all well being42 A state can best do this by providing 
social welfare services such as free education, free health care delivery, adequate 
housing and alleviating poverty.
Women And Better Life
The Better Life programme was initiated in 1987 by Maryam Babangida, the
41 Newswatch, September 21, 1987, p. 20.
42 Obaro Ikime, In Search of Nigerians: Changing Patterns of Inter-Group Relations in an Evolving 
Nation State, Ibadan, Impact Publishers for the Historical Society of Nigeria, 1985, p. 32.
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wife of the incumbent president, its major objective is to emancipate rural women and 
incorporate them into national life. The initiative was planned to complement her 
husband’s national mobilization campaign. To achieve her objectives, she co-opted the 
wives of the state governors to preside over the programme at the state level. The 
programme was accorded official status by decree in 1989. The decree established 
the National Commission for Women as a corporate body with perpetual succession 
and enlarged the scope of Better Life to include both rural and urban women. Mrs 
Babangida was duly appointed chairperson of the commission with all the rights and 
privileges attached to that office.
The most important activity of Better Life is the formation of cooperative 
societies. Given the marginal position of Nigerian women in general, and rural women 
in particular, it is reasoned that women stand a better chance of enhancing their 
position and influencing policies if they were united in cooperatives rather than if they 
worked individually. Other Better Life activities include stimulating creative 
entrepreneurship in the field of home and cottage industries, formulating policies and 
programmes aimed at enhancing the socio-economic and political position of women, 
helping women to enhance their earning power through loan schemes and improved 
vocational training, particularly in arts and crafts, food processing and related trades.
The highlight of the programme is its annual fair in Lagos. It brings together 
representatives of women cooperatives from all over the country in order for them to 
get to know each other and share and exchange ideas on socio-economic 
development. It is mainly designed to act as a bridge for ethnic, religious cultural and 
class differences among Nigerian women. The fair also provides a forum for the 
display of the products and potentials of rural Nigeria. It lasts for one week. Each day
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of the week is marked by a group of States with displays of their culture, local 
products and food items. At the 1990 annual fair almost all the state governors were 
in Lagos to identify with the programme and participate in the celebration of their 
states’ days.
Many Nigerians regard the fair as a great boost for nation-building because of 
the opportunity it gives to people from different sectors of the society to interact. One 
report praised its non-discriminatory nature, pointing out that:
'Even Mama Ngozi from Mbaise in Imo State had a face to face contact 
with Mama Rasaki of Lagos State. The opportunity given to both rural 
and urban women to interact forgetting whatever differences that may 
exist between them is one of the finest aspect of the programme.43
In general, the programme has contributed to consciousness raising among 
women and improved their earning capacity. In particular, it has improved the living 
standards of rural dwellers. Women whose products were hitherto limited to their local 
communities have been given opportunities to have their products exhibited and sold 
to the different peoples of Nigeria. Through its adult literacy programmes, it has 
enabled many rural Hausa women to read and write, at least in Hausa.44 The 
programme is now considered a major instrument of government rural development 
project.
The programme was not always perceived favourably. When it first started, it
43 Daily Times, Friday, March 23, 1990, p. 28.
44 Newswatch, March 26, 1990, p. 10.
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was derided as a publicity exploit and a waste of public funds. Its critics argued that 
in initiating the programme Maryam was acting unconstitutionally. They claimed that 
her relationship with the president did not confer on her the right to operate such a 
programme. Some saw the programme as another avenue for officials to enrich 
themselves and as a confidence trick on rural people.45 Although many people now 
appreciate the programme, it still continues to attract criticisms, the major ones being 
that it is dominated by urban elites and that it is wasteful.
Despite these criticisms, most Nigerian women, especially rural women, value 
the programme. These women look up to Maryam Babangida as their messiah. Like 
Eva Peron of Argentina, she has maximized the opportunities offered by her position 
to simultaneously draw attention to herself and to the condition of Nigerian women by 
successfully selling the programme to the government. It is the first programme ever 
initiated on behalf of Nigerian women. In appreciation of her contribution to their 
welfare, some women wore outfits with her portrait printed on them at the 1990 Better 
Life Annual Fair and turned the popular gospel chorus, 'I have decided to follow Jesus’ 
into ‘I have decided to follow Maryam’.46
The programme’s major achievement has been to call attention to the key role 
of women in nation-building. Nigeria is a patriarchal society where women are seen 
more as objects of pleasure rather than as co-equals in national development. By 
underwriting it, the government acknowledges that women have a key role to play in 
nation-building. This is a radical departure from the previous practice which sought to 
undermine their role and contribution to national development.
45 Times International, Lagos, Monday, March 26, 1990, pp. 9-10.
46 Newswatch, March 26, 1990, p. 8.
174
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CULTURAL NATIONALISM
Introduction
Nigerian nation-builders recognize that if the national project is to survive it 
needs a cultural foundation. Nation-building in Nigeria has therefore involved cultural 
engineering. This is the deliberate creation of a national culture and heritage to 
underscore the new all-embracing Nigerian identity sought by the state. This project 
is a very ambitious one as Nigeria has a great diversity of cultures in terms of history, 
language, religion and folk art. The major concern of cultural nationalism has thus 
been how to synthesize the various cultures within Nigeria. The classical European 
nation-states were lucky. They had a core ethnic group culture to build upon.
Academics have been the most prominent contributors to the cultural project 
in Nigeria. They designed Nigeria’s cultural contribution to the Second World Black 
and African Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC). They have been in the forefront 
of the development of a large body of Nigerian literature some of which have been 
acclaimed internationally. Historians, archaeologists and anthropologists from the 
country’s universities have been working together on a state-sponsored project at 
Zaria to reconstruct the history of Nigeria. The Universities of Ibadan, Nsukka and Ife 
have established centres of African studies and Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and 
Lagos University have established centres to promote Nigerian art forms.
Three major approaches have been utilized to promote cultural nationalism in 
Nigeria. These are the indigenization of imported western and Islamic cultures, 
idealization of African culture, and nationalization of the various ethnic cultures. Thus
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nationalism in Nigeria has to be understood by aligning it not with self-consciously held 
political ideologies but with the large cultural systems that both preceded and gave rise 
to it.1 The Nigerian experience is an eminent example of how the myths, values, 
symbols and memories of distinctive ethnic cultures are appropriated to serve the 
purpose of nationalism.
The project of cultural engineering is generally problematic for multi-ethnic 
states. It exposes the fragility of such states by stressing the sacrifices and 
adjustments that the population at large has to make in order to produce the required 
changes. This is particularly true of language usage and religion. In Nigeria 
government policies in these two areas have upset some groups and created political 
tensions.
In this chapter, I shall examine cultural engineering in relation to language, 
history, literature, mass media and art festivals before conducting a more detailed 
examination of the federal state’s religious policy in Chapter Eight.
LANGUAGE
Statistical information on the use and spread of languages in Nigeria is scarce. 
David Dalby estimated that one fifth of Africa's 2000 odd languages are spoken in the 
country.2 Kier Hansford et al. listed about 400 languages spoken in Nigeria.3 Apart
1 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
London, Verso, 1983, p. 19.
2 David Dalby, "National Language Policy in the Context of Africa", in Ayo Bamgbose (ed.), 
Language in Education in Nigeria, (Vol. 2), Proceedings of the Kaduna Language Symposium, 
November, 1977, organised by The National Language Centre, published by Federal Ministry of 
Education, Lagos, 1980, p. 100.
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from the three major linguae francae (four if Pidgin is included) and English, it is 
estimated that ten other Nigerian languages have over a million speakers, while a 
further twenty four languages have more than a hundred thousand speakers.4 This 
leaves about three hundred and sixty languages with fewer than a hundred thousand 
speakers.
The country’s official language is English. This is a problem for nationalists. It 
is seen as shameful that the largest country in black Africa has adopted a western 
language rather than an indigenous African language as its official language. 
Nationalists argue that the spectre of imperialism will continue to haunt Nigeria unless 
the state discards English as its official language.5 But the choice of an indigenous 
language as a national language and lingua franca is a difficult one.
There is bitter disagreement over which Nigerian language should be adopted 
as the national tongue. Each time there has been a debate on which one should be 
chosen, those whose languages are not considered have reacted intensely. In 1961 
a motion was passed in Parliament to introduce the teaching of Hausa, Yoruba and 
Igbo with a view to adopting one of them by 1981. But it was not implemented 
because of the tension it generated. Many Nigerians feared that the hidden agenda 
was to elevate Hausa as the national language. An editorial opinion condemned the 
motion and warned that the parliament 'was asking more than the greatest nationalist
3 K. Hansford et al. (eds.) 1976, cited in Ben Elugbe, "Language Policy and National Development 
in Nigeria", (unpublished) paper presented at the Conference on African Languages, Development and 
the State, Centre of African Studies, University of London, SOAS, 25-26 April 1991, p. 1.
4 Jibril Munzali, "Minority Languages and Linguae Francas in Nigerian Education", in E.N. Emenanjo 
(ed.), Multilingualism, Minority Languages and Language Policy in Nigeria, Agbor, Central Books Ltd., 
1990, pp. 114-115.
5 Abfodun Raufu, "Burying the Language Issue", Daily Times, Lagos, August 20, 1987, p. 11.
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of them all can handle’.6
The issue was again raised at the Constituent Assembly in 1979. It was 
rejected in favour of the use of English as the only official language. Members of the 
assembly felt that a national language should first be introduced at school and not at 
the national assembly and that the provision for Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo discriminated 
against non-speakers of the three languages. The military government overruled the 
assembly’s decision, observing that the continued use of English alone was 
embarrassing for Nigeria.7 Consequently, it inserted into the constitution the provision 
that the three major languages and English be adopted as national languages. The 
four languages were to be used in the two national assemblies. In the state 
assemblies, English and any indigenous languages decided upon by the state 
assembly were to be used. Although, the constitution does not specify, it presumes 
that Nigerians should leam one or the other of the three major languages. One would 
have thought that the place to start encouraging the use of local languages (if that was 
the aim) would not be the national assembly but those institutions that the people use 
in the pursuit of their daily needs such as schools, offices and banks.8
Members of minority groups were angered by the constitutional provision. 
Professor Obaro Ikime from one of the minority groups argued that it implied that the
6 Daily Express, November 23, 1961, cited in Arien Amayo, T h e  Search for National Integration 
and National Identity in Nigeria since Independence: the Linguistic Aspect", in M.O. Kayode and Y.B. 
Usman (eds.), The Economic and Social Development of Nigeria: Proceedings of the National 
Conference on Nigeria since Independence, Zaria, March 1983, Volume II, Zaria, Panel on Nigeria 
since Independence Project, 1985, p. 311.
7 Ibidem, p. 314.
8 Ibidem, p. 315.
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minorities did not count in national politics?9 Another university lecturer, Eskor Toyo 
also from a minority group, condemned it as a ‘product of big-nationality arrogance 
and hegemonic rivalry’.10 The plan, however, never got beyond the WAZOBIA 
concept fabricated from the three major languages.11 Wazobia involves translating 
the national news on radio and television into Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo. National 
Television newscasters greet the viewers in the three major languages at the end of 
the news. This concept is still resented by minorities. Ken Saro-Wiwa, a writer from 
the minority Rivers State, observes:
Wazobianism sees Nigeria as a melting-pot which stands on three legs, 
Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo, with all minorities cooking and boiling away in 
it for the pleasures of the majority groups - the Wazobians. To the 
Wazobian, all is well with Nigeria when this pot sits pretty on its three 
legs. Should any of the three legs suffer some inconvenience, we have 
loud grumblings, metaphysical theories, dissonance in the spheres, even 
civil war.12
The real issue in the bitter disagreement over which language should enjoy the 
supreme status of being the national language is the fear of political and cultural
9 Obaro Ikime, "Towards Understanding the National Question", in Africa Events, April, 1987, p. 43.
10 EskorToyo, "National Language and Development", New Nigerian, Kaduna, Thursday, September 
18, 1986. p. 7.
11 See glossary of terms.
12 Ken Saro-Wiwa, Nigeria: the Brink of Disaster, Lagos, Saros International Publishers, 1991, p.
35.
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domination that is involved.13 The choice of a language other than one’s group 
language lowers the esteem of the group. The military government rejected the 
continued use of English as an official language for precisely the same reason - it 
lowers the esteem of the state. The link between the choice of an official national 
language and fear of political and cultural domination conveys a lot about ethnicity in 
Nigeria. In particular, it demonstrates that more is involved in Nigerian ethnicity than 
mere material considerations. It is group worth that is at stake and such stakes are 
viewed with seriousness.
In view of the political costs of adopting an indigenous language as a national 
language (at this stage of Nigeria’s development) one wonders if existing practices are 
indeed a problem for national integration. In other words, does linguistic division or the 
present pattern of multilingualism account for ethnicity? Which is better for nation- 
building, national embarrassment or peace?
In a multi-lingual country like Nigeria, English, particularly the widely spoken 
Pidgin, gives people the chance to communicate meaningfully across ethnic barriers 
without having to go through the cumbersome process of learning at school the 
multitude of languages that abound in the country.14 English may be embarrassing 
for the state but it nevertheless keeps the peace. Besides, it is less expensive to 
continue using English. The language issue in Nigeria involves not merely determining 
the role of local vernaculars and the selection of a national language, but also the 
selection of languages to be used at the State and local government levels. This 
means a three tier or even a four tier language policy. For a poor country such as
13 Raufu, "Burying the Language Issue", op. cit., p. 11.
14 Ibidem, p. 11.
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Nigeria this is too expensive to administer. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the 
imposition of the three major languages on the citizens would provide Nigeria with a 
lingua franca. Such a policy is arbitrary and dangerous for Nigerian nationhood.15 It 
perpetuates the notion of Nigeria as a mere marriage of convenience of three warring 
ethnic groups16 and reinforces the authority of the three large groups.
The objectives of the government can best be served by leaving the language 
issue alone. Language usage is a dynamic process. Nigerians will continue to acquire 
their own repertoire of languages, regardless of government sanction, for personal 
communication, acquisition of knowledge and for career opportunities at local, national, 
regional or international levels. It is instructive on this issue that 118 languages have 
developed their own orthographies, with varying degrees of accuracy, without official 
sanction. Only twenty languages have official orthographies developed for them.17 
Furthermore, most Nigerians already speak one or two of the major languages. The 
rudimentary language policy of colonial administration created a situation whereby the 
great majority of Nigerians speak Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, or Efik (Ibibio included) either 
as a first or a second language. Many Yoruba and Igbo people now speak Hausa and 
most Igbo people living in Lagos, particularly the younger ones, speak Yoruba. Being 
able to speak Hausa has enabled some members of the other ethnic groups to 
enhance their participation in the redistributive process, facilitating their sharing in both 
the Hausa proportion and their own ethnic proportion of the ‘national cake’. Some 
Igbos have even adopted Hausa names in order to share in the ‘spoils’ of the state
15 Toyo, "National Languages and Development", op. cit., p. 7.
16 Ibidem, p. 7.
17 Ben Elugbe, "Language Policy and National Development", op. cit., p. 7.
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accruing to the Hausa group by virtue of their domination of the federal government. 
The reason for this pattern of multilingualism is not important. The question is: who is 
the better integrated citizen, he who speaks only one language, preferably the official 
language, or he who is able to manipulate several languages which are used for 
communication in the country?18 The present discursive practices in language usage 
should, then, be considered a blessing rather than a national curse. Through such 
practices a national language is likely to evolve in the future. The state may best serve 
its own interests by enabling such practices rather than sponsoring any kind of 
dramatic language reforms which are more likely to engineer perverse effects or have 
limited success.
HISTORY
The attempt to develop a shared historical basis for the Nigerian image stresses 
the fact that Nigerians must be the focus and principal actors in their history. This has 
entailed both the rejection of imperial history and ethnocentric European modes of 
historical study. Conventional European historiography has always been firmly based 
in written sources. Where these are absent is described as ‘prehistory’, and the 
beginning of a meaningful and interesting European history was for long dated from 
the appearance of a literary culture in classical Greece and Rome. Transposed to 
Africa, this conception of history condemns the pre-European past to an 
undifferentiated and uncivilized prehistory of no intrinsic interest. Imperial accounts of 
African history assumed that Africa did not have a history because its history was
18 Ayo Bamgbose, "Pride and Prejudice in Multilingualism and Development", paper presented at 
the Conference on African Languages, Development and the State, Centre of African Studies, 
University of London, SOAS, 25-26 April 1991, p. 1.
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largely oral and not documented. Many Africans feel that to be denied a history is in 
some sense to be denied the dignity of being a people.19
The struggle for the acceptability of oral traditions as a viable and valid source 
of scholarly history began with the effort of African historians seeking the approval of 
the Senate of the University of London for their dissertations.20 Their success 
enhanced the study not only of pre-colonial African history, but also of African 
languages, literatures, linguistics, religions and so on. It also meant that the new 
nationalist historiography, seeking to decolonize the minds of the masses about their 
past, realized that it had to learn from the established historians and to work within the 
framework that was acceptable to an international community.21 This integration of 
Nigerian national historiography into western historiography has placed undue stress 
on methodology, and not enough on interpretation. One result of this is that thirty 
years after independence, no one-volume interpretation of Nigerian national history by 
a Nigerian historian yet exists.22
A major problem of nationalist historians is how to synthesize the histories of 
the various groups. Focusing attention on the histories of individual groups is 
potentially divisive. National history, therefore, emphasizes the history of intergroup 
relationships. Oral traditions, written records, ethnology and material culture, 
archaeology and linguistics, are all probed for evidence of intergroup linkages in myths
19 Kwame Nkrumah, Address delivered to mark the opening of the First International Congress of 
Africanists, cited in Ali Mazrui, Cultural Engineering and Nation-building in East Africa, Evanston Illinois, 
Northwestern University Press, 1972, pp. 3-4.
20 J.F. Ade. Ajayi, "National History in the Context of Decolonisation: the Nigerian Example", paper 
presented at University of Bergen, Norway, May 1990, p. 8.
21 Ibidem, p. 8.
22 Ibidem, p. 9.
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of origins, commercial, religious and cultural exchanges. Ironically the attempt to 
synthesize Nigeria’s history has been facilitated by a non-Nigerian, Thomas Hodgkin. 
In his epic historical anthology of Nigeria, he tried to show the links that existed in the 
pre-colonial period between the various states and peoples which were the 
predecessors of modem Nigeria.23 Since the publication of Hodgkin’s work, Nigerian 
historians have embarked on projects of historical synthesis. Simplified versions of 
synthesized Nigerian history have become the staple ingredient of history textbooks 
and teaching. Interestingly, Nigerian national history has been produced in print and 
in English which are neither indigenous nor African.
The lack of balance in the material on the various groups poses a problem of 
how to present a coherent picture of all the peoples. This difficulty has been evaded 
through the presentation of Nigerian history not as a single historical cultural organism 
but as a complex network of historical and ethnological strands of different lengths.24 
In its simplest form it is presented as glimpses of ancient Nigerian history beginning 
with the earliest known materials through the accounts of the Portuguese to the 
contact with the British, of which there is abundant documentary evidence. This 
approach presents no problem for the Nigerian image exactly because it is the 
principle of cultural nationalism to nationalize what is sectional as the property of the 
nation.
Significantly, attempts to nationalize sectional histories have not brought about 
accusations of domination. This may be because indigenous political achievements
23 Thomas Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives: an Historical Anthology, London, OUP, 1975, p. 2.
24 J.D. Omer-Cooper, "The Question of Unity in African History", JHSN, Vol. Ill, No. 1, December 
1964, p. 110.
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and initiatives, and heroes of the disparate groups are equally glorified by nationalist 
history. Emphasis is placed on those events that demonstrate active resistance to 
colonialism, such as anti-tax riots, the celebrated Eleko case which led to the British 
occupation of Lagos, the Aba women’s riot and the nationalist movement. Also, 
particular attention is paid to those indigenous initiatives which can be linked to 
contemporary affairs and people in Nigeria. For instance, Ologbosere, the great Benin 
warrior-chief, is claimed to be The fore-runner of men like General Obasanjo who 
would later advocate our Africanness in Nigeria’.25 Ologbosere had massacred 
Consul-General Phillips who defiled the Oba of Benin with his visit. In retaliation the 
British sacked Benin and deported Oba Overamwen to Calabar.
Nationalist historiography denies that Nigeria is an artificial creation of the 
British. It depicts the country as originating from an immemorial and glorious past, 
through the present times to a limitless future. For instance, Eyo Ekpo’s 2000 Years 
of Nigerian A/t presents an archaeologically informed view of Nigerian history, locating 
Nigerian history from 2000 years ago, even though the concept of Nigeria is very 
much a twentieth century one26
Nationalist history has been successful in promoting a national consensus 
among many educated Nigerians in relation to colonial and pre-colonial Nigeria. 
However, its success in promoting a national consensus about post colonial Nigeria 
remains to be seen.
25 Atome Kunu, "The Nationalist Movement in Nigeria", in J.U. Obot (ed.), Nigeria: the People and 
their Heritage, Calabar, Wusen Press, 1987, p. 268.
26 Eyo Ekpo, 2000 Years of Nigerian Art, Lagos, Federal Department of Antiquities, 1979.
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LITERATURE
Writing is relatively new in Nigeria. The very fact that there is a large body of 
Nigerian literature today is an indication of nationalism. In a society where creative 
literature is relatively new, and where this activity is invested with cultural prestige in 
response to western impact, the fact that people write at all becomes an act of 
national assertion.27 The absence of writing in many parts of Nigeria prior to contact 
with Europeans has not deterred the Nigerian writer from claiming literature as his 
heritage. To acknowledge Eurocentric definitions of literature as the written word is to 
devalue and make inferior his culture. For him oral literature is respectable. In a 
lecture at the University of Calabar Philip Efiong claimed:
The origins of... Nigerian literary heritage cannot be traced to any definite 
period. This is so since the Nigerian, like man in every comer of the globe, has 
always existed in the company of one form of literature or the other.... literature 
is an artistic and skilful use of language to achieve effects on one’s audience.... 
The key word here is language and whether it is ‘spoken’ through writing, 
speech, dance, mime, the drum etc, it eventually plays the same role in view 
of its artistic usage.28
The large body of written creativity in Nigeria today is used to testify to the 
historicity of Nigerian literature. Nigerian writers such as Chinua Achebe and Wole
27 Ali Mazrui, Cultural Engineering and Nation-building in East Africa, op. cit., p. 23.
28 Philip Efiong, "Tracing the Nigerian Literary Heritage", in J.U. Obot (ed.), Nigeria: the People and 
their Heritage, op. cit., p. 215.
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Soyinka, the nobel laureate, whose works are acclaimed internationally have become 
national heroes. Wole Soyinka’s works are displayed with the caption The works that 
earned global recognition for Nigeria.’29
Themes of Nigerian literature are inspired by nationalism. For example, Chinua 
Achebe’s much acclaimed novel Things Fall Apart came out in 1958 in reaction to 
Joyce Cary’s Mr Johnson, a novel which sought to depict the black man as slow 
witted.30 A major nationalist concern of Nigerian literature has been the cultural 
conflicts between colonial ideals and traditional norms. Examples of such works 
include, The Only Son (1966) by John Munonye; One Man, One Wife (1965) by T.M. 
Aluko; Heaven’s Gate a poem by Christopher Okigbo; Pianos and Drums by Okara; 
Agbor Dance by John P. Clark.
Another popular theme of Nigerian literary nationalism is cultural revivalism. 
This has been achieved through the idealization of indigenous culture. Such enterprise 
entails the use of traditional myths and imagery to project messages that reach 
beyond their immediate locality. Examples include Chinua Achebe’s Arrow of God 
(1964); Elechi Amadi’s novels, The Great Ponds (1969), The Concubine (1966) and 
The Slave (1978); and J.P. Clarke’s 'The Song of a Goat" (1962). The literary 
nationalist attempts to link contemporary writing with past traditions and also 1o create 
works that can be described as being authentically Nigerian even though a ‘foreign’ 
medium is being used’.31 Only nationalism can create an authentically Nigerian 
literature in a medium foreign to Nigeria.
29 Ibidem, p. 214.
30 Chinua Achebe, Morning Yet on Creation Day: Essays, London, Heinemann Educational, 1975, 
p. 45.
31 Efiong, Tracing the Nigerian Literary Heritage", op. cit., p. 220.
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Nigerian nationalism has also been expressed in the thematic concern with 
political corruption in Nigeria. Such works invariably tie political corruption with neo­
colonialism and imperialism. More recently such social conscience nationalism has 
found expression in examining the futility of the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970). By 
far the most forceful example of this nationalism is Wole Soyinka’s The Man Died. It 
is a documentation of the writer’s experiences in jail. The writer demonstrates 
powerfully the injustice and weaknesses inherent in his society, in particular the 
political structure of the society. Injustice and perversion of justice is also the theme 
of Aluko’s Wrong Ones in the Dock (1982) and Joe Irukwu’s Nigeria: The case fora 
better Society. The disenchantment shown in these works is taken to a new height 
by Chinua Achebe’s The Trouble With Nigeria (1983) and The Ant Hills of the 
Savannah which is a lamentation of the ruin which military rule has brought to a 
developing country like Nigeria. Perhaps the best nationalistic achievements of The 
Ant Hills of the Savannah are the ‘dissolution of tribalism, even if this in itself does not 
wipe away the vermin in real life, the demonstration that religion for the people is not, 
really a divisive issue, and the point that the common enemy [ethnicity] cannot be 
located among the ranks of the oppressed.’32
One might wonder if these works do not express disenchantment with 
nationalism. The answer is no. Their major concern is for the Nigerian nation. For 
instance, Joe Irukwu claims that his book about Nigeria was written because of his 
‘faith in this country’.33 It is not the stigmatization or the ridicule of nationalism that 
is the objective. Rather, it is the defence of nationalism from those seen as its
32 Chuks lloegbunam, "The Soldier as an Ant", Newswatch, October 26, 1987, p. 54.
33 ThisWeek, Lagos, February 12, 1990, p. 24.
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enemies: the imperialists and their Nigerian collaborators.
Nigerian creative writers attempt to project Nigerian nationalism into a limitless 
future through literature specifically for children’s readership. Such writings aim not 
only to open up the children’s minds to creativity but to sharpen their awareness to 
significant national issues like civic responsibilities. Attempts to promote new trends 
in Nigerian nationalism can be witnessed in the emergence of pacesetter series 
literature in the manner of James Hadley Chase and Nick Carter. These are 
preoccupied with crime, adventure, fantasy, love, detective stories and glamour.
The great upsurge since the early 1970s in the number of Nigerian publishing 
houses attest to the growing importance of creative writing in nation building. Today 
there are over 70 publishing houses in Nigeria, a majority of them owned by Nigerians. 
Book fairs have become a common feature of Nigerian socio-economic life. Despite 
the proliferation of book fairs, books are never enough.34 This increase in publishing 
is auspicious for Nigerian nationalism. The appreciation of literature in Nigeria is the 
result of education. Consequently, the increase in publishing will help to bridge the gap 
between education and upbringing in literary tastes. Almost half of the Nigerian 
population fall between the ages of 5-30 years. This means that sometime during 
formal education they are bound to be exposed to a number of the fast growing 
literature market. They, thereby, become influenced by the ideas expressed in the 
literature. In this way, literary elites will be crucial in shaping the eventual form of the 
imagined nation. They are the cultural creators of the national project. They help both 
Nigerians and non-Nigerians imagine the nation which, in Chinua Achebe’s words, is
34 Newswatch, Lagos, February 15, 1988, p. 37.
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‘morning yet on creation day’.35 
THE MEDIA
Until the late 1970s, the Nigerian press was largely owned by either the federal 
or state government. Today there is an upsurge in private ownership of the press, 
particularly of the print media. Radio and television are still owned by the state. This 
pattern of ownership has meant that the government controls to a great measure what 
is broadcast. For the government, the media is a means to communicate its policies 
to the people rather than a means through which people may reach it.
The promotion of unity has been the ultimate moral imperative of the Nigerian 
mass media, particularly radio and television. This may be due to the important role 
that the fledgling Nigerian press played in the nationalist movement. Tight government 
controls have been used to keep the press in line. Military regimes, in particular, have 
pursued the curtailment of press freedom as a policy. For example, Decree No. 4 
enacted by General Buhari provided for a jail sentence on a journalist who published 
any article embarrassing to the Government or any of its functionaries, even if such 
a report was true. Another decree, No. 2, prohibited publications that smeared the 
good name of a government functionary or threatened the security of the state or 
incited citizens to riot. Other control measures include arbitrary detention of journalists 
and media executives, tight economic control on newsprint importation and 
distribution, and restriction of federal government adverts to government owned 
newspapers. The media gained considerable freedom following the overthrow of
35 Wendy Griswold, "The Writing on the Mud Wall: Nigerian Novels and the Imaginary Village", in 
American Sociological Review, Vol. 57, No. 6, December 1992, p. 713.
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Buhari’s government in August 1985. Decree No. 4 which had muzzled the press was 
repealed by President Babangida whose regime has continued to detain and harass 
journalists. However, the Buhari regime had taught journalists how to be cautious in 
their handling of sensitive national issues. This cautious nature of the press has given 
rise to laments that the soul and spirit of journalists’ have left them.36 Despite its 
limitations, the Nigerian press is the freest in Africa.
The idea of press control in Nigeria stems from fear that a completely free 
press may cause domestic strife and violent revolt. Although this fear has been 
ridiculed by the ‘independent’ press, it is not unfounded. Perhaps the most ghastly 
example of the danger of an irresponsible press is the 1966 radio broadcast which 
apparently ignited the second massacre of the Igbos in Northern Nigeria. The 
broadcast, initially transmitted from Cameroon and later by the northern-based Radio 
Kaduna, reported the killing of the Hausas in Eastern Nigeria by the Igbos. The North 
retaliated with what has been described as Ihe most appalling cases of mass killing 
in contemporary Africa’.37
Privately owned newspapers have more often promoted division than unity. 
Hence, there is need for government control of the press. On sensitive national issues 
the private press are partisan. Their campaigns for sectional interest often help to 
kindle passions rather than cool them. For instance, their reports on the religious riots 
in Kaduna State in 1987 were very irresponsible. Some newspapers went to the extent 
of highlighting demands by a Zaria-based clergyman, Alhaji Gumi, that Nigeria be 
broken into two, one for Christians and the other for Muslims. Editorials and reports
36 Newswatch, Lagos, July 24, 1989, p. 42.
37 Mazrui, op. cit., p. 56.
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were partisan and only helped to build up tension. Similarly, in 1986 during the 
controversy over the government decision to enrol Nigeria as a member of the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference, sectional press campaigns fuelled passions and 
built up tension which caused serious problems for the Babangida administration.
The press itself recognizes the need for control. A journalist pleaded with 
President Babangida to use lawful and democratic means to discipline the press for 
the sake of the nation, pointing out that ‘respect for fundamental human rights surely 
has its limits with regards to the unity of the nation.’38 Dan Agbese, an editor of 
Newswatch, agrees that the Nigerian press can be ‘bad news’ for Nigeria:
A non-Nigerian reading the country’s newspapers and magazines is bound to 
conclude that there are several wars going on in the country... Every positive 
move government has made is gratuitously greeted with a barrage of 
negativism by the press. Its diabolical aim is to prove that no matter how hard 
they crow about it no one, no Nigerian government, be it civilians or the armed 
forces, has enough love for the country to make it worth the while of the 
Andrews to stay on this side of the Atlantic.39
One area of the media which the government has apparently failed to seriously 
consider is satellite broadcasting. Government failure to acquire the new satellite 
technology has given rise to increasing nationalist concern that national values will be
38 Hotline, Kaduna, April 30, 1987, p. 38.
39 Dan Agbese, "On the sunny Side", Newswatch, Lagos, March 7, 1988, p. 54.
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eroded, and replaced by western values beamed directly into Nigerian homes.40 
Despite understandable financial constraints, this lacuna in its media policy weakens 
the claim of government to be primarily concerned with the promotion of national unity. 
Failure to control (at least in part) modem forms of media, and failure to provide an 
alternative to western programmes, can only weaken national identity. The Nigerian 
media is basically western-oriented in style, values and conventions. The very titles 
of national dailies are mostly imported from Fleet Street. Nationalists call for the mass 
media to experiment with an indigenous ‘alternative journalism’.41
If the government was to effectively utilize the mass media it could enhance its 
legitimacy, public comprehension of its policies, and citizens’ political socialization. The 
fact that a majority of the press, including all radio and television houses are 
government owned makes the mass media a powerful instrument for political 
development although this also carries with it the inherent danger of exploitation for 
thought control and demagogy.42 However, the government has failed to fully exploit 
the propaganda potential of either newspapers or electronic communications. The way 
in which it has employed such media has been simplistic and minimal, as in repeated 
broadcasting of the National Pledge, Thought for Today’ and ‘Moment for Thought’. 
Until it does exploit that potential, official nationalism is unlikely to become a truly 
popular force.
40 Babatunde Folarin; "The Media’s First Task", Nigerian Tribune, Ibadan, Wednesday, 11 April 
1990, p. 4.
41 Ibidem, p. 4.
42 David R. Smock and Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill, The Search for National Integration, New York, 
Free Press, 1976, p. 166.
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ART FESTIVALS
Nigerian governments have been more adept at exploiting traditional media, 
such as dance, songs, poetry. These function primarily as entertainment, but are also 
used in demonstrations of public support for government policies. As such, they 
complement modern forms of demonstration, like military reviews at national 
celebrations. In particular, traditional media have been utilized as vehicles of unity 
through art festivals.
The First World Negro Festival of the Arts held in Dakar in 1966 made Nigerian 
government aware of the potentiality of art festivals for national image-making. 
Because Nigeria was seen as the source of Negro art and culture, she was elected 
in 1965 to perform as the 'Star Country’ in the festival but her performance was 
undistinguished. More particularly, the shoddy display of the ancient treasures of 
Nigeria reduced their importance as an assertion of Africa’s proud past.43
Nigeria performed badly again at the first Pan-African cultural festival in Algiers 
in 1969. Although the first All-Nigeria Festival of Arts was held in Lagos to prepare a 
team for the festival, what resulted was cultural chaos. The Federal Military 
Government saw the event as a platform to present Nigeria as a united and indivisible 
country.44 An Igbo man, Ben Enwonwu, was invited from Europe to lead the Nigerian 
delegation and Atiliogwu dancers from the liberated areas of Biafra were despatched 
to Algiers to join the Nigerian contingent of artistes. Cultural synthesis was not 
considered significant. What mattered most was the representation of the various
43 J.A. Adedeji, "Culture as Reagents of Nigeria’s National Identity", in Kayode and Usman (eds.) 
The Economic and Social Development of Nigeria, op. cit., p. 293.
44 Ibidem, p. 293.
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Nigerian culture areas in one delegation, in particular the representation of the break­
away section of Nigeria.
The experience changed government attitude towards arts and culture. 
Government realized that the basis of unity could be built with a well articulated 
cultural policy. The cultural division in the federal ministry of information was given a 
new orientation and the Nigerian Arts Council was reconstituted and made an agent 
in the process of promoting national unity. The All-Nigerian Festival of the Arts was 
renamed 'Festival of Unity’. To ensure equality and full participation of the states in the 
festival, the venue for the yearly event was to be rotated among the states of the 
federation. A measure of competition was introduced in order to encourage innovation. 
State governments and some multinational corporations made contributions towards 
the trophies for competitive events. These are a set of gongs cast in gold, silver and 
bronze. A giant gold gong was donated by the head of state for the overall winning 
state. This gold gong became the symbol of national identity and unity.
In 1972 the Arts Council inaugurated the State Week Festival in the capital. The 
aim was to display the efforts of each state towards cultural promotion and 
development. Each state was to plan its own festival, and design its own criteria for 
the promotion of culture. The festival drew attention to the commercial benefits of arts 
and culture for trade fairs. The ministry of trade used the opportunity to recruit cultural 
troupes for side shows at its fairs and in particular, for the First All African Trade Fair 
in Nairobi in 1972. As a result, cultural side shows have become a regular feature at 
trade fairs, national parades and sporting events as well as for welcoming visiting 
dignitaries to Nigeria.
The new orientation for the All Nigeria Festival of Arts had positive effects for
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nation building. Apart from bringing culture to a new level of consciousness, it helped 
to produce a new attitude to cultural administration and planning. The exercise of 
staging festivals required the recruitment of trained personnel and a process of talent 
hunting. Graduates of the Schools of Art, Drama and Music began to be employed 
as cultural officers. Both contemporary and traditional artistes had gainful employment 
in promoting traditional arts to new levels of appreciation.45
The experience gained from the organization of art festivals in the country gave 
the state the confidence to host the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts 
and Culture (FESTAC) in 1977. About 56 countries participated. Critics of FESTAC 
have pointed out that it neither led to a unifying ideal for the black world in general nor 
for Nigeria in particular.46 Nevertheless, the event provided the occasion for the 
display of Nigerian nationalism, an ‘us’ versus them feeling.
National consciousness was reflected in the citizens’ willingness and 
enthusiasm to prove Nigeria’s greatness as the most endowed black country in the 
world. Such a spirit was most expressed in the controversy over the FESTAC symbol, 
the Benin Mask. Nigeria had asked Britain to return the famous ivory mask from the 
British Museum for the festival and Britain refused. Nigerians united in their 
condemnation of Britain. A comment on Lagos radio reflected the national mood on 
the issue:
The excuse that Nigeria cannot be allowed to keep what rightfully belongs to
45 Ibidem, p. 296.
46 See for example, Femi Osofisan, "FESTAC and the Heritage of Ambiguity", in O. Oyediran (ed.), 
Survey of Nigerian Affairs, 1976-1977, Ibadan, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and Macmillan, 
1981, p. 33.
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her because the object is in a fragile condition is as baseless as it is deceitful. 
The intention of Britain .. is primarily to discredit Nigeria and the collective 
attempt by the black people to re-educate the world on the positive 
contributions of the black man to the entire human experience which the white 
man arrogates to himself.... To us, the rightful owners such objects have 
spiritual as well as religious values considering our cultural background... What 
we resent is not only that these sacred objects are often misused but also that 
they are meaningless to those who keep them ... the same people who deny 
that the black man neither has a history nor a personality continue to make 
huge fortunes from our works of art. Besides, like the British example, the 
white man is out to obliterate any traces of black civilization from any known 
historical records. This is putting British stubbornness to return our art objects 
in its true perspective. ...As a matter of fact that 16th century ivory mask from 
Benin has been recognized all over the world as one of the finest examples of 
the creative ingenuity of the black man. The mask was last worn by Oba 
Overami who was forced out of his throne when the British attacked and 
plundered the Benin empire in 1897. The background to that senseless attack 
was the white man’s greed to exploit the natural potentials of the black man.47
If I have quoted at length, it is because the issues raised in the commentary portray 
forcefully the elements of Nigerian cultural nationalism, that is anti-colonialist/imperialist 
feeling, nationalization of fame, idealization of African and indigenous cultures, and
47 Commentary by Odnaki Okeni on Lagos Radio, November 2, 1976, reported in Africa Currents, 
London, no. 8, spring, 1977, p. 25-26.
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indigenization of foreign ideas. It does not matterthatthe famous mask originates from 
the Bini group; it is ‘ours’. Of all the cultural artifacts in the Nigerian museum none was 
found worthy to be used as a symbol. Rather, the famous one on display at the British 
Museum was chosen. It does not matter that it was the white man who judged the 
ivory mask as one of the finest examples of the creative ingenuity of the black man’ 
and thereby made it famous.
A replica of the mask was made in Benin and presented to the Head of State 
for use when Nigeria failed to persuade the British Government to relinquish the 
original. The importance attached to the FESTAC symbol as an image for Nigerian 
nationhood is evidenced by the expulsion of two expatriates, a Frenchman and an 
American, for not respecting the symbol.48 The nationalization of ethnic culture was 
also evident in the choice of the Durbar from the emirates of northern Nigeria and the 
Regatta from the peoples of the Niger delta and the riverine areas as highlights of 
Nigeria’s contribution to the festival. These two spectacular and colourful events were 
described by General Obasanjo as ‘peculiarly Nigerian’.49
In general, FESTAC gave Nigeria the opportunity to present an image of 
national culture that was representative of its constituent ethnic cultures. The famous 
Benin Mask, the Durbar; and the Regatta were carefully balanced with other less 
spectacular art forms from around the country. It is the most eminent example of the 
way in which the state has attempted to present a national culture as an amalgam of 
traditional cultures, unified by carefully chosen symbols. The FESTAC is thus
48 West Africa, London, January 10, 1977, p. 86.
49 Addresses by General Obasanjo, at the opening of the Regatta, January 25,1977, in Lagos and 
at the Durbar, February 8, 1977, in Kaduna, in A March of Progress: Collected Speeches of His 
Excellency, General Olusegun Obasanjo, Lagos, Federal Ministry of Information, pp. 107 and 108.
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interesting in showing the selective processes of cultural nationalism.
In general, cultural integration in Nigeria has made substantive gains. National 
integration has been achieved through clothing. There is no one national dress but 
through the predominant sporting of Hausa fashion at international sporting events 
Nigerians are increasingly being Hausaized without resistance. The agbada or 
babariga is now a national dress, largely identified with the rich, particularly with 
politicians. The Igbos, who more than any other major ethnic group adopted European 
dress, are now readopting traditional fashions. Wearing traditional clothing to work at 
the office is today very common practice. New and eclectic Nigerian fashions are 
emerging, especially among the young. This is a positive sign for national integration.
Inter-ethnic marriages are now more common and acceptable than before the 
civil war. The fact that many high ranking officers have married outside their ethnic 
groups can be regarded as an indicator for this change. For instance, President 
Babangida, a Hausa, is married to an Igbo woman. Inter-ethnic nuptial relations were 
a major post-war feature as federal soldiers, especially Hausas, ‘captured’ Igbo girls 
as wives. Igbo girls were regarded by Hausa soldiers as social assets.
The diversified nature of Nigerian literary culture is promoting a broadly based 
sort of nationalism. Great works of literature by the likes of Chinua Achebe and Wole 
Soyinka, exist side by side with low-brow pamphlet literature.50 The popularity of this 
literature may be appreciated from its humorous dimensions displayed in colourful and 
attractive titles like: Why Boys Don’t Trust Their GirlFriends; Money Hard to get But 
Easy To Spend; Beware of Harlots and Many Friends; Beautiful Maria in the Act of
50 This literature is more generally known as Onitsha Market literature.
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True Love; Veronica My Daughter, How to Avoid Enemies and Bad Company etc. The 
productivity and impact of this literary enterprise is high. In Onitsha market on any 
one day there are about sixty different pamphlets on sale on all topics.51 Its 
readership is wide including both elementary and secondary school children as well 
as drop-outs from these two school systems.
Cultural nationalists are proud of this literature, despite its substandard nature. 
It is regarded as the first literature that attempted to deal with current Nigerian issues, 
in other words the first literature with national outlook.52 Interestingly the same pride 
is not extended to Amos Tutuola’s The Palm Wine Drinkard, the first Nigerian literary 
attempt written in 1952. It was acclaimed abroad as a great achievement in creative 
fantasy and unusual diction. Cultural nationalists see it as ‘ironical’ that it was 
applauded despite being written in substandard English.53 The spirit of cultural 
nationalism resents such foreign applause as insulting and patronizing.
The Yoruba juju music and its Owambe dance has national appeal. The ‘high 
life’ music which was popular in the ‘sixties has been superseded by Western-style 
‘pop’ music which is now veritably popular amongst Nigerian youth. National television 
soaps like Cockcrow At Dawn, Village Headmaster, Behind The Clouds, Mirror In The 
Sun, Masquerade, etc. are providing many Nigerians with common cultural and social 
experiences to leam and share.
51 Emmanuel N. Obiechina (ed.), Onitsha Market Literature , Ibadan, Heinemann, 1972, p. 9.
52 Philip U. Efiong, "Tracing the Nigeria Literary Heritage", op. cit., p. 217.
53 Ibidem, pp. 217-218.
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Christianity and Islam have been indigenized.54 As Parrinder has observed, 
indigenized sects are a large factor in the religious situation of the country.55 
Members worship in ways that are peculiarly Nigerian. They pray and sing to God in 
Nigerian languages and dance joyfully to African tunes and rhythms. Most of the sects 
permit polygyny and boast of many prophets, some of whom claim to be Jesus 
reincarnated. Many of these churches have branches in Europe, Russia, and the USA. 
Traditional religion is now being revived by intellectuals, particularly university 
lecturers, who see it as an alternative to the two imported religions - Christianity and 
Islam - currently agitating Nigerian nationalism.
The Nigerian Pidgin is a major integrative factor. It is widely spoken in both 
urban and rural areas and, by educated and uneducated alike. Unfortunately, it is not 
recognized officially by government. Pidgin is an auspicious development for Nigerian 
nationalism in two ways: firstly, it is the only language original to Nigeria. The four 
languages being promoted by the government are group specific. Secondly, it provides 
a solution to the political and educational costs of adopting a four tier national 
language structure.
National pride is asserted through personal names. British- style names are 
being dropped. Christians now give their children traditional ethnic names at baptism. 
Previously, such an act would have been condemned as ‘pagan’ practice. Perhaps the 
most famous example of this assertion of traditional identity is Fela Anikulakpo-Kuti, 
the controversial Nigerian musician, who in his fight against ‘colonial mentality’
54 The Africanisation of Christian worship began in the late 19th century with the secession of a 
group of Nigerians from the Anglican church to form the United Native African Church (UNA).
55 Parrinder Geoffrey, Religion in an African City, London, OUP, 1953, p. 132.
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changed his family name from Ransome-Kuti to Anikulakpo-Kuti.56 A prominent 
politician of the First Republic, Mbonu Ojike, advocated the nationalist principle of 
'boycott of the boycottables’, rejecting the title ‘Mr.’ as anti-Nigerian and substituting 
it with the Igbo equivalent Mazi.57 The rejection of foreign names was boosted during 
the Second Republic when Sir Akanu Ibiam (knighted by Queen Elizabeth) led a group 
of Nigerians to bum their foreign names at a bonfire in Tafawa Balewa Square, 
Lagos.58
The name Nigeria evokes national pride. There were suggestions that the name 
be discarded, because of its British connection. The names Songhai, from the past 
and Wazobia, fabricated from the three major Nigerian languages, were suggested as 
alternatives. But the majority view is that Nigeria is such an appropriate name that the 
British cannot claim a copyright: it comes from Nigritia, the land of the blacks, and 
Nigeria has the largest concentration of black people. It also reflects the country’s 
most prominent physical feature, the River Niger. The identity is therefore borne with 
pride. The adoption of English as an official language has however been less 
acceptable and is a matter of political expediency. But the humiliation has been borne 
with the contention that English has become so universal that the British no longer 
have the copyright.59 Cultural nationalists point to Wole Soyinka’s work in English 
which won the Nobel Prize for literature in 1987 as proof of their claim to the
56 Colonial mentality is the belief that everything European is the best. It was the subject of a song 
by Fela Anikulakpo-Kuti.
57 Atome Kunu, "The Nationalist Movement in Nigeria", in J.U. Obot (ed.), op. cit., p. 277.
58 Ibidem, p. 277.
59 J.F. Ade. Ajayi, "National History in the Context of Decolonization", op. cit., p. 5.
202
language.60 Nigerian nationalism certainly has to be understood in relation both to 
its traditional ethnic cultures and British culture.
60 Ibidem, p. 5.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CULTURAL NATIONALISM AND RELIGIOUS POLICIES
Introduction
The links between religion and nationalism can be very close. In Poland, 
Ireland, Armenia, Israel, Iran and Sudan, religion reinforces nationalism. English 
nationalism was closely reinforced by the Church of England. In eighteenth-century 
England only members of the Church of England were enfranchised.1 It was not until 
the second half of the nineteenth century that all religious barriers to membership of 
the House of Commons were removed.2 Connor Cruise O’Brien has shown how the 
French and American nationalism were underpinned by religion.3 Winthrop Hudson 
argued that the sense of nationalism in the US cannot be understood without taking 
into account its religious heritage.4 In Nigeria, Christianity helped in the movement for 
independence. The United Native African Church, which broke away from the orthodox 
Anglican Church, played an important role in the agitation for independence. However, 
the Nigerian state did not adopt a state religion on independence. Rather, it continued 
the colonial policy of neutrality in religious affairs. The existence of religious cleavages 
did not create difficult political problems for Nigeria until the late 1970s when the 
cleavage between Islam and Christianity became increasingly conflictual. This is the
1 Anthony Birch, Nationalism and National Integration, London, Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 43.
2 Ibidem, p. 43.
3 Connor Cruise O’Brien, God Land: Reflections on Religion and Nationalism, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1988, pp. 43-63.
4 Winthrop S. Hudson (ed.), Nationalism and Religion in America: Concepts of American Identity 
and Mission, New York, Harper & Row, 1970, passim.
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first time that there has ever been serious rivalry, let alone widespread and violent 
conflict, between the two religious groups in the history of the territory that now 
comprises Nigeria.
I shall argue that recent religious conflict is largely an unintended consequence 
of federal government policy. A series of Muslim-led governments contravened 
formally the secular basis of the state by implementing policies which were widely 
perceived as favourable to Islam and by extension to the dominant Muslim 
Hausa/Fulani group. Such policies both raised Muslim expectations and provoked 
Christian animosity, leading to increasing political activity on both sides. Commentators 
have claimed that Nigeria has become polarized between 'Christian Nigerians and 
Muslim Nigerians’,5 and asked whether the country is heading 'for a religious war that 
will destroy the basis of its existence as a nation-state?’6 Such writers clearly believe 
that religious cleavage is supplanting ethnicity as the basis of people’s political 
identities and therefore obstructing the growth of national identity and cohesion.
In passing, it should be noted that popular political expression through religious 
organizations has also been encouraged by the military’s banning of political parties 
from the beginning of 1984, and since then of other civil organizations which 
challenged governmental policies.7 The recent creation of two national and secular 
parties once again permits more conventional forms of political activity, and may
5 A.E. Ekoko and L.O. Amadi, "Religion and Stability in Nigeria", in J.A. Atanda et al. (eds.), Nigeria 
since Independence: the First 25 Years, Volume IX, Religion, Ibadan, Heinemann Educational, 1989, 
p. 130.
6 Newswatch, Lagos, October 8, 1990, p. 42.
7 Matthew Hassan Kukah, "Religion and the Politics of Deprivation: a case Study of the Religious 
Riots in Kaduna State, Nigeria", paper presented at the International Conference on Religion and 
Protest in Africa, Cornell University, Ithaca, 25-7th April, 1991, p. 26-27.
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therefore be expected to detract from the politicisation of religion. Certain claims about 
the danger posed to national unity by the religious cleavage might therefore be thought 
to be premature, although it cannot be doubted that religious issues continue to be a 
volatile factor in Nigerian politics.
In this chapter I shall concentrate upon government policies on religious issues, 
and popular reactions to them.
RELIGION AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: BACKGROUND
Religion has always played an important role in the life of all the peoples of 
Nigeria. There is little or no formal distinction between the secular and the sacred. In 
pre-colonial times, the political, social and economic system was legitimated by 
religion. Religious beliefs, practices and forms of authority differed from group to 
group, and were largely accommodating rather than formalized, structured or 
hierarchical.
The coming of Islam and Christianity introduced radically different forms of 
religious organization to the territory that now comprises Nigeria. Both claimed that 
their differing doctrines expressed universal truth, motivating them to proselytize to 
others and to impose uniformity of belief amongst themselves. Such doctrinal 
uniformity was imposed by formally structured and usually hierarchical religious 
organizations.
Islam spread to Nigeria from across the Sahara. It reinforced the theocratic 
system in the northern areas where it took root and came to be closely associated with 
the Hausa/Fulani groups. Christianity spread from the coast, becoming well 
established among the southern peoples. Unlike Islam, it did not provide the basis for
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a theocracy, but drew a distinction between the sacred and the secular. However, it 
was accompanied by elements of western culture and education and it paved the way 
for colonial rule which exercised its power through existing political structures. Thus 
traditional rulers such as Caliphs, Emirs, Obas, Obis, orEzes continued to act as both 
political and religious heads of their people.
Colonial rule promoted Christianity (outside the Emirates) and used it as an 
agent for its 'civilizing mission’. The administrators guarded the north from Christian 
missionary influence in honour of the pledge made to the Fulani rulers that they would 
not interfere with religious practice in the area.8 However, in the 1930s the 
administration cautiously opened up the north to western influence by allowing 
Christian missions to run leper colonies throughout the northern provinces and to 
proselytize in the middle belt areas. The close cooperation between colonial officials 
and missionaries in the south enabled Christianity to enjoy one of the fastest growth 
rates in its history.9 Later, Christianity helped in the movement for Nigerian 
independence, the first Nationalists being clergymen or religiously active laymen like 
W.E. Cole and Edward Blyden.
The colonial state was officially neutral on religion. Its policy was one of 
tolerance and non-involvement in religious issues which it regarded as a ‘private’ 
matter. It did, however, recognize the central role of religion in the lives of the various 
peoples in the north/south division of its administration and in its legacy of the three- 
regional federal structure at independence.
8 Geoffrey Parrinder, Religion in an African City, London, OUP, 1953, pp. 63-64 and 83.
9 Jibrin Ibrahim, "Politics of Religion in Nigeria: the Parameters of the 1987 Crisis in Kaduna State", 
ROAPE, 45-46, 1989, p. 74.
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Religion became politicised in the run up to independence as the Nigerian 
leaders used it to compete for public opinion. For instance, the pilgrimage issue, which 
started out as a matter of facilitating the movement of pilgrims through Sudan to Saudi 
Arabia became a central concern of the leader of the Northern Peoples’ Congress 
(NPC), Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto. Bello, who was also the premier 
of the Northern Region, set up a Pilgrims Welfare Board as a corporate organ of his 
government to alleviate the sufferings of pilgrims to Mecca. Shortly after, the leader 
of the Action Group (AG) and premier of the Western Region, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, 
also set up a similar board in his office. The real motive behind the decision of the two 
premiers was neither humanitarian nor religious:
For Bello, it was an opportunity to demonstrate his religious commitment 
to Islam and to live up to expectations of his allies in the Muslim world....
In the case of Chief Awolowo, a Christian, the establishment of a Pilgrim 
Welfare Board was a political strategy to stop the Muslims from forming 
a rival political party in the Region.10
Not to be outdone, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the leader of the National Convention of 
Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), sponsored a religious sect called the National 
Church of Nigeria and the Cameroons which preached about an African god.11
On independence, the colonial policy of non-involvement was adopted as the
10 Oloso K.K., Hajj and its Operation in Nigeria 1954-1980, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Ibadan, 1985, 
cited in P.R.A. Adegbesan, "Pragmatic Involvement in Religious Matters: a case Study of Nigeria", in 
Stephen Olugbemi (ed.), Alternative Political Futures for Nigeria, Lagos, Nigerian Political Science 
Association, 1987, p. 102.
11 Parrinder, Religion in an African City, op. cit., 1953, p. 128.
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basis of the secularity of the Nigerian state. This secular status of the state was 
implicit in the constitution’s silence on religion, apart from guaranteeing freedom of 
worship. The missionaries remained in control of educational, health care and welfare 
institutions most of which were government-aided. Religion was manipulated by 
politicians for vote but it did not dominate national politics. Ethnicity dominated national 
politics. However, the political situation in the Northern Region was so integrated with 
Islam that separation was impossible.12 The major northern issues were control of 
federal power and catching up with the south in socio-economic development. These 
were expressed by the ruling NPC through a strong ‘northernization’ programme 
especially in high level jobs.13 But the line between this northernization and 
Islamization was not a distinct one. The Muslim culture was given superordinate status 
while the non-Muslim areas were subjugated under the system.14 Non-Muslim 
officials of the regional government could not rise above the junior levels. This, and 
the fact that Bello was committed to the Islamization of all Nigeria engendered fear 
and resentment among non-Muslims and became a justification for the January 1966 
military coup and the following civil war.15
During the war religion was manipulated to the benefit of both sides. Biafran 
leaders depicted the conflict as a Muslim/Christian one.16 This helped them to gain
12 Dean S. Gilliland, African Religion Meets Islam: Religious Change in Northern Nigeria, Lanham, 
University Press of America, 1986, p. 158.
13 Ibidem, p. 159.
14 Tseayo J.I., Conflict and Incorporation in Nigeria: the Integration of the Tiv, Zaria, Gaskiya 
Corporation, 1975, p. 112.
15 Ben Gbulie, Nigeria’s Five Majors: Coup D ’etat of 15th January 1966, First Inside Account, 
Onitsha, Africana Educational Publishers, 1981, p. 52.
16 Abdurrahman I. Doi, Islam in Nigeria, Zaria, Gaskiya Corporation, 1984, pp. 345-346.
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favourable international opinion, winning for them the sympathy and support of 
Catholic countries, especially the Irish and the French governments.17 Nigerian 
leaders on the other hand used the fact that the head of state was a Christian 
(Gowon, an Anglican) to show the non-religious nature of the war. This factor helped 
to reassure non-Muslims and to win support for the war effort from northern and 
western Christians as well as from the eastern minorities.
POST-WAR RELIGIOUS POLICIES: SECULARIZATION OF EDUCATION
Education became secularized after the war.18 The prevailing educational 
system which was controlled by religious bodies was considered inadequate for 
mobilization and indoctrination for nationalism.19 The federal government therefore 
took control of schools and hospitals from religious bodies most of which were 
Christian, despite their opposition. Religious education was still allowed to continue 
after government take-over of schools. The teaching of religion and moral education 
was therefore not considered antithetical to nationalism.
In general, the secularization of schools was a haphazard exercise. It caused 
a lot of discontent among Christian missions, particularly in the north where some 
schools taken over from Christians were rebaptized with Muslim names and given
17 L. Wiseberg, "Christian Churches and the Nigerian Civil War", Journal of African Studies, Vol. 
2(3), 1975, p. 324.
18 The take-over of mission schools was first initiated by the state governments during the war. The 
split between the ‘Biafran’ and Nigerian churches enabled the state governments to take-over clinics, 
schools and hospitals belonging to predominantly Igbo churches in the country.
19 Jacob K. Olupona, "Muslim-Christian Relations in Nigeria: Then and Now", paper presented to 
the Oxford African Society Seminar, Oxford University, January 27, 1988, p. 15.
210
Islamic identities.20 Most Igbo people saw the policy as both a punitive measure 
against the missions for their support of Biafra and a prelude to the eventual 
Islamization of the country, particularly of the Igbo people.21 Professor of Islamic 
study at the Ahmadu Bello University, Abdurrahman Doi, regards secularization as 
beneficial to Islam. According to him, Ihis policy has given freedom to Islam to further 
its cause and in a way it imposed restrictions on Christianity which has so far 
dominated the educational and social scene of the country’.22 Because of the policy, 
Christian missions came together and formed the Christian Association of Nigeria 
(CAN) to defend Christianity in Nigeria.23
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES FOR HAJJ
More Nigerians performed the Hajj in the 1970s due to the oil boom. It was 
estimated that 106,000 Nigerian Muslims went to Mecca in 1977. This means that after 
Indonesians, more Nigerians performed the Hajj than any other nationality.24
The federal government became partially involved in the Hajj in 1972. It 
established an office in the external affairs ministry to coordinate the activities of the 
various State Pilgrim Welfare Boards which were responsible for pilgrims from their 
respective States.25 Full involvement followed in 1975 with the establishment of the
20 Ibidem, p. 15.
21 Ibidem, p. 15.
22 Doi, Islam in Nigeria, op. cit„ p. 344.
23 Jibrin Ibrahim, "Politics of Religion in Nigeria”, op. cit., p. 76.
24 Peter B. Clarke and Ian Linden, Islam in Modem Nigeria: a Study of a Muslim Community in a 
Post-Independence State 1960-1983, Mainz/Munich, Kaiser-Grunewald, 1984, p. 62.
25 Before then only those States carved out of the former Western and Northern Regions were 
involved in the Hajj.
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National Pilgrim Board (N.P.B) to subsidize the pilgrimage to Mecca. This decision to 
become involved in a purely Islamic matter was motivated by the need to protect the 
country's image abroad following embarrassing reports about the activities of 
unscrupulous Nigerians in the holy land, and to check the abuse of national resources 
through currency trafficking and smuggling.
Subsequent governments continued to treat Hajj operations as normal 
government responsibilities. These operations became notorious for the favours 
granted to eminent individuals and for the political rewards given to converts to Islam 
who make the journey.26 Public funds were spent on each pilgrim, not only in 
infrastructure and social assistance, but also in foreign reserves made available at 
artificially low rates27 Christians were incensed by what they saw as the misuse of 
the nation’s wealth, especially in the light of the numerical strength of Christianity and 
demanded that the same opportunity be given to them.28 They were eventually 
granted their own Christian Pilgrim Boards or representations on existing boards. 
However, they were granted a quota of 1,400 pilgrims against the 20,000 for Muslims. 
This imbalance itself became a major grievance for Christians.
The 1986 foreign exchange regulations which abolished pilgrim privileges has 
helped to defuse the pilgrimage issue as a source of conflict. However, the fact that 
federal funds could be used to provide travel to Muslims demonstrated how powerful 
the Islamic forces were at the highest levels of government. The sending of whole 
delegations at government expense produced the erroneous impression that Islam was
26 Gilliland, African Religion Meets Islam, op. cit., p. 193.
27 John Onaiyekan, Bishop of llorin, "Secularism and the Nigerian State", paper presented at ABU, 
Zaria, July 11, 1987, p. 10.
28 Gilliland, op. cit., p. 193.
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the state religion of Nigeria.29 The special irony though is that the policy was 
introduced during the regime of a Christian, that is Gowon.
RELIGIOUS BALANCING
The Murtala/Obasanjo regime advanced religious balancing as a deliberate 
strategy for strengthening nationalism. Ministerial appointments and top positions were 
carefully balanced according to the religious affiliation of those appointed. For 
example, in 1974 when General Obasanjo, a Yoruba and a Christian, succeeded 
Mohammed, his second-in-command had to come from the north to maintain the 
balance. However, his next in command was Lieutenant General Theophilus Yakubu 
Danjuma, a northerner who was also a Christian. He was disqualified. The position 
could only be occupied by someone who was both a northerner and a Muslim. 
Religion thus grew in political saliency. It was therefore not by chance that religion 
threatened national stability during the Obasanjo regime. The context was the 1978 
debate on the draft constitution. The issue was the place of the Sharia (Islamic law) 
in the new constitution.
In the Second Republic most political parties ensured that candidates for the 
two top posts in the country, that is the presidency and vice-presidency, were 
balanced between a Christian and a Muslim. This policy was further reflected in the 
accord between the NPN and the NPP. Both parties agreed 1o maintain complete 
equality in state contribution and treatment of all religious groups’.30 They also 
agreed that government would not discriminate against foreign missionaries of any
29 Ibidem, p. 193.
30 Olupona, "Muslim-Christian Relations in Nigeria", op. cit., p. 21.
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faith wishing to establish educational or health care institutions.31 This agreement 
effectively abolished the previous military ban on foreign missionary activity in Nigeria. 
The apogee of religious balancing was the historic visits to Nigeria of Pope John Paul 
II, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Chief Imam of Mecca in 1982.
Certain factors complicate the government’s balancing act. These include the 
holistic approach of Islam, the importance of religion in the lives of Nigerians, and the 
nature of Nigerian politics as ‘sharing of the national cake’. The constitution, despite 
its secular provisions, does not require leaders at federal or state levels to put away 
their religion until the end of their terms of office. The series of Muslim-led 
governments since 1979, and the implementation of policies widely perceived as 
favourable to Islam, has generated fears among non-Muslims, especially Christians, 
that there are plans to Islamize Nigeria. As a result of such fears, Christians are now 
poised to stop what they regard as 'creeping Islamization’ in Nigeria.32
THE SECULAR STATUS OF THE STATE
Interpreting the constitutional provisions about the secular nature of Nigeria was 
a central issue at the 1978 Constituent Assembly. Opposition to secularism came 
largely from Muslims who argued that it would make state involvement in religious 
matters such as pilgrimages and the Sharia unconstitutional. Muslim fundamentalist 
groups, in particular the Muslim Students Society, argued for the creation of a truly 
Islamic state as the solution to immorality and corruption in Nigeria. Non-Muslims 
argued in support of secularism. Socialists argued that religion had no place in a
31 Ibidem, p. 21.
32 Newswatch, Lagos, October 8, 1990, p. 42.
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secular state. Christians argued that it would be unfair for the state to favour one 
religion in view of its religious pluralism, suggesting that the state should provide a 
context in which all religions would flourish.
The final draft of the Constitution did not declare Nigeria a secular state. 
However, it guaranteed freedom of religious worship and declared Nigeria God’s land. 
In the Preamble Nigerians are held to have agreed to live in unity and harmony as 
one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation under God’. The neutrality of the state 
in religious matters was affirmed. Article 10 stated that the Government of the 
Federation or of the State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion’. The 
Constitution did not, however, spell out the conditions or limits to such neutrality. For 
instance, it does not say whether it includes aid to pilgrims or donations to religious 
organizations or the involvement of the state in the observance of religious holidays.
THE SHARIA DEBATE
The debate on the role and place of the Sharia in the new constitution was 
more explosive. The proposal to create a federal court of appeal generated a bitter 
exchange at the assembly. Muslim members argued that such a court was 
fundamentally Christian in origin and demanded a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal. For 
many Muslims Sharia court of appeal was the symbol of political freedom.33 
Christians protested that such a court compromised the secular nature of the state. 
For them such a move symbolized potential Muslim domination of Nigeria.34 The
33 David D. Laitin, Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986, p. 1.
31 Ibidem, p. 1.
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debate resulted in religious riots.
Muslim representatives led by Alhaji Shehu Shagari staged a walk-out in protest 
against the defeat of the Sharia proposal. This engendered a new wave of protests 
and demonstrations from the public, some in support and some against the Sharia. 
The head of state, General Obasanjo, intervened to halt the debate. What finally 
emerged in the 1979 Constitution was a compromise in which the English and Islamic 
judicial systems were juxtaposed. Existing Sharia courts were sanctioned. New ones 
could be established in states that required them by parliamentary resolution and 
confirmation by the state governor. Jibrin Ibrahim observes that this dual legal system 
is most undesirable for Nigerian unity.35
The Sharia debate was planned by the Hausa/Fulani ruling elite to promote its 
political ambitions for the Second Republic.36 Islam has been a useful tool enabling 
the group to maintain political power in post-colonial Nigeria. During the First Republic 
they achieved this through Islamization policies disguised as northernization policies. 
To regain power after the January 1966 military coup, the group ‘quickly cast its 
interests against a wider spectrum by arguing for the need to guard "northern 
interests"’.37 Northern interests was only a euphemism for Islamic interests. The 
oligarchy reasoned that their power would be assured in the Second Republic if the 
old Northern Region could unite under the Muslim banner. That hope was dashed. 
They had not reckoned with the new political and social structures that had developed 
in the region as a result of the creation of more states. The irony is that the debate
35 Ibrahim, "The Politics of Religion in Nigeria", op. cit., p. 77.
36 See Chapter 4, Matthew Kukah, Religion and Politics in Northern Nigeria since 1960, Ph.D. 
Thesis, University of London, SOAS, 1989.
37 Ibidem, p. 7
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was initiated to mobilize Muslims but it instead became the rallying point for 
Christians.38
The Sharia issue again dominated the Constituent Assembly inaugurated in 
May 1988 to deliberate on political arrangements for the Third Republic. Muslims 
wanted a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal to be established as well as the extension 
of the Sharia law to the southern States. Christians did not only oppose this motion, 
they wanted the gains the Muslims made in the 1979 Constitution to be removed. The 
debate became very bitter, generating fears of a religious conflict spreading from the 
assembly to the entire country. History repeated itself as President Babangida 
intervened to halt the debate. This intervention can 'merely postpone the evil day’.39 
What is thought, by both sides, to be at stake in the Sharia issue is which religious 
group will possess the state.
RELIGIOUS EDIFICES FOR THE NEW CAPITAL
The federal government under Shagari gave a grant of 10 million naira to 
Muslims in 1982 to build a national mosque in Abuja.40 Christians protested against 
Shagari’s action and were made a similar offer which up till now has not been 
honoured by the state41 John Onaiyekan, Bishop of Morin, observed that it was ‘a 
lame excuse' to delay payment to Christians because not all of them belong to the 
Christian Association of Nigeria, pointing out that there was no similar demand for
38 Gilliland, African Religion Meets Islam, op. cit., p. 188.
39 Newswatch, Lagos, December 12, 1988, p. 20.
40 On assumption of office, Murtala Mohammed had similarly built a mosque at the State House, 
Dodan Barracks, but made no provision for a Christian place of worship.
41 Onaiyekan, "Secularism and the Nigerian State", op. cit., p. 10.
217
unanimity in the Muslim fold before their money was paid out.42 in defence of the 
government decision to fund the building of religious houses, the minister of internal 
affairs, Col. John Shagaya, observed that government thought it would be good to 
assist in providing funds to develop edifices that will serve not only for religious 
worship but also as monuments in our new federal capital, Abuja’.43 Such religious 
symbolism appears to belie the claim that Nigeria is veritably a secular state.
THE ‘FUNDAMENTALIST BACKLASH
In the Second Republic Nigeria witnessed an unprecedented religious uprising 
in Kano in 1980. An Islamic sect called Maitatsine caused riots in which at least 5000 
people died, including the leader of the sect, the self-proclaimed Muslim prophet, 
Mallam Muhammadu Marwa. Property worth millions of naira was destroyed. It took 
a combined operation by the army and the air force to quell the eleven-day revolt. The 
riots both alerted the country to the potentiality of new Islamic movements and marred 
the image of Muslims in Nigeria as united and peaceful.44
The Federal government set up a commission of inquiry under Justice Aniagolu 
to investigate the revolt. The commission’s report underscored the rising tide of Islamic 
fundamentalism among Muslim youths. It pointed out that the Muslim Students Society 
in the north did not recognize the Nigerian Constitution nor the existence of the federal 
government, and was committed to the attainment of an Islamic state through an
42 Ibidem, p. 10.
43 Thisweek, Lagos, March 14, 1988, p. 26.
44 Gilliland, op. cit., p. 192.
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Iranian type revolution.45
In October 1982, further Maitatsine revolts occurred in Bulunkutu, Maiduguri and 
Kano. But for the Kano revolt when some Muslim fundamentalists set fire to a church 
in Fegge, the Maitatsine would not have directly affected Christians.46 The federal 
government sent an emissary to CAN in Kano with a gift of 75,000 naira. The official 
status of this gift is however unclear. Perhaps it was meant to buy Christians’ silence, 
perhaps it was part of compensation, perhaps it was Shagari’s way of muddling 
through.147
The Maitatsines caused two further revolts in Jimeta-Yola, Gongola State, in 
1984 and in Gombe, Bauchi State in 1985. The Jimeta-Yola riots were reported to 
have claimed 1,000 lives and property worth five million naira.48 The Gongola State 
government estimated that it would cost over 61 million naira to reconstruct and fully 
rehabilitate the town. A total of 789 families made up of about 6,000 people were 
registered as displaced victims for relief materials.
Various explanations have been given for the Maitatsine revolts. The Aniagolu 
Commission that investigated the riots blamed it on the rising tide of Islamic 
fundamentalism and fanaticism among youth. Doi argued that its adherents were 
foreigners sponsored by forces hostile to Islam and its progress in Nigeria.49 Peter 
Clarke traced the roots of the movement to nineteenth century Islamic millenarianism
45 Report of the Aniagolu Commission cited in Olupona, "Muslim-Christian Relations in Nigeria", op. 
cit., p. 23.
46 Ibidem, p. 23.
47 Ekoko and Amadi, "Religion and Stability in Nigeria", op. cit., p. 122.
48 Ibidem, p. 128.
49 Doi, Islam in Nigeria, op. cit., pp. 293-302.
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and Mahdism in the area, relating the message and figure of Maitatsine to theories of 
revolution and socio-economic deprivation.50 Jacob Oiupona similarly claims that it 
was a purely Muslim Millenarian movement that was protesting against religious and 
social oppression in contemporary Nigerian society.51 Paul Lubeck, while 
acknowledging its millenarian tradition contends that the movement revealed a clear 
class antagonism within its ideology.52 Irrespective of which view is correct, 
Maitatsine may be seen as an expression of popular disillusionment with elite-led 
secular nationalism.
THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ISSUE
In January 1986 the Babangida regime surreptitiously made Nigeria a member 
of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), a body which promotes international 
Islamic solidarity. Christians were outraged. To them, it was a dangerous development, 
a covert imposition of a state religion and the abandonment of the secular status of 
the state. Muslims responded that it had nothing to do with Islam as a state religion 
and pointed to secular states such as Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau 
which are members of the organization. They claimed that the action was an economic 
one, to obtain desperately needed funds from the Islamic Development Bank, for 
which membership of the OIC is a requirement.53 Nigeria had just before then
50 Peter Clarke, "The Maitatsine Movement in Northern Nigeria in Historical and Current 
Perspective", in Rosalind I.J. Hackett, New Religious Movements in Nigeria, New York, The Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1987, pp. 93-116.
51 Oiupona, op. cit., p. 23.
52 Paul Lubeck, "Islamic Protest under Semi-Industrial Capitalism: Yan Tatsine Explained", Africa, 
Journal of the International African Institute, 55 (4), 1985, pp. 369-389.
53 Newswatch, October 8, 1990, p. 42.
220
rejected the IMF terms for a loan. Christians were unimpressed by the economic 
explanation.
President Babangida used the opportunity of his meeting with Catholic Bishops 
to comment on the Christian argument against OIC membership. He denied that the 
constitutional clause on religion entails the separation of state and religion. According 
to him such interpretation:
unnecessarily placed the State in a position of either neglecting religion 
outright as a factor in our national life or treating it with benign neglect.
This would be quite inconsistent with the central role religion plays in the 
lives of our people. ... the normative role of religion in the attitude and 
conduct of our people cannot simply be ignored. We have therefore 
decided not to so ignore religion as a potent weapon of social 
mobilization.54
He contended that religion should be given the opportunity to assist mobilization not 
only in the educational sphere but in all spheres of development:
Accordingly, we shall not neglect any opportunity to serve our national 
interest in any reasonable international forum. The same policy of 
propagating our national interest has been pursued by many nations 
outside the African continent with very positive results. To this end, the
54 Major General Ibrahim B. Babangida, "Positive Encouragement to Every Religion", Collected 
Speeches of the President; Lagos, Federal Ministry of Information and Culture, p. 252.
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Nigerian flag will be raised in every international forum to which we have 
sufficient reason to belong or to attend.55
The President’s defiant attitude made Christians more nervous. The Anglican Bishop 
of Kwara, Herbert Haruna, warned the government to beware of a religious war while 
appealing to Christians in the armed forces to defend their faith.56
The issue effectively divided the country into Christians and Muslims. 
Government and media institutions were polarized, and Government secrets were 
routinely leaked to religious leaders. Public servants at the external affairs ministry 
believed that it was Iheir moral duty to do so’.57 Each group accused the other of 
domination and vowed to defend their position with their lives. Many died in the 
ensuing protests, especially in Kano, Kaduna, Kwara and Oyo States. Embarrassed, 
Babangida set up a committee with an equal number of Christians and Muslims to 
examine the ‘implications of Nigeria’s full membership of the OIC’. The panel was 
predictably divided. It eventually submitted its report (some say two conflicting reports). 
The details have never been made public.
The covert manner in which the country became a member of the OIC was 
partially responsible for the conflict over the issue. Babangida’s second-in-command, 
Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe, an Igbo, denied any knowledge about the issue. He claimed 
that it was never discussed by the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). The 
information minister, Tony Ukpo, confirmed that the matter was not officially discussed.
55 Ibidem, p. 252.
56 Newswatch, February 24, 1986, p 14.
57 Ibidem, p. 15.
222
Besides, the decision to join broke an already established pattern. Nigeria had 
maintained an observer status in the organization for 17 years. When the organization 
was established in 1971 the government had made it clear that it had no intention of 
becoming a full member. Successive heads of state steered clear of the issue and 
played safe but General Buhari decided to tackle the issue. He arranged for Nigeria 
to become a full-fledged member, but before he could execute his plans he was 
overthrown. Non-Muslims felt that President Babangida took the decision in an attempt 
to appease the Hausa/Fulani oligarchy unhappy with the overthrow of the Buhari 
regime which had been seen as representing their interests.58 They therefore felt that 
it was a deliberate slap in the face.59
Nigeria is alleged to have withdrawn its membership of the OIC. However, the 
harm cannot so readily be undone. The issue effectively divided Nigerians 'into 
Christian Nigerians and Muslim Nigerians’.60 No official announcement has been 
made confirming the withdrawal of membership, presumably to prevent further 
violence. The speculation is that the government consulted the ministry of justice as 
to the legality of its action and was advised that it was unconstitutional since the 
decision to join was not approved by the AFRC. What chance has secular nationalism 
when its holy book, the constitution, fails to inspire reverence from its high priest, the 
president?
58 Financial Times, London, Monday, March 19, 1990, p. XIV.
59 Adegbesan, "Pragmatic Involvement in Religious Matters", op. cit., p. 104.
60 Ekoko and Amadi, op. cit., 130.
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THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS (NACRA)
A National Advisory Council on Religious Affairs (NACRA) was established in 
June 1986 as a result of the OIC conflict. Its main objective is to promote national 
unity and to maintain peace among all faiths. To this effect it is expected to regulate 
religious activities and to promote dialogue, consultation, understanding and social 
harmony amongst religious groups. It is to resolve issues which tend to cause 
suspicion, mistrust and antagonism among religious groups, and identify programmes 
and projects that will promote religious harmony and national integration as well as 
enhancing social and moral values.
It took over a year from its establishment for NACRA to be inaugurated. 
Christians refused to participate. Because of the evident political power of Islam, 
Christians feared that they would be the losers in a government-controlled council. In 
their view, it would be equivalent to a ministry of religion such as that which normally 
exists in countries that have an official religion with the purpose of promoting one 
religion at the expense of others.61
While these arguments were going on, the first major violent conflict between 
Christians and Muslims occurred in Kaduna State. The conflict began as a 
misunderstanding between Christians and Muslims at the College of Education, 
Kafanchan, and subsequently spread to other parts of the state. As happened after 
the massacres of May and September 1966, many residents of the core area of the 
uprising lost confidence in the ability of government to protect them and left ‘foreign 
territory’ for their ‘homelands’.62
61 Onaiyekan, "Secularism and the Nigerian State", op. cit. p. 11.
62 Ibrahim, "The Politics of Religion in Nigeria", op. cit., p. 65
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It is not by accident that the confrontation between Christians and Muslims 
occurred in Kaduna State. The south of the state is predominantly Christian while the 
north comprising the Zaria emirate is Muslim. The indigenous ethnic groups within the 
Christian areas, generally referred to as Southern Zaria people, have historically 
resented the Hausa/Fulani settlers because of their traditional control of political power 
in the area. Kafanchan itself is a 'southern Zaria’ town, predominantly Christian with 
settler Muslim Hausa/Fulani communities. The conflict thus had both ethnic and 
religious connotations.
President Babangida, in a nation-wide broadcast, described the unrest as the 
'civilian equivalent of an attempted coup d’etat’ against the government and the 
Nigerian nation’.63 He saw the riots as part of the intrigue and competition for power 
between the elites. He proscribed all religious associations in institutions of higher 
learning for one year and set up a tribunal to deal with the criminal aspects of the 
crisis. In response to federal government order, the Kaduna State government set up 
a committee headed by the state Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice, Mrs 
H. N. Donli, to probe the social aspects of the riots.
The riots convinced Christian leaders to participate in the proposed advisory 
council on religion. The government on June 29 1987 inaugurated the council, 
selecting equal numbers of Muslims and Christians. The decree establishing the 
council was amended to accommodate the objections of Christians.
A council comprising equal number of Christians and Muslims is unlikely to 
achieve much. What government has effectively done is to set the two groups against 
each other. For example, members could not agree on a chairman. They decided for
63 Radio Broadcast by President Babangida on March 16, 1987.
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two chairmen, one from each faith and with equal powers, in order to remove the fear
i
of domination. Traditional religionists were not invited to the council, a measure which 
might have mitigated the extreme positions of the two camps and enhanced cultural 
nationalism.
Official policy towards traditional religion is ambivalent. Through the promotion 
of “traditional culture’, indigenous religious beliefs were accorded rights in law, 
administrative policy, medicine, psychiatry and pharmacology.64 Marriages and 
contractual obligations sealed customarily were legitimated. The government has set 
up two different panels to study traditional healing which is tied to traditional religion. 
Practitioners of indigenous religion are now recognized as having a religion. Whereas 
indigenous religious forms were previously referred to as paganism and animism, they 
are now referred to as traditional religion. The minister of internal affairs, Col. 
Shagaya, pointedly told the journalist who referred to traditional religious rituals as 
paganism that “there is nothing like paganism, rather they are called Traditional 
Religion because they also recognize the existence of God and therefore have a 
religion.’65 In official forms, traditional religion now respectably appears where it was 
once not an acceptable alternative to Christianity and Islam. For example, in the 1973 
census all Nigerians were required to identify themselves as either Muslim or Christian 
and thus, the government was already inadvertently promoting a cleavage between 
Christianity and Islam.66 Traditional African religion is now taught in schools as part 
of religious knowledge. Yet, it has not been accorded any significant role in nation-
64 Ogbu U. Kalu, "Religions in Nigeria: an Overview", in J.A. Atanda et al. (eds.), Nigeria Since 
Independence: the First 25 Years, Volume IX, Religion, op. cit., p. 23.
65 Thisweek, Lagos, March 14, 1988, p. 26.
66 Gilliland, op. cit., p. 171.
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building.
At the inauguration of the council, the Chief of General Staff and second-in- 
command to president Babangida, Vice-Admiral Aikhomu, warned the members not 
to forget that there are other religions in Nigeria besides Islam and Christianity. The 
warning was bound to be futile. Members can only represent their respective religions. 
The Catholic Bishop of lloriri, a member of the council, remarked that they would have 
regarded the warning as mischievous but ‘for the dignity of its source’.67 By providing 
only for Christians and Muslims in the Council the government is effectively indicating 
that traditional religion, unlike Islam and Christianity, has no place in nation-building, 
as well as inadvertently reinforcing the existing cleavage between the two organized 
religious blocs.
POPULAR REACTIONS
The contravention of the secular basis of the state by the series of Muslim-led 
governments from 1979 onwards raised Muslim expectations. It particularly 
encouraged fundamentalist political activism in the northern states where Islamization 
policies were vigorously pursued.68 Islamic fundamentalism would not have posed a 
problem for nationalism but for its active campaign against secularism and for the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria. Christian radicalism has arisen to oppose 
such fundamentalist ideas. As a result of the activities of Islamic fundamentalist and 
Christian radical groups, institutions intended to foster nationalism now foster religious 
solidarity.
67 John Onaiyekan, "Secularism and the Nigerian State”, op. cit., p. 8.
68 Oiupona, op. cit., p. 20.
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In May 1986, the statue of Christ at the Protestant Chapel, University of Ibadan, 
was burnt down. The arsonists were assumed to be Muslim because they left Arabic 
inscriptions on the walls of the chapel. The antagonism between Christians and 
Muslims at the University started in 1985 at the opening of the new mosque when 
Muslims called for the removal of the cross erected with the chapel in 1953. The 
cross, they complained, was in the direction of the Kibla and as such distracted their 
attention during prayers.
The NYSC camps are divided between Christians and Muslims. 
Announcements of such meetings as the NYSC’s Christian Corpers’ Crusaders, 
Muslim Doctors’ Association, Christian Lawyers Corpers’ Fellowship and so on, are rife 
in NYSC news bulletins.69 In 1987, students of Queen Amina College (formerly 
Queen of Apostles College) Kaduna, rioted in rejection of a new school uniform seen 
as Islamic. The old European-style uniform was seen by the Muslims as Christian. A 
similar riot took place at the Federal Government Girls College, Lagos.
Politicians prepared to battle for the Third Republic on religious lines as soon 
as President Babangida lifted the ban on party politics. Alhaji Gumi, an Islamic scholar, 
leader of the Izala fundamentalist group and a member of the NACRA, wanted the 
country to be divided if Christians did not accept a Muslim president.70 Dr. Chief 
Arthur Nzeribe, an Igbo multi millionaire businessman, not only called for all Christians 
to unite and elect a Christian President but for the presidential candidates of the 
aspiring parties to be Christian Southerners.71 To forestall this, the President
69 Ibidem, p. 43.
70 Quality, Lagos, October, 1987, p. 35.
71 Arthur Nzeribe, Nigeria I Believe: a Manifesto for the 3rd Republic, London, Kilimanjaro, 1988,
p. 10.
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dissolved all aspiring political associations and imposed two secular parties, the Social 
Democratic Party and the National Republican Convention.
In January 1990 Christians protested over their under representation in the 
Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). Babangida had reshuffled his cabinet replacing 
the existing Armed Forces service chiefs with three Muslims - Sunny Abacha (Army), 
Murtala Nyako (Navy), and Nuriemi Yusuf (Airforce). Christian leaders interpreted the 
action as anti-Christian and called on Christians to protest. President Babangida 
cancelled his planned trip to the USA at the last minute to defuse the tension.
On April 22, 1990, a group of mainly Christian soldiers carried out what has 
been described by government as ‘Nigeria’s bloodiest coup’. According to the radio 
broadcast by Major Gideon Orkar, a leader of the coup, the predominantly Muslim 
states of Sokoto, Katsina, Kano, Borno and Bauchi were to be expelled from Nigeria 
‘as a temporary shock measure’.
In March 1991 there was a religious riot in Katsina. In April 1991 seven 
churches were burnt down in religious riots in which more than 84 people died in 
Bauchi and over 200 in Tafawa Balewatown. Muslims claimed that Christians caused 
the riots when they rejected Muslim demands that an abattoir in Tafawa Balewa town 
should not be used for the slaughter of pigs and dogs. Christians claimed that the 
Muslims were encouraged to riot by the spiritual leader of the pro-Iranian Islamic 
Movement, Mallam Ibrahim El Zakzaky. He was believed to have ordered that 
Governor Madaki, a Christian, be killed for supporting blasphemy against the 
Prophet.72 That Zakzaky had the audacity to impose a death warrant on a military 
Governor, and that his followers are fanatical enough to carry it out, testifies to both
72 West Africa, London, 20-26 May, 1991, p. 796.
the increasing importance of religion in national life and the deep legitimacy crisis 
facing secular nationalism. The violent religious uprisings in the north in July 1992 and 
January 1993 provide further evidence that religion is an increasingly important factor 
in Nigeria’s quest for nationhood.
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CHAPTER NINE 
ETHNICITY IN NIGERIA 
Introduction
In this and subsequent chapters I shall examine the nature of ethnicity and 
nationalism in Nigeria. The theoretical issues examined concern the relationship 
between ethnic identity and nationalism. Ethnicity has remained a major dynamic of 
national life in Nigeria despite government efforts to undermine it and bring about 
homogeneity. Nevertheless, the persistence of ethnic cleavages has not hindered the 
development of some sort of nationalist spirit. As Keith Panter-Brick has pointed out, 
it would be wrong to deny the place of nationalism in present day Nigeria.1 'It reached 
a quite high pitch under the brief leadership of General Murtala Mohammed, 
expressing itself most strongly in foreign policy and in widespread demands for a 
national ideology'.2 In some instances the Nigerian political identity has been preferred 
to the ethnic identity as in the case of the Hausa inhabitants of Yardaji village.3 If, as 
traditional sociological wisdom indicates, ethnicity and nationalism are not only 
different but also mutually incompatible, how are they then harmonized in the 
individual Nigerian? Are they fundamentally incompatible and prone to conflict or can 
they, despite their different claims on the individual, co-exist in harmony?
I shall argue that ethnicity and nationalism complement each other in Nigeria.
1 Keith Panter-Brick (ed.), Soldiers and Oil: the Political Transformation of Nigeria, London, Frank 
Cass, 1978, p. 6.
2 Ibidem, p. 6.
3 William F.S. Miles, "Self-Identity, Ethnic Identity and National Consciousness: an Example from 
Rural Hausaland", in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Volume 9, No. 4, October 1986, pp. 439-440.
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Both are related variables playing a role in the formation of national societies. Anthony 
Smith’s Ethnic Origins of Nations carries this message.4 While ethnicity may, in some 
circumstances and in some areas of life, obstruct the growth of national identity and 
cohesion, it may not do so in others. Ethnicity and nationalism are made more 
compatible by some of the intended and unintended effects which each set of 
processes has on the others.
The nature of ethnicity in contemporary Nigeria is dealt with in this chapter while 
nationalism is examined in Chapter Ten. The new religious setting for the interaction 
between ethnicity and nationalism is examined in Chapter Eleven.
NIGERIAN ETHNICITY: A NORMAL BEHAVIOUR
Ethnic identity is a real matter for socio-political calculation and engineering in 
Nigeria. People use their ethnic ties and cleavages rationally, in order to attain their 
individual aims, whether these are housing, employment, scholarship, school 
admission, or political office. An Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa, or Tiv person who needs 
something from the state may be quite aware of the official procedure by which to 
apply for it, nevertheless, he is also aware that things are done unofficially with the 
strategic use of ethnic, friendship or pecuniary ties. The various levels of the society 
- political and economic, urban and rural, privileged and less privileged - are held 
together by ties of mutual self-interest. Such a system was described by Max Weber 
in relation to religion as a system of social and ethical conduct of association of
4 Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986.
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neighbours.5
in such a system, two principles are elemental. The first is the dualism of in­
group and out-group morality and the second, apathy for out-group morality, and 
simple reciprocity for in-group morality.6 The principled obligation for in-group morality 
is to give fraternal support to members of the group in need. Hence, to the average 
Nigerian, a political leader is good only if he is able to patronize members of his family 
at the expense of other families, to promote the cause of his tribe at the expense of 
the nation, and, if need be, to defend the wrong of a brother at the expense of 
justice’.7
Reciprocity is the key notion in such a system. The procedure follows the basic 
principle of 'you do me, I do you’, in Nigerian Pidgin, meaning 'as you do unto me I 
shall do unto you’. The underlying notion is, your want of today may be mine 
tomorrow. Although this principle is seldom rationalized, it plays its part in the 
sentiment of ethnic exchange. Not to respond is to break an unwritten ethical code of 
conduct. It is seen as the duty of those who respond to do so. This sort of ethnicity 
is criticized as opportunistic. However, the opportunism is sanctioned and accepted 
by the society as normal behaviour.8 Those for whom it works less well may decry it 
as nepotism, tribalism or corruption. The game is one in which opportunity knocks but 
once, and only fools refuse to make use of such opportunity. To miss the opportunity
5 H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, London, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 329.
6 Ibidem, p. 329.
7 William D. Graf and Aminu Tijjani (eds.), Shehu Shagari: My Vision of Nigeria, London, Frank 
Cass, 1981, p. xxi.
8 Peil Margaret, Nigerian Politics: the People’s View, London, Cassell & Company, 1976, p. 67.
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is to lose out. Such thinking informs the 'collective belief that public office is a basket 
of ripe fruits’ and, 'every so often, new people must be allowed their presumed access 
to it’.9 The only sensible thing to do is to wait for one’s turn. To a non-Nigerian this 
may sound cynical. But, as Dan Agbese has observed:
One good reason changes in government and in the ranks of political 
office-holders is so loudly hailed by Nigerians derives from this singular, 
even if erroneous, view. If there are no changes, the nation faces the 
danger of seeing only one group of persons "chop". And that is patently 
wrong. A/a only one man go chop?0
Reciprocal ethnicity is beneficial. It acts as a social insurance for Nigerians in 
the absence of an official welfare system. It is a convenient means for the association 
of peoples and it provides mutual aid. For instance, it ‘provides a buffer for new 
entrants into the cities and for those who find themselves in difficulty thereby ensuring 
mutual aid and leadership, providing common welfare, security and credit and offering 
a basis for links with the rural areas’.11 Moreover, 'it recognizes a principle of 
differentiation whereby the opportunities of non-elites are maximized.’12
Most analyses of ethnicity in Nigeria tend to accuse elites of manipulating ethnic
9 Dan Agbese, "For the Nth Time", in Newswatch, Lagos, August 8, 1988, p. 4.
10 Ibidem, p. 4.
11 Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu, Fourth Dimension, 1978, p. 31.
12 Lawrence Frank, "Ideological Competition in Nigeria: Urban Populism versus Elite Nationalism", 
in JMAS, 17, 3, 1979, p. 451.
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identity for their own ends.13 The issue of why ordinary people submit to this 
manipulation is ultimately explained in terms of the common man’s susceptibility to 
false consciousness. My observation is that both elites and ordinary people are 
engaged in a reciprocal process in which ethnic ties are used to bargain. Ethnicity, 
unlike wealth or education or machine guns, or status, is equally available to the 
common man.14 Low status people respond to ethnicity because it is the principle of 
differentiation that is least disadvantageous to them.15 Hence they too are engaged 
in the manipulation of ethnic identity.
Educated Nigerians often claim that they are not ethnocentric. Such claims were 
not supported by evidence. In a pilot study which I conducted on Nigerian students at 
Oxford University in the summer of 1985, direct attitudinal surveys proved ineffective. 
All respondents denied being ethnically conscious in their dealings with fellow 
Nigerians from other ethnic groups. They were very cagey in their responses, but this 
was not totally unexpected as ethnicity is castigated and derided, particularly among 
intellectuals. However, their ethnic biases became plain when I asked their opinion on 
contentious national issues like the federal character, the creation of more states and 
the minority problem. Their perceptions on these issues were determined by the extent 
to which they were advantaged or otherwise by their particular ethnic identities.
Everyone feels ’ethnic’ at one time or the other, depending on circumstances
13 See for instance Nnoli, Ethnic politics in Nigeria, op. cit., pp. 176-177; Onigu Otite, Ethnic 
Pluralism and Ethnicity in Nigeria, Ibadan, Shaneson C.l. Limited, 1990, pp. 25, 74,159; and Richard 
L. Sklar, "Ethnic Relations and Social Class", in A.O. Sanda, Ethnic Relations in Nigeria: Problems and 
Prospects, Ibadan, Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan, 1976, p. 151.
14 Lawrence Frank, "Ideological Competition in Nigeria: Urban Populism versus Elite Nationalism", 
op. cit., p. 451.
15 Ibidem, p. 452.
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and the issues that are being addressed. As the head of state, General Buhari, 
pointed out ‘ail of us are guilty’ of ethnic chauvinism.16 Rejection of one’s ethnic 
identity does not obviate the identity. Others will call upon the individual who has 
repudiated his ethnic identity to perform’, as Obi Okonkwo discovered to his 
detriment.17 In an individual’s evaluation of any given situation, many factors will be 
critical, but some of them may be related to his ethnic identity.18
Ethnic categorization is common. Nigerians seldom categorize others by their 
wealth or occupation.19 With the creation of states a new dimension has been added 
to ethnic categorization. People now identify themselves and others by their state of 
origin. Although state sentiments are referred to by some Nigerians as statism, there 
is really no major difference between such sentiments and ethnic sentiments because 
an individual’s ethnic identity is recognizable from his state of origin. Ethnic 
categorization, thus, informs official government practice which requires Nigerians to 
identify their state of origin on official application forms. Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, 
the ex-Biafran leader, decried such a situation, observing that:
In Nigeria, the accident of birth is sacrosanct. So also the accident of 
geography, the accident of language, the accident of religion, the
16 Rosaline Odeh, Muhammadu Buhari: Nigeria's Seventh Head of State, Lagos, Federal 
Department of Information, May 1984, p. 35.
17 Obi Okonkwo is the tragic hero in No Longer at Ease, Chinua Achebe's sequel to his celebrated 
novel, Things Fall Apart. In the novel, Obi Okonkwo refuses to acknowledge his ethnic ties by shunning 
his tribal union in Lagos, the Umuofia Progressive Union, and it leads to his downfall.
18 Peil, Nigerian Politics: the People’s View, op. cit. p. 69.
19 James O. Ogunlade, "Ethnic Identification and Preference of some School Children in Western 
Nigeria", in Sanda, O.A. (ed.) Ethnic Relations in Nigeria, p. 65.
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accident of tribal marks and the accident of dress... Each of these is 
regarded in Nigeria as immutable. Each can decide and does decide to 
a large extent the subjects place in society. Yet we preach ad nauseam 
ad infinitum the gospel of unity. Who is deceiving who?20
Competition for jobs and frustration at failure are seen in ethnic terms. For 
instance, campaigners for the release from detention of the ex-governor of Anambra 
State, Jim Nwobodo, claimed that Nwobodo was ‘simply unfortunate to have been 
bom in this part of the country’, implying that if he were not Igbo he would have long 
been released.21 This tendency to interpret failure in ethnic terms has been 
exacerbated by federal character and the quota system.
Ethnic rivalries are useful in Nigeria. They are especially used to negotiate 
terms favourable to ethnic elites. For example, the rivalry between ethnic majorities 
and minorities enabled the emergence of minority political leaders championing their 
emancipation through the creation of states. With almost half the numbers of states 
presently in their control, the minority ethnic groups still complain vigorously of neglect. 
Majority/minority rivalry still remains a major national problem with yet new minorities 
and champions emerging. The convenience of majority/minority rivalry is graphically 
portrayed by Abdullahi Mahdi, the head of the History Department at ABU, Zaria, who 
has observed that once those who present themselves as champions of ethnic 
minority interests ‘are heard and identified and are given pittance, they keep quiet’.22
20 Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Because I am Involved, Spectrum Books, Ibadan, 1989, p. 23.
21 Newswave, Lagos, August, 1988, p. 34.
22 Newswatch, Lagos, October 8, 1990, p. 64.
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Ethnic bargaining is therefore a predominant feature of Nigerian politics. The 
advantage of threat forces immediate settlement. Leaders bargain because they 
disagree and expect that further agreement is possible and will be profitable. A 
compromise arrived at by bargaining is necessary to a successful election alliance:
Because individuals in different groups may also share membership in 
another group, compromise by bargaining is stimulated. Because 
individuals in different groups share some common values, bargaining 
is possible. And because different issues activate different combinations 
of groups, compromise by bargaining is continuous.23
Ethnic stereotypes are widespread. This tends to encourage people to use 
ethnicity to characterize those with whom they have no closer ties. For instance, the 
Igbos are stereotyped as the Jews of Nigeria, willing to sell their souls for money; the 
Hausas as stupid and mindless followers of their tradition and leaders; and the 
Yorubas as dirty and shifty people seeking to reap where they have not sown. The 
rampant effect of such stereotypes are believed to be the result of upbringing. Sanusi 
Abubakar decried the practice of encouraging children to perceive the Yorubas as a 
dirty, conniving, conspiratorial lot, or the Igbos as shifty, money-centred and potential 
robbers or the Hausa/Fulani as lazy, ignorant beggars and herdsmen, as inimical to 
nationalism24 A study of Yoruba school children concluded that the respondents
23 Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, New York, Harper & 
Row, 1963, p. 333.
24 Sanusi Abubakar, "Ethnicism and Nationalism'', Hotline, Kaduna, March, 1987, p. 24.
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'were merely projecting the stereotype feelings of their parents’ in not thinking well of 
the Igbos.25
No single agency can be held responsible for transmitting stereotypes to 
children. The children in the survey cited above were more likely to have been 
influenced by the federal propaganda which at that time portrayed the Igbos as rebels 
'and the ethnic group that plunged the federation into the recent civil war.’26 Ethnic 
stereotypes are more likely to be disseminated through what Uchendu has called 
‘joking relationships’ in a pan-ethnic framework.27 Ethnic stereotypes are, then, not 
all pejorative.
Ethnic categorization is reinforced by links between urban and rural areas. Most 
urban dwellers are immigrants born and bred in the rural areas. Only a tiny minority 
of the present adult population is urban born. Urban residence is regarded as 
transient. Home means the ancestral village. Generally, migrants to the city maintain 
close links with those at home by frequent visits. Such links are further reinforced by 
the formation of ethnic associations in the cities and abroad28 As ‘Lai Olurode has 
observed the Nigerian experience has always taught one to be loyal in whatever one 
engages in toward one's place of origin as one hopes to retire or be buried there as
25 Ogunlade 0 . James, "Ethnic Identification and Preference of some School Children in Western 
Nigeria", op. cit., pp. 61-67.
26 Ibidem, p. 63.
27 Victor C. Uchendu, "The Dilemma of Ethnicity and Polity Primacy in Black Africa", in George De 
Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross (eds.), Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuity and Change, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1975, p. 272.
28 My daughter belongs to one such association, the Umu Imo (the children of Imo) Society, here 
in London.
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well’.29 Only a fool would disregard issues affecting his home town or local 
government area where he may be confined in future.30 To prove the point, Shagari 
and his vice president, Ekwueme, have been restricted by military order to their 
villages.
The standard sociological theory for modernization and ultimately nation- 
building, invariably looks to the city as the locus for the formation of national, supra- 
ethnic identity within the developing countries.31 In the process of social mobilization, 
the city becomes a sort of melting pot as kinship links become weaker, local 
languages and dialects give way to the dominant national language and local cultures 
and customs lose their sway. The Nigerian experience controverts this assumption.
Ethnic attachment is a more important element of personal identity in cities than 
in villages. In rural areas, ethnic identity is not an issue. People usually do not ask 
themselves if they feel more Nigerian or more ethnic in their ethnic homeland.32 It is 
in the cities that contact between members of the ethnic groups occurs. Native urban 
dwellers resent migrants and often exert pressures on city administration to protect 
their traditional, but illegal rights’.33 Non-indigenous dwellers on the other hand feel 
alienated and reluctant to participate in the development of the city. This has 
hampered national integration. In Lagos, the 'sons of the soil’ regularly harass the
29 ‘Lai Olurode, A Political Economy of Nigeria’s 1983 Elections, Ikeja, Lagos, John West 
Publications, 1990, p. 160.
30 Ibidem, p. 160.
31 See Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT 
Press, 1966.
32 See William F.S. Miles, "Self-Identity, Ethnic Affinity and National Consciousness: an example 
from rural Hausaland", op. cit., p. 439.
331.A. Animashaun, "Urbanization and its Implications for Nigerian Development", in J.U. Obot (ed.), 
Nigeria: the People and their Heritage, Calabar, Wusen Press, 1987, p. 212.
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strangers’, particularly Igbo traders, for allegedly prospering at the expense of native 
Lagosians. The ethno-religious conflicts in the north stem from such tension. Most 
northern cities [in comparison to southern cities] have a disproportionate concentration 
of southerners who live in sabon garis, that is strangers’ quarters. When these 
strangers become prosperous the local people feel threatened and are quick to remind 
the strangers that the land does not belong to them:
Whether in the university or in the cities, when non Northerners own big 
businesses or become church leaders or heads of departments they 
constitute a serious threat to the hegemony of the ruling class in the 
region unless they behave accordingly and these circumstances have 
been part of the conflicts in Northern Nigeria.34
Moreover, rural urban migration has been due to the ‘push’ factors of intolerable 
rural poverty rather than the ‘pull’ of industrialization and employment exerted by the 
urban areas. Urban amenities are inadequate and at various degrees of inefficiency 
and decay. Mass urban unemployment and poverty prevails. This has been 
exacerbated by large-scale retrenchment of public sector workers by the military and 
economic depression since the 1980s. It is the net-work of social relations - village and 
ethnic associations, ethnic contacts, friends, co-workers, neighbours - that makes it 
possible for the disadvantaged to remain in the city even when conditions are bad. 
Ethnicity is thus an important means of survival in the city.
34 Matthew Kukah, Religion and Politics in Northern Nigeria since 1960, Ph.D. Thesis, University 
of London, SO AS, 1990, p. 297
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THE NATURE OF ETHNIC IDENTITY IN NIGERIA
Multiple ethnic identity is prevalent among Nigerians. An individual can claim 
three or more ethnic identities simultaneously. For instance, the Ukwani ethnic group 
has eight sub-groups within it - Ogume, Abbi, Umukwata, Amai, Umutu, etc.. Within 
these sub-groups, there are further sub-groups which also divide further into 
sub-groups. For example, the Ogume sub-category divides into seven groups - 
Ogbagu-Ogume, Ogbe-Ogume, Ogbole, Onitcha-Uno, Umuchime, Utue and Umu-Ebu. 
Within each of these, there are further divisions into ward or clan groups, then into 
kinship groups. An Ukwuani man can then be an Ogume man, an Ogbagu-Ogume 
man and an Umu-Enalu man depending on the purpose of his social interaction. Onigu 
Otite stated that multiple ethnic identities may be acquired first by descent through the 
father in a patrilineal society such as the Hausa, Bini, Kanuri and Urhobo, or through 
the mother in a matrilineal/double descent society such as the Afikpo, the Fulani and 
the Yakurr, and secondly through matrifiliation or patrifiliation, using and exploiting 
complementary kinship rather than descent, for merely being the child of his or her 
parent in a unilineal descent system.35 Similarly, William Miles observed that eight 
or nine separate attributes of self-identity might be elicited for each person among the 
Hausa group he studied.36 The form of ethnic group identity prevalent in Nigeria 
therefore differs from the ideal-types expounded in anti-nation-building theory, that is 
the primordialist and the instrumentalist types.37 The first stresses the affective 
components in identity formation. The second adopts a sociological stance and
35 Onigu Otite, Ethnic Pluralism and Ethnicity in Nigeria, op. cit., p. 27.
36 William F.S. Miles, "Self-identity, Ethnic Affinity and National Consciousness", op. cit., p. 432.
37 Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds.), Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 19.
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concentrates on the way in which social circumstances influence degrees of ethnic 
attachment, mobilization and conflict. These ideal-types assume that individuals have 
only one privileged ethnic identity.
Perceptions of ethnic identities are very accommodating. In urban centres 
migrants may be identified as members of groups which they would not acknowledge 
at home. Thus an Onitsha migrant in Lagos will be identified with other Igbos, whom 
he would normally deny if he was at Onitsha. In the same manner, an Egba-Yoruba 
and an Ijebu-Yoruba are perceived as one even though the rivalry between the Egbas 
and Ijebus has been an historical one. People from the north are all perceived as 
Hausa in the south. Sub-groups within ethnic groups may have a history of internecine 
conflict like the Yoruba and Hausa groups. They may have dialects that differ so much 
that they are unintelligible to each other, as with some Igbo groups. Yet to the outside 
world the groups appear as monolithic interest groups.
Group boundaries are not rigid. Effective ties claimed under certain 
circumstances may be denied at other times. Two groups may unite for the purpose 
of co-operative action, like getting a new state service for their areas, or they may fight 
bitterly to have an amenity sited in their respective areas. For instance, the Sade and 
Fika communities in Bauchi State cooperate on religious matters but are divided on 
land matters. They have fought a series of bloody battles over a piece of farmland.38 
Similarly, the Ogbagu-Ogume and the Ogbe-Ogume communities have fought bitterly 
over the leadership of the Ogume group. Their rivalry is such that each has an Orie
38 Sade and Fika are both border communities with Sade in Bauchi State and Fika in Bomo State. 
It is common for sub-groups within ethnic groups to wage war on each other because of land.
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Ogume or market day, instead of a common one for the entire Ogume community.39 
Despite their enmity there is a high rate of inter-marriage between the two groups. 
They co-operated to fight for a new highway through their territory, and for a 
secondary school for the entire Ogume community. Within the Urhobo group, 
intra-ethnic conflict resolves into pan-Urhobo unity vis-a-vis neighbouring Bini (Edo) 
or Itsekiri ethnic groups. The Urhobo and the Itsekiri groups have fought bitter battles 
but the two groups are inter-mixed by marriage.
Ethnic boundaries are therefore adjusted according to circumstances and the 
self interests of the groups. Such situations may be objectively or subjectively defined, 
externally or internally induced, and may be redefined by the affected individuals, sub­
groups and groups at any given time. For instance, Akintola’s UPP was as Yoruba as 
Awolowo’s Action Group but the identity which the two men used in their competition 
for leadership was not the Yoruba identity but their particular sub-group identities. 
Such changing boundaries are conducive to ethnic rivalry; a rivalry that is convenient 
for all the players.
Ethnic identity is largely based on association rather than common origin. The 
Ukwuani communities, for instance, speak the same language and claim the same 
ethno-Ukwuani identity, but they do not claim the same ancestral or migrational origin. 
Within the Ogume sub-group, some sections migrated from Nnewi in the Igbo area to 
the east, whereas others came from Benin.40 The seniority of the sub-groups is 
reckoned according to sequence of migration into their present territory. These
39 Each Ukwani sub-group has one day of the Ukwani week (four days) as its own market day. 
Rotation of the market days facilitates social interaction.
40 Interview with Chief Ossai Ogene Oluka, the Chief Priest of Onyebuke shrine, Chief Odokwu 
Igwara, the Okwa (Okparauku) of Umu Enalu, and Chief Ojugbeli, all of Ogbagu-Ogume, the oldest 
settlement of the Ogume people.
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migrations mostly occurred about three hundred years ago. Among the Urhobo groups 
there is an awareness of a common language and collective traditions but each group 
manipulates its separate historical, political and cultural symbols as a means of 
asserting its exclusive identity.41 What then is the basis of the pan-Ukwani or pan- 
Urhobo identity? Why do such different communities claim the same ethnic identity?
According to the explanation by the Ogume elders interviewed, the one decisive 
factor in the formation of their Ukwani identity is association and socialization: ‘years 
and years of living together and doing things together1.42 Alagoa in his study of 43 
Ijaws groups concluded that the basis for the Ijaw identity of non-ljaw speaking groups 
was usually historical.43 In the sixteenth century, the Efiks (an Ibibio sub-group) were 
known to the Europeans as the people of Old Calabar, not as Efiks. Because of their 
long and continuous contact with European influences, they have tended to regard 
themselves as very different from the rest of the Ibibio group and strongly resent any 
identification with the Ibibio, although both speak basically the same language.44 The 
Hausa groups are divided on religious lines, those who were conquered by the Fulanis 
and socialized to be Muslims and those who remained pagans, the Maguzuwa. 
Salamone’s study of the Gungawa who adopted Hausa identity in Yauri suggests that 
religion and access to political power are important determinants in becoming
41 Onigu Otite, Autonomy and Dependence: the Urhobo Kingdom of Okpe in Modem Nigeria, 
London, North-western University Press, 1973, p. 12.
42 Interview with Chiefs Ojugbeli, Odokwu Igwara and Ossai Ogene Oluka at Ogbagu-Ogume.
43 Alagoa, A History of the Niger Delta: an Historical Interpretation of Ijo Oral Tradition, Ibadan, 
Ibadan University Press, 1972, p. 14.
44 Arthur G. Leonard, The Lower Niger and Its Tribes, London, Frank Cass, 1906, p. 17-21.
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Hausa.45 The pan-Yoruba identity is a modern one largely based on association. 
John Peel has shown how the Ijesha group through a process of historical association 
became ethnically Yoruba during the course of this century.46 Igbo communities such 
as Onitsha, Asaba, have only recently (due to the experience of the war) 
acknowledged their Igbo identity.
The major ethnic groups as ethnographic categories refer to groupings of 
peoples that share common traits and traditions but also exhibit great differences 
internally. The common bond of ethnicity built over the lines of division is the result of 
years and years of association - living together, trading together, and even fighting 
with or against each other. The apparent fragmentation of the Igbos was undermined 
by fundamental alliances in religious, cultural, political and economic spheres. Inter 
marriages, attendance at inter-clan festivals, blood-covenants between neighbouring 
political units, and the many communal market groups were effective instruments of 
cultural unity 47 The alliances which existed between Bonny and other trading towns 
in the delta were ‘covenants’, which acted as treaties:
But they were more than treaties in that, being ratified or cemented with 
the human blood, individual members of contracting parties regarded 
one another as "blood brothers”. The bond thus, created was not limited 
by time or space. Wherever Bonny and Brass men met they looked on
45 Frank A. Salamone, "Becoming Hausa: Ethnic Identity Change and its Implications for the Study 
of Ethnic Pluralism and Stratification", in A.O. Sanda (ed.), op. cit., passim.
46 J.D.Y. Peel, Ijeshas and Nigerians: the Incorporation of a Yoruba Kingdom, 1890s-1970s, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, passim.
47 Dike, Trade and Politics in The Niger Delta 1830-1885, London, OUP, 1956, p. 44.
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one another as brothers, bound perpetually by the blood covenant linking
their two countries.48
The Nigerian model of ethnic groups involves then the awareness that 
processes of collaboration and competition lead groups to a new identity or one that 
is more broadly or narrowly defined. It challenges the standard sociological approach 
of treating ethnic groups as solidary groups in conflict, demonstrating that ethnic 
groups are not monolithic interest groups, and that it is possible for sub-groups from 
different ethnic groups to collaborate in pursuit of their common interests, while 
retaining a strong sense of their separate ethnic identities. Such inter-ethnic 
cooperation may be informal or formal. Informal cooperation may take the form of a 
limited, loose economic, political, or other interest, that does not extend to social and 
cultural relationships where ethnicity may remain primary. Formal cooperation would 
involve more institutionalized relationships like those that exist in consociational 
regimes where elites from different ethnic groups collaborate on a regular basis to 
preserve both ethnic separateness and inter-ethnic elite dominance. The analytical 
implications of the Nigerian model for nation-building and ethnicity are immense. This 
is because it is attentive to patterns of intersectional communication and collaboration 
between segments of separate ethnic groups, and between the state and particular 
sub-groups or groups. The relationship between the state and particular groups is very 
crucial as the state may be pursuing its nation-building to the advantage of certain 
groups within it. A major reason for the salience of ethnicity in modern and 
modernizing states is that it is often intimately connected with issues of dominance,
48 Ibidem, p. 44.
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hierarchy and stratification.49 The model especially calls attention to the fact that the 
achievement of broad class, national, or ethnic group consciousness, is not a normal, 
ordinary event that is universal and permanent.
ETHNIC CONFLICT IN NIGERIA: A THEORY OF FEAR
Fear of domination is characteristic of the behaviour of ethnic groups in Nigeria. 
The majority ethnic groups fear being dominated by each other. The minority groups 
fear being dominated by the majority groups, especially those contiguous to them. As 
a result of such fears minority groups form political alliances with geographically 
distant majority groups against contiguous majority groups, a phenomenon which I 
refer to as geo-political ethnicity. Sub-groups and religious groups replicate these 
fears which increasingly become translated into resentment and discontent and 
subsequently protest and conflict. The salience of ethnicity for conflict in the country 
is, thus, conditioned by such fears.
Fear of domination stems from evaluations by members of the various groups 
of their relative position vis-a-vis the distribution of power and societal resources. 
Hence, it is fundamentally the fear of being marginalized or alienated in the share of 
the 'national cake’ by other contending groups. A succinct and vivid exposition of this 
theory was presented by the Northern Nigerian delegation to the Ad Hoc Constitutional 
Conference held in Lagos in September 1966:
We all have our fears of one another. Some fear that opportunities in
49 A.L. Epstein, Ethos and Identity: Three Studies in Ethnicity, London, Tavistock Publications, 1978, 
p. 114.
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their own areas are iimited.... Some fear the sheer weight of numbers 
of other parts which could be used to the detriment of their own 
interests. Some fear the sheer weight of skills and the aggressive drive 
of other groups which they feel has to be regulated, if they are not to be 
left as the economic, social and possibly political under-dogs in their own 
areas of origin. ... These fears may be real or imagined; they may be 
reasonable or petty. Whether they are genuine or not, they have to be 
taken account of because they influence to a considerable degree, the 
actions of the groups towards one another and, more important perhaps, 
the daily actions of the individuals from other groups.50
A memorandum submitted by the Mid-Western delegation at the same conference 
reiterated the theory.51
Fear of domination is the result of three related factors: the Nigerian conception 
of power, the inequalities in the economic and political relations of the groups, and the 
threat which such inequalities pose to members of the groups. In Nigeria, and indeed 
most African states, political power is conceptualized as residing in the ethnic group 
from which the leadership comes. This is because political power is seen as 
personalized in the politician (rather than in the post) and, by extension, in his group. 
Individual appointments to positions of power, status and influence are seen as an 
honour to the groups to which the individuals belong. Such a conception of power
50 Federal Government, Ad Hoc Conference on the Nigerian Constitution, Nigerian Crisis 1966,11- 
Documents of the Conference, Northern Delegation, Lagos, Government Printer, p. 1.
51 Ibidem, p. 29.
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supports the reciprocal system of ethnicity and explains why the fear of domination is 
such a potent factor in the ethnic behaviour of Nigerians. In a country like Nigeria 
where the state is not only seen as the procurer, keeper and distributor of resources, 
but also as the promoter of values, such fears become substantial. It is not unlikely 
that the state could be used by the group that dominates it, to promote its own group 
interests above those of other groups. The state thus becomes a threat in so far as 
it is not controlled by the group.
Fear of domination lies at the root of Nigeria’s inability to conduct an acceptable 
census.52 Census is a major issue of conflict because numbers govern in Nigerian 
politics. They 'determine who occupies what position in the political pecking order’.53 
They determine what size of the national cake a group can have. Since independence, 
Nigeria has had three planned population censuses. The first, in 1962, was cancelled. 
The second, in 1963, was accepted even though it generated much acrimony and was 
a contributory factor to the destabilising political unrest in the Western Region in 1964. 
The third one, in 1973, was accompanied by much acrimony and was consequently 
invalidated. A census was conducted in 1991 but its figures have not yet been ratified 
owing to public criticism. Many communities, local governments and states dissatisfied 
with their share of the population are challenging the figures at the Census Tribunal. 
It was in order to avoid public disaffection that the director of the census decided not 
to include ethnicity in the census. The special irony is that census taking, which was 
originally resented by Nigerians because it was associated with taxation or draft into 
the army, came to be regarded by the same people as a means of getting a fair share
52 S.G. Ikoku, Nigeria's Fourth Coup D'Etat, Enugu, Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1985, p. 111.
53 Newswatch, Lagos, October 8,1990, p. 33.
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of the ‘national cake’.54
Calls for a confederacy or the rotation of political power among ethnic groups 
are the result of fear of domination. Arguing for a confederal system, Odumegwu- 
Ojukwu observed that it will make for less friction, no wars and less fear.55 The 
Political Bureau recommended the rotation of political power as a measure to deal with 
fears of domination but government rejected the idea, observing that such a policy 
amounted to  an acceptance of our inability to grow beyond ethnic or state loyalty’.56 
Such a position in no way eliminates the fear which brought about the issue of 
rotation.
The fear factor in Nigerian ethnicity is so pervasive. It is not just expressed as a 
group sentiment but also as an individual one. Individuals project their fears and 
suspicions on other groups and blame their difficulties on the machinations of these 
'enemies’. Failure to get employment or a political office is invariably explained not in 
terms of an impartial assessment of the individual’s capacity, but in terms of 
discrimination due to the differences in the ethnic background of the candidate and the 
selectors. Margaret Peil referred to this as ‘ethnic scapegoating’.57
National issues are rarely discussed and perceived objectively but according to 
who is dominating who. For instance, issues such as revenue allocation, creation of 
more states, a lingua franca, are perceived according to how advantageous or 
disadvantageous the possible outcomes would be to the group. As far as many people
54 Ahmadu Kurfi, The Nigerian General Election 1959 and 1979 and the Aftermath, 1990, cited in 
Ibidem, p. 48.
55 Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Because I am Involved, Ibadan, Spectrum Books, 1989, p. 25.
56 Newswatch, Lagos, September 21, 1987, p. 17.
57 Margaret Peil, Nigerian Politics: the People’s View, op. cit., p. 74.
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are concerned, the determining criteria on such issues are objective or subjective to 
the extent that it favours or disfavours their own group.
The publication of a slim volume (164 pages) on the late Chukwuma Nzeogwu, 
leader of Nigeria’s first military coup, was followed by violent reaction from sections 
of the Hausa/Fulani group who saw the book as an insult. Waziri Tambawal argued 
that the book was written to give a dog a bad name in order to hang it and by 
extension to paint a lurid picture of Northern leaders generally in order to show the 
world that such people do not deserve to rule Nigeria or even to participate effectively 
in its governance’.58 Consequently, several copies of the book were burnt in a bonfire 
by protesters, including university students. The fury that followed the book’s 
publication was described as ‘demonic’.59 Other examples of how fear of domination 
drives away reason can be seen in recent religious conflicts in the country, for 
example, the admission of Nigeria into the OIC or the removal of Domkat Bali as 
minister of defence.60 To the outside world, the controversy and the fury may seem 
irrational and perplexing, or even pessimistic, but in Nigeria, they are a normal form 
of behaviour stemming from fear of domination.
Such fear-induced evaluation of issues leads to frustration and ultimately to 
conflict. It was such a situation that led to the military overthrow of the First Republic 
and subsequently to the civil war. To the coup plotters, it was the only way to destroy 
the stranglehold of the traditional Hausa/Fulani elite on the Nigerian political system.
58 Abdullahi Waziri Tambawal, "Obasanjo: Opportunism, Treason and Hypocrisy", in Hotline, 
Kaduna, March 15, 1987, p. 8.
59 Newswatch, Lagos, March 9, 1987, p. 14.
60 Refer to Chapter Eight. These conflicts cited should be seen as ethno-religious in the sense that 
Islam is associated with the Hausa/Fulani.
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The Hausa/Fulani fear of being dominated by the Igbos led to the revenge coup of 
July 1966. Igbo fear of alienation due to the relentless and manifest sense of injustice 
and victimization caused by the pogrom of Igbo officers and civilians living in the north 
led to the unconstitutional means of secession to remedy the situation.
The main features of this psychological state are irrationality and insecurity. 
Why, for instance, should Hausa/Fulanis fear that the publication of the book, 
Nzeogwu, would undermine their position and value? In what way can this be? Why 
do they refer to Nzeogwu as a ‘murderer’ (the Sardauna of Sokoto, the group’s 
spiritual and political leader, was killed in the coup he led) and uphold as 'heroes’ the 
Northern soldiers that carried out the counter coup in which the Igbo President was 
killed? Ironically, the Hausa/Fulanis have been the 'inheritors’ of the legacy of 
Nzeogwu’s action, that is, military coups and as such, are partners in the murder of 
which they accuse Nzeogwu. Again, why should a routine cabinet reshuffle of the 
President threaten the security of the country? Peter Lloyd’s study of ethnic tensions 
between the Urhobo and the indigenous Itsekiri groups in Warn town excellently 
portrays this irrational nature of ethnicity:
Why should they fear Urhobo superiority? Typical responses included 
"They might insult the Olu (the king)", "Hooligans might insult my father 
(a chief) in the street". A reign of terror against the Itsekiri was predicted.
... the Itsekiri feared that the Urhobo might abuse them, as they had 
once abused the Urhobo. ... There seemed .. to be little immediate 
likelihood that the Itsekiri would loose their ethnic identity, even though 
the Urhobo had a reputation for cultural assimilation (two Ibo clans, for
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instance, having become Urhobo in recent decades).... It is such fears 
which seem to produce mob violence - violence which expresses no 
specific or well articulated interests, at least of the mob.61
Such fears are conducive to manipulation by self-interested individuals because 
of their irrational nature. According to Lloyd, those who gained most in the tension 
between the Urhobo and Itsekiri ‘were the Olu and his circle of chiefs’.62 They 
encouraged the ordinary Itsekiri people 1o believe that a diminution in status of the Olu 
and his chiefs would be a substantial threat to their own separate identity’.63 Lloyd, 
like several other theorists, concluded that ethnicity is to be understood from the 
perspective of elite competition for power, in short that ethnic identity is manipulated 
by the elite in competition for power. What is manipulated is the collective group fear 
of domination not their ethnic identity.
The pervasive significance of fears and anxieties about domination among the 
Nigerian ethnic groups suggest that analysts ought to be more attentive to the 
salience, importance and intensity of such fears and anxieties. Psychological factors 
have been emphasized in the causation of ethnic conflict, but seldom have they been 
advanced or expressed as the fear of domination. Although Kirk Greene proposed the 
‘Angstkomplex theory’ of ethnic conflict in Nigeria, this intuition was not sufficiently
61 P.C. Lloyd, "Ethnicity and the Structure of Inequality in a Nigerian Town in the Mid-1950s", in 
Abner Cohen (ed.), Urban Ethnicity, London, Tavistock Publications, 1974, pp. 248 & 249.
62 Ibidem, p. 248.
63 Ibidem, p. 249.
254
developed.64
The concept of fear is a useful tool for the analysis of ethnicity. Ethnic identity 
is a combination of factors of self-identification (phenomenology) and categorization 
of others. Within this process fear constitutes the fundamental factor. It is fear that 
determines the boundaries of the identity. The lines of division between ethnic groups 
are either caused by or themselves produce a social psychological system. In such 
a system the fear is the dominant and constant element defining evaluations about 
contacting groups and subsequently, boundaries of the groups. The extent to which 
action taken to deal with the fear, reduces or heightens the frustration generated by 
such fear, suggests what forces of ethnicity - centripetal or centrifugal forces - are 
unleashed. Hence, the extent to which actors use their ethnic identities in Nigeria to 
categorize themselves and others for the purpose of interaction is determined by social 
psychological factors in which fear is central. To resolve the condition that generated 
such fear - whether genuine or imagined - involves processes of group collaboration 
or competition. This leads to a new perception concerning one’s own identity or to a 
redefined identity. For example, an Onitsha man in Lagos which is Yoruba country, 
typically expands his identity to an all inclusive Igbo identity. This is rationally a way 
of dealing with fear of domination and alienation. His chances of participating in the 
national struggle for survival is enhanced if he collaborates with other Igbo groups. 
Fear, thus, explains why ethnic boundaries are flexible.
Finally, the theory of fear stresses the historicity of ethnic identity and groups 
and explains the socialized nature of ethnic identities. In doing this it takes cognizance
64 A.H.M. Kirk-Green, "Genesis of the Nigerian Civil War and the Theory of Fear, Research Report 
No. 27, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1975, passim.
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of interactive variables as well as symbolic ethnic interests and values, demonstrating 
that group cohesion is somehow instrumental. In other words, that cohesion is both 
a function of emotions and of institutional factors. For instance, group integration 
decreases during a crisis when there is no available solution and increases if a likely 
cooperative solution is present.65 Thus, the consciousness of being different in 
relation to the wider society is of fundamental strategic importance to the 
consciousness of belonging. It thus synthesizes the instrumentalist and the 
primordialist perspectives on ethnicity, reducing the need to choose between the two 
polar models, a tendency which has damaged the proper understanding of the 
phenomenon.
Early studies of ethnicity in Nigeria approached ethnic conflict from the 
perspective of cultural pluralism.66 These studies generally assumed that such 
conflicts were the result of the cultural differences between the groups and that 
ethnicity was the most destabilising factor in Nigerian politics. They believed that direct 
and continuous contact between the groups would decrease the differences among 
them. Conflict resolution was thus possible only if the groups could be brought into 
contact with each other.67
More recent studies suggest that there is no automatic relationship between
65 Hamblin, "Group Integration during a Crisis", in Human Relations, 9, 1958, pp. 67-76, cited in 
John M.G. van der Dennen, "Ethnocentrism and In-group/Out-Group Differentiation: a review and 
Interpretation of the Literature", in Vernon Reynolds et al. (eds.), The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism, 
London, Croom Helm, 1987, p. 35.
66 See for instance James Coleman, Nigeria: Background To Nationalism, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1971, p. 64; Victor A. Olorunsola, The Politics of Cultural Subnationalism in Africa, 
Garden City, Anchor, 1972; and also Robert Levine, Dreams and Deeds, London, University of 
Chicago Press, 1966, p. 7.
67 Olorunsola, op. cit., p. 23.
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value differences and ethnic group differences. Such studies generally claim that 
ethnicity is the result of the creation of new socio-economic systems particularly 
evident in large towns and cities and that it manipulates cultural symbols as groups 
compete for power in these new institutions. For example, Abner Cohen’s penetrating 
study of the Hausa in a Yoruba town, Ibadan, concluded that the intensification of 
ethnic group affiliation among the Yoruba and the Hausa in Ibadan was the result of 
their relationship to the kola trade rather than their different cultural orientations.68 
Symbolic cultural markers were used in the competition but it was the presence of the 
competition that reinforced their identity. Such studies imply that ethnicity would not 
be salient if differences in income, occupation, political power, opportunities and 
general living standards were reduced or eradicated. Such analyses reflect and 
reinforce a more generalized theory of group relations that maintains that competition 
for societal resources is at the heart of ethnicity. Thus, for these analysts, ethnicity in 
Nigeria can best be explained as an economic or, more generally, as a material 
impulse. These notions of ethnicity in Nigeria beg several questions. For instance, why 
do ethnic affiliations elicit more passionate response and loyalty than trade union 
allegiances, to what extent is ethnicity dependent on social deprivation or privilege, 
and to what extent do ethnic groups and social classes overlap?
In Nigeria, there is no correlation between ethnicity and social deprivation, 
privilege or classes. The issue of which language should be chosen as the national 
language emphasizes the point that ethnicity in Nigeria is not solely about the 
distribution of resources. Many Nigerians already speak one or two of the major
68 Abner Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969, 
p. 132-133.
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languages and the knowledge of a language other than their own have usually helped 
them materially. The same people who have benefitted because of their knowledge 
of another language oppose the use of that acquired language as the official language 
because it is not their mother tongue. For example many Igbos who work and live in 
Lagos have leamt to speak the Yoruba language but they will never support the choice 
of Yoruba as a national language because it is not their mother tongue. There is now 
a real concern among Igbos living in Lagos about their young children speaking 
Yoruba as a first language. Some parents I spoke with told me that they were set to 
stop it happening to their children. The sheer passion expended in pursuing ethnic 
matters in Nigeria indicate that ethnicity cannot be explained by mere rational and 
objective calculations of material interests and symbolic differences between groups. 
The presence of pathological fears and anxieties about present and future 
circumstances shows that a more fundamental factor than mere material interest is at 
stake. These fears and anxieties are more disruptive than the existence of the actual 
group lines of cleavage. The problem of multi-ethnic societies stem from the uncertain 
nature of such fears and anxieties rather than from systemic cultural and institutional 
differences among the groups. To eradicate these fears and anxieties is to check 
ethnic and related conflicts.
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CHAPTER TEN 
NATIONALISM IN NIGERIA
Introduction
In this chapter I shall examine the nature of nationalism in Nigeria. I shall argue 
that ethnicity has contributed to national unity in Nigeria and that Nigerian nationalism 
exists in two different senses: as a popular emotional force and as an elite ideology. 
Unfortunately for Nigeria, whilst nationalism as an elite ideology is very effective, it is 
very weak as a popular emotion with the former tending to undermine the appeal and 
strength of the latter. However, nationalism as an elite ideology to legitimate the 
control of state power and struggles for it, does not have the intrinsic power to 
promote a popular and homogenous nationalism in Nigeria. It can only exploit the 
sense of national identity which already exists for the benefit of dominant elites. 
Therefore despite the high public profile of its hyperbolic rhetoric, elite nationalism 
largely fails as a means to unite the putative nation. However, the structure of 
oppression associated with elite-led nationalism provides the opportunity for other 
elites to arise and challenge the social order. This produces a debilitating cycle of 
political and economic renewal which in turn mobilizes individuals and communities to 
a new awareness of their political and social identity as Nigerians. The Nigerian 
experience controverts the analytical perspective which locates nationalism in the 
period of transition to industrial society. It suggests that nationalism is best understood 
as an effect of the ongoing dialectic of tradition in which legitimation claims of a social
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order are sustained and challenged.1
I shall, firstly, examine the nature of the Nigerian identity and the role of the 
minority ethnic groups in keeping Nigeria united before going on to examine the two 
faces of Nigerian nationalism.
THE NATURE OF NIGERIAN IDENTITY
The Nigerian identity is multicultural. Nigerians have two compatible national 
identities: they are Hausa, Fulani, Igbo, Tiv, Bini, etc. in terms of their cultural identity 
and Nigerian in terms of their political identity. The various groups all have their own 
poets, songs, novelists and distinctive styles of clothing, cuisine and humour. Nigerians 
have, however, accepted such cultural pluralism as an integral aspect of their identity. 
When they think of their national identity, they most commonly think of themselves first 
as Hausa, Fulani, Igbo, Yoruba, and so forth. At the same time, there is rarely any 
doubt about their being Nigerian. This is so even though politicians, sometimes, in the 
heat of political controversy, demand that Nigeria be broken up or be reconstituted as 
a confederation of its various ethnic nationalities. However, when faced with the 
decision to do so - as demonstrated by the civil war - many more Nigerians opt to 
keep it together as one unit, thus indicating a desire for the Nigerian identity. The 
slogan To Keep Nigeria One Is A Task That Must Be Done’ was a winner during the 
civil war and even the name of the head of state during the war, Yakubu Gowon, was 
turned into an acronym for "You Are Keeping Us Better United" and "Go On With One 
Nigeria".
1 Jayant Lele, "The Two Faces of Nationalism: on the Revolutionary Potential of Tradition", in 
Jaques Dofny and Akinsola Akiwowo (eds.), National and Ethnic Movements, London, Sage 
Publications for the International Sociological Association, 1980, p. 207.
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Ethnic and national political identities complement each other in Nigeria. The 
‘average Nigerian’ ( a popular term used to refer to a typical Nigerian) is used for 
multiple allegiances. These are important for negotiating opportunities for self 
improvement - ‘survival’ in Nigerian parlance. 'As we say in Nigeria, A child of two 
tribes never dies in a tribal war.’2 Such allegiances provide social security to 
Nigerians in the absence of a formal welfare system. The informal network of 
patronage which ethnic identities provide help to bridge the gap between the elite and 
the masses. In that way, it enables national integration and adds to the legitimation 
of the state.3
Individuals do not regard their ethnic and political identities as incompatible. 
General Buhari observed, when he was head of state, that identifying with one’s group 
did not stop an individual from being a good Nigerian.4 A survey of incoming and 
outgoing NYSC participants in 1976 showed that the majority thought that ethnic 
identity did not jeopardize their national identity.5 They were asked if they thought it 
was possible to be a good citizen and still have strong ethnic ties. 61 percent of the 
pre-NYSC said it was very possible, 12 percent somewhat possible, 22 percent only 
a little possible and 4 percent not possible. 66 percent of the post-NYSC thought it 
very possible, 31 percent somewhat possible, 1 percent a little possible and 2 percent
2 Matthew Hassan Kukah, Religion and Politics in Northern Nigeria since 1960, Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of London, SOAS, 1990, p. 296.
3 J.S. Coleman, and C.G. Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1964, p. 8ff.
4 Rosaline Odeh (ed.), Muhammadu Buhari: Nigeria's Seventh Head of State, Lagos, Federal 
Department of Information, 1984, p. 35.
5 The survey was carried out in 1976 by ABU students. See Otwin Marenin, ‘National Service and 
National Consciousness in Nigeria', JMAS, 17, 4 (1979), pp. 646-647.
261
not possible. Asked if it was possible to achieve national unity and to maintain ethno­
cultural distinctiveness, 63 percent of the pre-NYSC agreed that it was very possible, 
28 percent somewhat possible and 8 percent not possible, while 42 of the post-NYSC 
were very positive, 42 percent somewhat positive and 16 percent negative. This affinity 
between ethnic and state identities may be sufficiently explained by the fact that a 
plurality of identities enhances the chances available to Nigerians in the pursuit of their 
individual self interests. Opportunities for self improvement are few. Hence, it is 
advantageous to maintain several identities which can be strategically employed for 
the purpose of negotiating these limited opportunities.
According to the survey referred to above, loyalty to Nigeria and personal 
ambition are on a par. The respondents were asked what importance they would 
attach to the teaching of the following: the essentials of their religion, respect for 
authority, the traditions of their people, loyalty to Nigeria, the ambition to get ahead in 
life. Of the pre-NYSC group, 13 percent were for religion, 18 percent authority, 13 
percent for tradition, 28 percent for loyalty and 28 percent ambition. Of the post-NYSC 
group, 9 percent were for religion, 17 percent for authority, 15 percent for tradition, 29 
percent for loyalty and 29 percent for ambition. In a conflict of national loyalty and 
personal ambition, personal ambition overrides.6
The overriding importance of personal ambition means that loyalty to the state 
is weak. Nevertheless, it testifies to a more fundamental problem which is that 
Nigerians do not sufficiently trust their state to cater for their needs. This is a serious 
indictment against nation-building. For the individual to internalize the symbols of the 
nation, the nation must impinge upon the actual experience of the individual. Not only
6 Ibidem, p. 649.
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must it directly touch the individual, but the experience of this contact must be such 
that it actually benefits the individual, in terms of psychological security, to make an 
identification with the nation.7 Nationalism is weak in Nigeria precisely because the 
state has persistently proved unresponsive to the felt needs of its citizens. 
‘Government virtually alienates the individual as it shoulders minimum responsibility’.8 
The dominant ideology is that people must learn to be independent of government - 
it does not matter that only government controls the most profitable access to the 
society’s resources’.9 According to Obaro Ikime Nigeria will continue to search for 
Nigerians so long as it fails to guarantee the genuine protection of the interests of all 
its peoples.10
ETHNIC MINORITIES AND NIGERIAN NATIONALISM
Nigerian nationalism has benefitted from ethnic differences. This factor has 
been overlooked largely because of the popular approach to ethnic relations in Nigeria 
which emphasizes the power conflict between the three majorities. This approach 
assumes falsely that the politics of Nigeria is the politics of three majorities of almost 
equal strength, and ignores the influence of the numerous minority groups who 
together make up over 50 percent of the Nigerian population and who have been the
7 William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations, Cambridge, CUP, 
1990, p. 59.
8 ‘Lai Olurode, A Political Economy of Nigeria’s 1983 Elections, Lagos, John West Publications, 
1990, p. 164.
9 Ibidem, p. 164.
10 Obaro Ikime, In Search of Nigerians, pamphlet, presidential inaugural lecture at the 30th 
Congress of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Ibadan, Impact Publishers, 1985, pp. 31-32.
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strongest supporters of national unity.11 It has been the minorities that have 
determined by their self sacrifice, whether in the conference room or on the battlefield, 
that Nigeria would survive as a country.12 For instance, in 1966-67 when Nigeria was 
on the verge of total disintegration it was the minorities from the Mid-West, the Middle 
Belt, Calabar, Ogoja and Rivers that championed the cause of one united Nigeria 
while the three majority groups argued for some form of confederacy or outright 
secession.13 Minority leaders ‘saw the minority role, not as a fruitless challenge to the 
majority peoples in destructive power politics but rather as a kind of cement of 
Nigerian unity’.14 The Mid-Western delegation at the 1966 Ad Hoc Conference in 
Lagos presented the minority view, arguing that to dissolve Nigeria into its constituent 
major ethnic regions would be most unwise:
A break would mean that people who have long shared a common 
government, a common destiny and a common nationalism would be 
launched into independent hostile neighbours constantly fearful of 
intervention from one another. Such fears, real or imaginary, would 
sooner or later develop into armed conflict which in the context of
11 Some scholars like Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism, 1978, p. 295, and 
Margaret Peil, Nigerian Politics: the People's View, London, Cassell, 1976, p. 72, have noted the 
influence of the minorities on Nigerian unity but they did not show how they have done this.
12 Jonathan Zwingina, "National Minorities", The African Guardian, 3/9/87 p. 7, and Joe Garba, 
Revolution in Nigeria, p. 21, cited in Matthew Kukah, Religion and Politics in Northern Nigeria since 
1960, Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, SOAS, 1990, p. 303.
13 The Bendel State (formerly Mid-West Region) is generally regarded as a microcosm of Nigeria 
due to its accommodation of numerous minorities. The middle belt region of the former Northern Region 
contains an estimated number of 150 minorities.
14 M. J. Dent, ‘Senator J.S. Tarka’, in Simon Shango (ed.), Tributes to A Great Leader, Enugu, Ejike 
Nwankwo Associates, 1982, p. 17.
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current world politics, would only invite meddlesome intervention of the 
other nations. In the resulting fight for survival the sovereignty for which 
we dissected the nation would be lost. Our nation, which today 
commands respect and dignity in the community of nations, would 
degenerate into relatively petty states. Having proved incapable of 
containing their domestic problems, the dissociating states could possibly 
have no respected voice in the world's councils.15
During the civil war, it was the minorities who fought to keep Nigeria one. 
Majority of the soldiers who fought on the Nigerian side were drawn from the middle 
belt minorities.16 The Eastern Region’s minorities for their part sabotaged the war 
efforts of the Biafran army. Nigerians of Mid-West origin were extremely hostile to the 
Biafran invasion of the region. The non-lgbo elements facilitated the federal 
government recapture of the region from the secessionists. Their action was both a 
demonstration of anger against the secession and a profession of faith in Nigerian 
unity.17 Today, the minorities still remain the major factor in Nigeria’s integration 
whether the north seeks regionalism as a means of retaining power or the south seeks 
an alliance on the basis of religious sentiments.18 In terms of real politik, therefore, 
the ethnic minorities are the majority that hold the balance in Nigerian nationalism.
15 Nigerian government, September, 1966, Ad Hoc Conference Papers, Government Printer, Enugu, 
pp. 32-37. See also p. IV for how the Middle Belt minorities exerted influence on the northern 
delegation to accept a strong central government rather than a loose confederation.
16 Dent, op. cit., p. 19.
17 Sam Egite Oyovbaire, Federalism in Nigeria: a Study in the Development of the Nigerian State, 
London, Macmillan, 1985, p. 132.
18 Kukah, Religion and Politics in Northern Nigeria since 1960, op. cit., p. 303.
265
They have been able to do this essentially because of the rivalry between the 
ethnic majorities. The principle of respect for ethnic difference obliges the major 
groups to consider not only each other but also their smaller neighbours. It is in the 
space between the major groups that minority cultures are able to prosper. If Nigeria 
was to be divided up between the major groups it is unlikely that such tolerance would 
be afforded the minorities, as the major group in each territory would probably attempt 
to enforce its cultural domination.
Minority ethnic groups’ fears of domination by neighbouring majority groups 
have always propelled them to seek political alliances with majority groups outside 
their region. For instance, the Middle Belt minorities’ fear Hausa/Fulani domination and 
have as a result sought alliances with majority groups in the south. Similarly, southern 
minorities have sought alliances with the northern majority group. Such a situation 
ensures that no one group can be absolutely dominant except through the coercion 
of the minorities in the same political unit as was the case in the 1960s. Indeed, no 
ruling political party in Nigeria has ever had an overall majority in the parliament. They 
have always had to seek an accord with a second political party in other to effect their 
rule. This means that political alliances are flexible and are frequently redefined 
according to changing circumstances. Such changing political groupings can be 
interpreted as a sign of a pluralistic ‘democracy’. Although this sort of democracy does 
not guarantee an overarching spirit of nationalism as in the best democratic tradition 
of the west, it signifies that ethnic lines are not rigid and that the groups are not 
solidary, exclusive groups as they are popularly portrayed to be. It shows the dynamic 
process of inter-ethnic group relations which tells us more about links, cooperation, 
reciprocity and exchange, demonstrating potentials that exist for achieving national
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unity in societies like Nigeria.
THE TWO FACES OF NIGERIAN NATIONALISM
Nigerian nationalism has to be understood in terms of its dual nature, as 
legitimation of domination and as a reaction to such domination. In other words, 
nationalism in Nigeria is both a popular emotional force and an elite ideology. 
Nationalism as a popular emotional force is strong in relation to other countries and 
foreigners. This sense of nationalism is reflected in popular support for the state when 
it is threatened from outside criticism, commercial aggression, physical attack or when 
it is in competition with other nations. For instance, mass nationalism was stimulated 
when Cameroonian troops killed five Nigerian soldiers inside Nigerian territory in 1981. 
The intensity of nationalist feelings aroused by the incident was such that the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives, Edwin Ume-Ezeoke, called on the government to 
return 'fire for fire’.19 Similar sentiments were demonstrated in 1983, when Chad 
claimed part of Nigerian territory. The condition of Nigerians living on the Nigeria- 
Cameroon border was again a major issue of public concern in 1990. Many Nigerians 
called on the state to wage war on Cameroon as the only solution to the atrocities on 
Nigerians’.20
Imperialist interventions in Nigerian or African affairs excite popular nationalist 
feelings. For instance, there was national outrage in 1988 when it was revealed that 
Italy was dumping nuclear and toxic wastes in Nigeria. Most Nigerians were united in 
condemning imperialism and its local agents. One commentator described the national
19 Daily Times, Lagos, June 1, 1981, and New Nigerian, Kaduna, June 1,1981.
20 See for instance The Sunday Concord, April 8, 1990, p. 9.
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furore on the issue as a ‘consciousness-raising experience’.21 Also, in 1987, when 
it was alleged that South Africa was building a military air base in Fernando Po, mass 
nationalism came to the fore in the form of popular demands for the annexation of the 
island. Such mass feelings are often engineered and used by Nigerian leaders to win 
public opinion. For instance, President Babangida helped to generate mass feelings 
against the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to win popular support for the harsh 
economic measures he knew he had to impose on the country in 1986. He initiated 
a national debate on whether Nigeria should accept an IMF loan. His nationalist 
economic slogan proclaimed in posters all over the country was: ‘IMF Economic 
Independence or Slavery?’. The irony was that the economic conditions imposed by 
Babangida were the same as the IMF conditionalities which were rejected as 
imperialist.
A major rallying point for popular nationalism is the Junior World soccer 
competition. The dominating role of the Nigerian under-17 team, the Eaglets, in this 
competition has been the source of great national pride for Nigerians. Since 1985 
when the team won the World Cup ‘Nigerians began to realise that if they could not 
make a computer or manufacture a "black bomb" but could roll a round object very 
well, they could still capture the imagination of the world.’22 The Eaglets are today 
a symbol of Nigerian nationalism. President Babangida while urging Nigerians to 
become patriotic, told them to be more 'like the Eaglets who are the wonder of Toronto 
and the world of young football’ and to resolve to give to our nation continuing reason
21 Shehu Abubakar, "Exit Chemical Waste, Enter Nuclear Waste", in Hotline, Kaduna, August 22- 
September 4, 1988, p. 7.
22 Newswatch, Lagos, September 28, 1987, p. 4.
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for pride and satisfaction; and to the world a reason for envy’.23
The state has therefore benefitted from successful nation-building in relation to 
external environment. Such nationalism was summed up in the patriotic rhetoric of 
General Buhari: this generation of Nigerians, and indeed, future generations, have no 
other country than Nigeria. We shall remain here and salvage it together.124
Internally, nationalism as a popular force is sporadic and ineffective as a force 
for national unity. Such sense of nationalism is reflected in widespread disillusion and 
anger directed against government and the big men’. It has been expressed informally 
through mass participation in riots, demonstrations, strikes, violent protests, uprisings 
and ‘jungle justice’. For instance, in 1989, during the junior World Cup football finals 
held in Saudi Arabia, the Nigerian Electric Power Authority (NEPA) cut off the power 
supply to FESTAC village, a suburb of Lagos, during a crucial televised quarter-final 
match between Nigeria and the Soviet Union. Angry residents marched to the area 
NEPA office, chased away the officials and vandalized the building and vital 
equipments, including a transformer, to press home their case for a stable supply of 
electricity in the area.25 In December 1980, Kano, Nigeria’s second largest city, was 
the scene of large scale riots by followers of the self-proclaimed Islamic prophet and 
preacher, Maitatsine. His followers consisted mainly of poor people protesting against 
what they perceived as the abuse of Islamic principles by the wealthy. Although many 
Nigerians were shocked by the endemic nature of such protests, the Maitatsine 
critique of the wealthy elites and the government is shared by most of Nigeria’s urban
23 Speech by President Babangida at the launching of the Social Mobilization Programme, July 25, 
1987, Lagos, p. 8.
24 Part of General Buhari’s maiden speech reproduced in Newswatch, September 9,1985, p. 26.
25 Sunday Concord, Lagos, July 29, 1990, p. 5.
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poor.26 In 1989 the urban poor, including university students, school children, small 
traders and lower level state bureaucrats demonstrated against the privileged classes 
and the government’s Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP), leaving a trail of blood and 
ashes behind them.27 What all this amounts to is that Nigerians are becoming more 
conscious of their identity as Nigerians. They are now aware that they have a stake 
in government.
A less dramatic manifestation of this radical nationalism is the growth of political 
and non-political organizations seeking to promote a better Nigeria. Such non-political 
organizations include the Committee of Patriots (COP), the Nigerian Council for 
National Awareness, the Unity Movement, the National Association of Anti-Corruption 
Crusaders and the Pro-Democracy Movement. In 1987, the largest, COP, publicized 
its aims and objectives and invited all Nigerians to become members. The 
overwhelming response indicate that many Nigerians are concerned about the future 
of their country. Such concern has given rise to the genre of Nigerian literature 
referred to as social conscience literature. Such writings generally deal with 
corruption, demonstrating to the powerful that people know what they are doing. Their 
major aim is to define Nigeria to itself and to others. ‘Literature and Nation-building’ 
was the theme of the annual meeting of the Association of Nigerian Authors in 1991.
Nigerian nationalism has been more effective as an ideology used by the elite 
to legitimate the exercise of and the struggles for state power. Its history has been a 
history of power relations. It was the rallying cry of the Nigerian political elites against
26 Paul M. Lubeck, "Islamic Protest under Semi-industrial Capitalism: Yan Tatsine Explained”, 
Africa, Vol. 55, No. 4, 1985, p. 387.
27 Newswatch, Lagos, June 12, 1989, p. 10.
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the British colonial government. For the Nigerian nationalists the struggle for 
independence amounted to a struggle for succession to colonial power and privilege, 
that is the right to replace one elite with another.28 In the First Republic nationalism 
was merely a means for a sectional group to control the federal government. Under 
the military the situation has remained unchanged. Nationalism is the ideology used 
to legitimate military coups and military exercise of power. When sections of the 
Nigerian army first seized power from the civilians in January 1966, they claimed that 
their action was motivated by Ihe spirit of Nigerianism’.29 Although the revenge coup 
of July 1966 proved that this image of the military as the defender of national values 
was false, the military has continued to use such nationalist ideology to legitimate its 
claims to power. Nigeria since independence has had eight coups, six of these 
attempts have been between 1970 and 1990. The coup plotters invariably claim that 
their aim is to preserve national values. The ‘Why-We-Struck’ speeches are typical:
After due consultations over these deplorable conditions, I and my 
colleagues in the armed forces have, in the discharge of our national 
role as promoters and protectors of our national interest, decided to 
effect a change in the leadership of the government of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria and form a federal military government.30
28 William D. Graf, The Nigerian State, London, James Currey, 1988, p. 18.
29 Billy J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order Politics and Crisis in Nigeria, Ibadan, Ibadan 
University Press, 1973, p. 107. See also Alexander A. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the 
Biafran War, Enugu, Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980, p. 19.
30 Broadcast by Major General Sanni Abacha to explain why the army had overthrown the civilian 
government of Shagari, on December 31, 1983.
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Elites seek state power ostensibly to promote development, that is the 
improvement of life chances of citizens. This idea of development emphasizes 
modernization and economic power. The Chairman of the National Republican 
Convention (NRC), Tom Ikimi, enunciated the elite idea of nationalism when he 
observed that it is the means 1o put the nation together, build the nation and create 
wealth for our people’.31 Nationalism, thus, is the use of state power to bind together 
and provide a broad Nigerian identity for those tempted by the benefits of 
modernization - status, security, honours and wealth - to abandon tradition.
In Nigeria the control of the state is the primary avenue to private accumulation. 
In other words, the possession of political power, or access to it, is the means to 
status, security, honours, benefits and wealth. Ruling elites use their position not only 
to enrich themselves but also to actively incapacitate their rivals. Hence, the line 
between power for developmental purposes and for elite profit-making may be difficult 
to distinguish. This relationship between class formation, state power and state 
structure both weakens the appeal and strength of nationalism as a popular force and 
makes nationalism a divisive rather than an integrative element in Nigeria. It does this 
in two related ways: by affiliating nationalism with ethnicity and by opposing popular 
democracy. The struggle for power needs substantial mass involvement and 
participation. The logic of political mobilization dictates that people be mobilized in 
terms of what matters to them. In an ethnically-divided and largely illiterate society like 
Nigeria ethnicity is the most readily available and efficient means for this purpose. 
Elites therefore seek to win the people’s votes upon appeals to traditional features of 
the society, such as ethnic and religious identities (rather than on ideological issues).
31 Interview with Tom Ikimi reported in African Concord, Lagos, 13 August 1990, p. 27.
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It is relevant to emphasize that Nigerian elites, in spite of their different ethnic origins, 
have no problem sharing political positions and official booty.32 In other words, they 
cooperate and form alliances to realize their political and economic self-interests in 
spite of their separate ethnic identities, demonstrating that politics in Nigeria is not 
simply an ethnic phenomenon. The dilemma of dominant and aspirant dominant elites 
is how to possess and secure power in a democratic state such as Nigeria that lacks 
social consensus legitimating the accumulation of capital. With the people’ standing 
between them and the source of capital, that is state power, such elites can be 
expected to use all means available - fair and foul - to compete for such power.
In addition to appeals to ethnicity, the most effective way to gain power is to 
subvert democratic procedures. This is achieved through election rigging, thuggery and 
police brutality:
Rigging elections has for a long time been as Nigerian as pounded yam 
or millet.33 All parties are tempted to do it, if they think they can get 
away with it. The electoral laws of 1979 and 1982 did their best to make 
the voting system as foolproof as any law can make it, but vigilant party 
activities still have the will to find loopholes, and where there is a will 
there is a way. It is probably only possible to rig elections effectively 
from a position of power.34
32 Olurode, A Political Economy of Nigeria's 1983 Elections, op. cit., p. 165.
33 These are staple Nigerian foods.
34 Olurode, op. cit., p. 7.
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Attempts to subvert democratic decision-making always precipitate political 
crises and provide military elites with the opportunity to make a bid for state power. 
Election rigging creates a feeling of frustration and helplessness among the populace 
as a government they voted out continues in power. The military comes to the rescue 
of the people and effect the change. The public welcomes the military intervention with 
the expectation that the security they crave is imminent. Past crimes against the 
people are cited as justifications both for the new regime and its reforms. The new 
military government attempts to legitimize itself as well as exorcise the ghost of the 
past government by making out that the period when its predecessor was in power 
were bad old days and that it represents a new order of national salvation.
This process is a normal and universal feature of all human societies. New 
groups arise to challenge the legitimation claims of an existing social order whenever 
conditions of misery destroy even the semblance of order and meaning in the daily 
lives of a population. As Karl Deutsch has observed, if a government proves 
persistently unresponsive to the felt needs of its population:
[Some] or many of its subjects will cease to identify themselves with it 
psychologically; it will be reduced to ruling by force where it can no 
longer rule by display, example, and persuasion; and if political 
alternatives to it appear, it will be replaced eventually by other political 
units, larger or smaller in extent, which at least promise to respond more 
effectively to the needs and expectations of their peoples.35
35 Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", in Jason L. Finkle and Richard 
W. Gable (eds.), Political Development and Social Change, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1966, p. 
216.
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In legitimating itself, the new ruling group attempts to satisfy popular 
expectations by promoting some sort of development. However, the appeal of private 
accumulation from the state proves far too irresistible. The new rulers use their power 
for profit, duplicating the crimes that they came into power to correct. This arouses 
popular resentment and further provides opportunity for another section of the military 
to make a bid for power. The Nigerian political experience is consequently like a game 
of musical chairs, a debilitating cycle of political renewal and decay. The overall effect 
is political and economic chaos. Such a negative condition mainly destroys individuals 
not the structures that obstruct the growth of a popular homogenous nationalism.
Paradoxically, the structure of oppression which has accompanied elite-led 
nationalism is increasingly transforming the Nigerian society. Constant changes of 
government have given Nigerians a new understanding of their political and social 
identity. The abuse of power for profit by ruling elites has made ordinary people aware 
that their oppression stemmed from capital and not from [sic] ethnic groups’.36 The 
cries of 'change, change’ in every political rally during the Second Republic, although 
often interpreted by the government to mean change of individuals, marked the steady 
growth of this new understanding.37 When the military overthrew the civilian 
government on the eve of 1984 the people rallied to the new regime with the 
expectation that the change they sought had come. ‘Happy New Government’ replaced 
the traditional new year greeting. Nduba Echezona has argued that the manner in 
which broad sections of the Nigerian peoples reacted to the new regime’s attempts to
36 Nduba Echezona, "Strategies for National Integration In Nigeria" in Stephen O. Olugbemi (ed.), 
Alternative Political Futures for Nigeria, Lagos, Nigerian Political Science Association, 1987, p. 184.
37 Ibidem, p. 184.
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deal with corrupt politicians is indicative that the future of utmost total integration of the 
peoples of Nigeria has arrived.38 It was no more a question, as in the 1960s, of 
sympathizing with politicians in terms of ethnic consciousness or ethnic world view, but 
of seeing issues from a trans-Nigerian perspective.139
The poor performance of the military has further reinforced this awareness. 
Military coups are no longer popularly welcomed. Through the sustained failure of the 
economy and the increased instability caused by military coups and threats of them, 
Nigerians have understood that the military are no less self-interested than are their 
civilian compatriots. The August 1985 and April 1990 coups were accompanied by 
popular indifference. According to an opinion poll of the 1985 coup, many of the 
respondents indicated that they had resigned themselves to fate.40 Margaret Salami, 
an Isolo house-wife and roadside trader, described as expressing the popular view, 
claimed that she was ‘not bothered by whoever grabs the mantel of leadership in 
Nigeria’, her major concern being her kiosk which was her only means of livelihood.41 
Such popular apathy to government testifies to the deep legitimacy crisis facing elite- 
led nationalism in Nigeria.
Nigerian nationalism as an ideology for domination largely fails as a means to 
unite the putative nation despite the high public profile of its hyperbolic rhetoric. It has 
made ordinary Nigerians victims rather than beneficiaries of nationalism and modernity 
and consequently created an identity crisis for individuals and communities who are
38 Ibidem, p. 184.
39 Ibidem, p. 184.
40 Newswatch, Lagos, September 9, 1985, p. 25.
41 Ibidem, p. 25.
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increasingly turning to religion as a corrective for the disorder and meaninglessness 
in their lives.
The Nigerian experience controverts the analytical perspective which claims that 
nationalism is a phenomenon specific to modern industrialized societies. Nigeria 
cannot be described as an industrialized society, yet it would be wrong to say that it 
has no nationalism. Its nationalism reached quite a high pitch under the leadership of 
General Murtala Mohammed. To subscribe to the idea that nationalism is only feasible 
in industrialized societies is to deny Nigeria nationalism. Such a perspective misses 
the significance of social factors such as the structure of power in relation to the 
process of wealth accumulation and the contradictory relations of domination and 
resistance which accompanies such a process. Consequently it is ahistorical. 
Nationalism can best be understood as a product of the continuing dialectic of history 
in which legitimation claims of a social order are sustained and challenged. Thus 
nationalism has two faces, one as dominant ideology legitimizing appropriation, the 
other revolutionary, resisting domination under oppression in a period of uncertainty.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
HOLY NATIONALISM 
Introduction
The credibility and secular ideology of the Nigerian state have come under 
increasing attack from Islamic fundamentalists. Young muslims see the establishment 
of an Islamic state as the only alternative to the stressful changes of elite-led secular 
nationalism and modernity. Christian radicalism has arisen in opposition to such 
militant Islam. The competition between the two religious systems is redrawing cultural 
boundaries and agitating nationalism in Nigeria. Islam which has historically united 
sections of the society is increasingly losing its capacity to do so. It has become a 
divisive factor, particularly in northern Nigeria. In contrast, Christianity, not known for 
its unity, is increasingly becoming a unifying factor for large sections of the society. It 
is the new identity for previously subject ethnic communities of the middle belt now 
revolting against their former Muslim Hausa\Fulani rulers. The final outcome of the 
contest no doubt has far reaching implications for the future of Nigeria as a nation.
In this chapter I shall examine the increasing importance of Christian and 
Muslim identities in national life. I shall argue that the current political revitalization of 
religion in Nigeria is both an expression of the deep legitimacy crisis confronting elite- 
led secular nationalism and a means of resolving such a crisis. It is therefore an 
increasingly important factor in legitimating Nigerian nationhood, because it enables 
individuals to locate themselves within the political, social and economic environment 
of the emergent Nigerian nation. Recourse to religion as a corrective to national 
identity crisis is not unique to Nigeria. In Turkey and Malaysia, for example, alienated
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victims of maldevelopment turned to Islam to express their new identity crises.1
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section describes the 
religious changes taking place in the country while the second seeks to explain such 
changes.
RELIGION AND CHANGE IN NIGERIA
The growing sense of political identity in the country has become both national 
and religious. Christian and Muslim identities are now competing with the Nigerian 
political identity in importance. A journalist vividly portrayed the situation when he 
observed that Nigeria meant ‘far less to the ordinary Nigerian than his Allah or God.’2 
This emergent 'holy nationalism’ has been conditioned by the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism since the 1970s and, in response, Christian radicalism.
Islamic fundamentalism is distinct from the Islamization campaigns in the 1960s 
promoted by the Premier of Northern Nigeria, Sir Ahmadu Bello, which was aimed at 
unifying the Northern Region under the NPC. Current Islamization campaign is aimed 
at purifying Islam from syncretised, un-lslamic practices. This involves purging Muslim 
communities of traditional African religious practices and condemning the mystical 
practices and beliefs of Sufi brotherhoods (Yan Darikas), mainly the Tijaniyya and the 
Quadriyya, who together make up the bulk of Nigerian Muslims. The movement is 
intolerant of non-Muslims and its supporters are mainly youths. It includes groups such 
as the Maitatsine, /za/a, Muslim Students’ Society (MSS) and the pro-Iranian Islamic
1 Ozay Mehmet, Islamic Identity and Development: Studies of the Islamic Periphery, Routledge, 
London, 1990, p. 3.
2 New Nigerian, 6/12/77, cited in Matthew Hassan Kukah, "Religion and the Politics of Deprivation: 
a Case Study of the Religious Riots in Kaduna State”, paper presented at the International Conference 
on Religion and Protest in Africa, Cornell University, Ithaca, USA, 25-27th April 1991, p. 23.
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movement.
The Izala, led by Islamic scholar, Sheik Abubakar Gumi, is a powerful and 
theologically orthodox group. It considers the Maitatsine, Tijaniyya, Quadriyya and 
Ahmadiyya as non-Muslims. There have been numerous clashes between the Darika 
and the Izala since Sheik Gumi denounced Ahmadiyya Muslims as un-lslamic. Gumi 
has always been close to power in Nigeria and has maintained very close relations 
with the Saudi authorities since the late 1950s, when he was the Nigerian ambassador 
in that country and Sir Bello's Arabic translator on pilgrimages to Mecca. He has 
funding from Saudi Arabia and from business. The group therefore has buses and 
public address systems and is able to organize regular campaigns in northern towns 
and villages. Its cassette recordings of Gumi’s sermons are sold throughout the north. 
The group has a significant female membership. It has over a thousand married 
women registered as members at ABU, Zaria, where the group’s activities have 
become part of the programme of the Centre for Adult Education.3
The MSS was founded in 1954 as a mainly Yoruba organization. By the 1970s, 
it had been transformed into a national organization with over 400 branches around 
the country. Members of the group are from universities and higher institutions of 
learning. The society organizes prayers, fellowship and evangelization campaigns on 
university campuses. It campaigns against the secularity of the state and the sale and 
consumption of alcohol. The radicalization of the group was encouraged by the 
debates over the Sharia in 1977/78 and the 'Islamic revolution' of 1979 in Iran which 
raised the prospect of a holy Nigerian nation from the realms of theory to practice. The
3 Jibrin Ibrahim, "The Politics of Religion in Nigeria: the Parameters of the 1987 Crisis in Kaduna 
State", ROAPE, 45-46 (1989), p. 72.
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Iranian government sponsored members of the MSS to travel in Iran for indoctrination 
and provided literature for propaganda against the Nigerian secular state.
The pro-Iranian Islamic movement is an off-shoot of the MSS. Its leaders, 
Mallam Ibrahim El Zakzaky and Yakubu Yahaya, belonged to the militant wing of the 
MSS in their university days. The group comprises both populist and elitist elements 
and is referred to in the press as Shiite but members reject the tag, declaring that 
•there is nothing like the Shiite in Nigeria, but only Islam’.4 It is committed to the total 
Islamization of Nigeria. For the group anything short of the holistic approach of 
Ayatollah Iran is unacceptable.
The Maitatsine group comprises mainly Koranic students, (almajirai, or 
gardawa), and unemployed migrants to cities. The group separates itself from the 
orthodox community both socially and spatially.5 Muslim scholars in Nigeria deny that 
the Maitatsine is an Islamic group but the members believe themselves to be Muslims. 
What is significant about the Maitatsine is that their teaching and doctrines condemn 
the widespread corruption of existing secular and religious elites especially the orgy 
of western consumption enjoyed by the privileged classes during the oil boom.6 The 
group perceives the Nigerian police ‘as the contemporary expression of the devil’.7
In general, Muslim fundamentalists are opposed to secular nationalism. They 
perceive the secular status of the state as a western idea and consequently 
unacceptable to them. They believe that secularity is responsible for the country’s
4 West Africa, London, 20-26 May 1991, p. 796.
5 Paul Lubeck, "The Yan Tatsine Explained", Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 
1985, Vol. 55, No. 4, p. 370.
6 Ibidem, p. 370.
7 Ibidem, p. 384-385.
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economic and social problems and advocate the establishment of an Islamic state as 
the only solution. They see the school as an agent of immorality, its corrupting 
influence being blamed on two contradictory factors, its Christian orientation and 
secularity.8 Civil associations are also rejected as Christian. For example, the Muslim 
Sisters Organization of Nigeria in 1985 disassociated itself from the National Council 
of Women's Societies because it was 'Christian in orientation and part of the Zionist 
global network’.9
Militant Islam has not gone unchallenged. A new Christian radicalism has arisen 
in opposition. Such radicalism has been articulated through the activities of the 
evangelical and pentecostal groups, collectively referred to as the 'Born Again' 
movement, and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). CAN is the Christian 
answer to Jama’atu Nasril Islam, the political arm of Muslim orthodoxy. It represents 
Christian unity only in a clear political sense, to defend the place of Christianity in 
Nigeria. Its chairman is Catholic Archbishop Olubunmi Okogie. He has commented on 
every government action which he perceives as infringing on the rights of Christians 
and tending to consolidate the lake-over’ of Nigeria by the Muslims. At a press 
conference in May 1990 he denounced the composition of the Armed Forces Ruling 
Council (AFRC) as hostile to Christians and southerners, and the gradual 
transformation of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, into an Islamic city'.10
The ‘Born Again’ movement is the major force behind radical Christian activism
8 Umar Muhammad Sani, "Islam in Nigeria: its Concept, Manifestations and Role in Nation-Building", 
in J.A. Atanda et al. (eds.), Nigeria Since Independence: the First 25 Years Vol. IX  Religion, Ibadan, 
Heinemann Educational, 1989, p. 88.
9 Jacob K. Olupona, "Muslim-Christian Relations in Nigeria: Then and Now", paper presented to the 
Oxford African society Seminar, Oxford, January 27,1988, p. 43.
10 Newswatch, Lagos, October 8, 1990, p. 42.
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in Nigeria. It has been greatly inspired by the evangelizing activities of Protestant 
sects, usually but by no means exclusively American. It was promoted in the 
universities in the 1970s by the Scripture Union and the Student Christian Movement. 
The movement has sufficient funds to distribute free literature and facilities. It 
maintains close ties with other Christian evangelical groups all over the world. In 1985, 
for example, it organized an evangelical congress at the gymnasium of Ahmadu Bello 
University where satellite discs were set up to link the congress with similar events 
taking place in Europe and America. Like its Muslim counterpart, the MSS, its 
members are young, committed and active. They are intolerant of other Christians and 
non-Christians, especially militant Islam. They campaign against corruption, 
hierarchical power, materialism and syncretism in the churches and call on Christians 
to be bom again into the new, real Christianity. Their world view is defined by the 
Bible. They organize prayers, fellowships, rallies and evangelization campaigns on the 
campuses. Their liturgy is simple and devoid of ritualism and traditional elements such 
as spirit possession, polygamy and taboos. The movement is non-denominational and 
aims beyond the limitations of the established churches. From a structural point of 
view it constitutes a unifying yet liberating force.11 The rapid growth of the movement 
in Nigeria may be attributed to the centrality and popularity of the Holy Spirit concept 
which for the individual, represents an experience of empowerment allowing him/her 
individual worth and spirituality.12
The prayer-healing churches (Aladura) are spiritualist rather than fundamentalist
11 Rosalind Hackett (ed.)f New Religious Movements in Nigeria, Lewiston, New York, the Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1987, p. 10.
12 Ibidem, p. 10.
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in form. However, they deserve a special mention because of their popularity and large 
following. Their Biblicism puts them firmly in the Christian tradition. Otherwise, they are 
entirely indigenous in form and content. They are churches of drumming and dancing, 
of dreams, trances and visions, of prophetic healing, divination and spiritual help. Their 
great popularity today stems from their capacity to give material help in addition to 
spiritual comfort to their members. These churches have proved the most creative and 
adventurous in the search by individuals for a more meaningful and relevant existence 
as Nigerians in an environment of strenuous changes prompted by modernization.
Radicalism among Christians has acquired some degree of militancy. This is 
most evident in the northern parts, especially in the vast middle belt region. The 
impression generally conveyed by some Nigerians, and primarily by foreign journalists 
and news media, is that northern Nigeria is solidly Muslim and the south Christian. 
This is incorrect. Such inaccuracies damage the proper understanding of the role and 
place of religion in Nigerian society. In particular, they tend to portray religion in the 
country as merely conflictual and disintegrative. The reality is that it is transformative, 
that is, both integrative and disintegrative. It is an increasingly important factor 
providing new cultural boundaries in the country.
Militant Islam is weakening Muslim solidarity. It has become a divisive factor 
particularly in northern Nigeria, causing an absence of unanimity over the place of 
Muslim orthodoxy in Nigerian society as a whole. It has created a dilemma for 
conventional Muslims. They dare not support or oppose the militants for fear of being 
accused of either aiding anarchy or quarrelling with those who fight for Prophet 
Mohammed. Izala's doctrinal attacks on the dominant Sufi orders have been followed 
by increasingly violent clashes between the groups. The January 1993 religious riots
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in Katsina was between two Muslim sects. In 1984 the Fitiyanul Islam, a Sufi order, 
petitioned the police in Zaria against Izala. Some of the core areas in the 1987 conflict 
between Muslims and Christians in Kaduna State were areas where constant clashes 
between the Darikas and the Izala are known to have occurred. This has led to the 
belief that Christians may be scapegoats for the inter- and intra-sectional quarrels 
among the Muslim sects in those parts of the country.13 Muslim intellectuals such as 
Sheik Adam Abdullah al-llori have criticized Gumi for causing trouble within the ranks 
of Islam instead of fighting the ‘pagans’. However, such a critique also reflects 
southern resentment of the quest for dominance by the Muslim north.14
Moreover, the MSS and the Islamic movement are opposing the Hausa/Fulani 
establishment. They regard both the political and the religious authority of 
Hausa/Fulani traditional ruling elites as a creation of imperialism. The leader of the 
Islamic movement, Mallam Zakzaky, stated that their aim was to overthrow the status 
quo and install ‘another system entirely based on Islam’.15 He observed that the 
Hausa/Fulani ruling class were part of Ihe overall system controlling the country’ and 
accused them of complicity with the west.16
Fundamentalist opposition to the Hausa/Fulani establishment is auspicious for 
Nigerian nationalism. The Hausa/Fulani control of political power since independence 
has been a major source of frustration for other ethnic groups in the country. The fact 
is that Islam in the country is most closely associated with Hausa/Fulani traditional
13 Kukah, "Religion and the Politics of Deprivation", op. cit., p. 24.
14 Ogbu Kalu, "Religions in Nigeria: an Overview", in J.A. Atanda et al. (eds.), op. cit., p. 20.
15 The Guardian, London, Tuesday, May 7 1991, p. 11.
16 Ibidem, p. 11.
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Christians here resent being classed as Muslim northerners or as Hausas.18 The 
Muslims in the far north of this region, that is Sokoto, Kano and Maiduguri, find it 
difficult to accept what is happening and continue to misrepresent the area as solidly 
Muslim. For example Sheik Abubakar Gumi claimed in 1987, when he received the 
$100,000 King Faisal International Award for service to Islam, that Muslims constitute 
about 70% of the Nigerian population. Shehu Shagari in his book, My Vision of 
Nigeria, claimed that about half the population of Nigeria is Muslim and that half of the 
Yoruba people are Muslim while the rest are Christians or adherents of traditional 
religion.19 No count of Muslims would come close to 70% unless it falsely assumes 
that these middle belt peoples are collectively Muslims. Even Shagari’s modest 50% 
must not be taken seriously. With no census figures available, claims by either 
Christians or Muslims to majority must be disregarded. However, it must be 
emphasized that in any serious conflict between the two religious groups, nationwide, 
Christianity would have as many on its side as Islam. The tendency has been for the 
so called ‘animists’ to side with Christians. Both for animists and Christians, Islam is 
the enemy in so far as it is associated with the Hausa/Fulani group.
The notion of a Christian south is anomalous. The Yorubas are in the south, yet 
40 percent of them are Muslim.20 For the Yorubas, ethnicity has been a more salient 
basis of identification and competition rather than religion. The Igbos are mainly 
Christians (both protestant and Catholic) although a few of them have become
18 Dean S. Gilliland, African Religion Meets Islam: Religious Change in Northern Nigeria, Lanham, 
University Press of America, 1986, p. 216.
18 Shehu Shagari, My Vision of Nigeria, London, Frank Cass, 1981, p. 413.
20 Laitin David, Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1986, p. 8.
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Muslims since the 1970s. The majority of those who have converted to Islam have 
done so in the hope of gaining some of the political and economic benefits associated 
with Islam in Nigeria. Ethnicity remains an important basis of identification for Igbos. 
However, in a major confrontation between Muslims and Christians in the south, 
Christians will outnumber Muslims. Nevertheless, intense reactions to Islamic 
developments in the country will not come from the south. Christians and Muslims in 
the south are more liberal and less radical in their attitude to religion. In January 1990 
when Christian leaders called on the faithful to protest against the cabinet reshuffle by 
Babangida, the call was largely ignored in the south but demonstrations supported by 
CAN took place in the middle belt towns of Kaduna, Jos, Yola, Bauchi and llorin. It is 
the Christians of the middle belt, living in close proximity to the Muslims of Kano, 
Kaduna and Maiduguri, who will react most intensely to Islamic developments.21
Major confrontations between the two religions have been in the middle belt. 
For most members of these communities, there is no distinction between church and 
state. Christianity now reinforces their ethnic identities. It is an important political factor 
in the struggle between the indigenous peoples of the area and their traditional 
Hausa/Fulani rulers. As a ‘son of the soil’, Rev. Yesufu Turaki, secretary of the 
Evangelical Church of West Africa in Jos, has observed:
Religion has been transformed into a new fundamental political factor...
It is now clear that anybody who tries to make a distinction between 
church and state will fail...the North-South dichotomy is dead. Those who
21 Dean S. Gilliland, African Religion Meets Islam: Religious Change in Northern Nigeria, op. cit., 
p. 217.
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think it is not, have failed to understand the new factor. Religion is the 
new dichotomy.22
Kukah has observed that the current sharpening of ethnic identities in the area is 
occurring in direct proportion to the upward swing in economic, political or professional 
fortunes of the sons and daughters of these communities23 This resurgence of 
ethnic pride is part and parcel of the struggle of communal identity among peoples 
who feel that for long they have been portrayed as Muslim or Hausa thanks to the 
success of the propaganda machinery of the Hausa/Fulani ruling classes.’24 Religious 
conflicts in these parts are therefore not often distinct from ethnic conflicts.
Ethnic rivalries, land rights and local leadership are all major causes in most of 
the recent religious riots in the north.25 The Kaduna State conflict in 1987 was an 
outlet for the long-standing communal tensions between the ethnic groups south of the 
Zaria Emirate, who believe themselves to be indigenous to the area and the 
Hausa/Fulani whom they regard as strangers and settlers but who have continued to 
control the traditional political power bequeathed them by the colonial administration 
to the total exclusion of all other ethnic communities in the area26 The Bauchi conflict 
between Christians and Muslims in 1991 was also a disguise for ethnic tensions. It 
was the climax of a long-standing feud between the Tyiawa ethnic group, the original
22 Dapo Asaju, "The Politicisation of Religion in Nigeria” in ‘Segun Johnson, (ed.), Readings in 
Selected Nigerian Problems, Lagos, Okanlawon Publishers, 1990, p. 186.
23 Kukah, "Religion and the Politics of Deprivation", op. cit., p. 28.
24 Ibidem, p. 28.
25 The Guardian, London, Monday, May 6 1991, p. 7.
26 Kukah, ‘Religion and the Politics of Deprivation", op. cit., p. 13.
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owners of Tafawa Balewa (where the riots started), and the immigrant Fulanis.27 
Similarly, the abortive coup against Babangida in April 1990 masked ethnic tensions. 
Although religion defined the coup, the hidden agenda was ethno-political. The 
dissidents, mainly from the Middle Belt, were protesting against what they perceived 
as the abuse of state power by the Hausa/Fulani. Military rule is for them the means 
of salvation and justice in the whole process of sharing the national cake’.28 Religion 
is therefore a proxy for ethnicity.
RELIGION AND THE NIGERIAN IDENTITY
The current political revitalization of religion in Nigeria as fundamentalist, 
evangelical and other types may be seen as an increasingly important factor in 
Nigeria’s quest for nationhood. It is both an expression of the deep legitimacy crisis 
confronting elite-led secular nationalism and a means of resolving such crisis. It is 
ultimately concerned with legitimating Nigerian nationalism because it seeks to enable 
individuals and ethnic communities to locate themselves within the political, social and 
economic environment of the emergent nation. Their sense of national identity has 
been accompanied by political and socio-economic insecurities arising from the failure 
of elite-led secular nationalism to deliver the promised land flowing with milk and 
honey.
The Nigerian state at independence held out the promise of salvation from both 
national bondage and personal suffering. What the people got instead was continuous 
social, economic and political instability. They became victims of nationalism and
27 Newswatch, Lagos, May 20 1991, pp. 23-24.
28 Kukah, Religion and Politics in Northern Nigeria since 1960, op. cit., p. 299.
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modernity instead of its beneficiaries. For example, they have endured six military 
coups since the end of the civil war (three of them abortive) and many more rumours 
of coups. They have witnessed a rise in violent crimes such as armed robbery and 
ritual killing. They have experienced both prosperity and poverty in a relatively short 
period of time. The exceptional growth in oil revenues in the early 1970s generated 
a popular awareness of being Nigerian while legitimating inequality. The rich got richer, 
mainly illegally, through the state as the state sought to expand its authority over the 
economy. State practices became effective instruments for privatizing public wealth 
rather than for the achievement of balanced socio-economic development promised 
by nationalism. Corruption and immorality acquired normative status as a means of 
getting on. Political instability became the norm as political and military elites struggled 
to possess the state, the god of wealth. By mid 1980s oil boom turned into oil doom 
and the once prosperous nation, whose problem was how to spend its money, found 
itself begging for money. Nigerians became disillusioned and apprehensive about their 
individual and collective existence as Nigerians. Their existence as such did not make 
sense and 1o be in society is to be ‘sane1 precisely in the sense of being shielded 
from the ultimate ‘insanity’ of such anomic terror’.29 Owing to the importance of 
religion in their lives many Nigerians continued to perceive the country’s problems in 
religious terms. Consequently, they resorted to previously established religious 
identities as a corrective to the disorder and meaninglessness in their lives.
Religion is presently big business in Nigeria. There are approximately 1500
29 Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy, New York, 1967, cited in Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation 
Crisis, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988, p. 118.
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distinct new religious movements active in contemporary Nigeria.30 They include neo- 
traditional movements, healing homes or prayer churches, Ethiopian or African 
churches, spiritual or Aladura churches, revivalist (Christian or Islamic) movements 
and spiritual science movements. Most people in Nigeria have had personal contact 
or involvement, either directly or indirectly through a friend or relative, with one of 
these movements. The growth in religion is most conspicuous in the cities. The 
enchanting songs, rituals and hopes of a better tomorrow draw these people into the 
alluring arms of pastors and prophets who in turn are making a boom out of the 
situation’:
There is hardly a street in Ajegunle [a poor suburb of Lagos] without a 
church of the spiritual kind. Along Okito Street alone at the Awodiora 
area of Ajegunle, there are about seven churches, [sic] Some of which 
are shops by day and prayer houses by the evenings. As one Ajegunle 
resident aptly [sic] put it 'most of the churches ... have a common 
purpose, that is to make money. They are everywhere with new ones 
springing up daily’.31
Patronage of traditional religion has increased. This is evidenced by the 
increase in the growth of secret societies and cults, and of ritual killings for money.32 
Revelations about the growth of cults in Nigerian universities was a matter of great
30 Rosalind I.J. Hackett (ed.), New Religious Movements in Nigeria, op. cit., p. 2.
31 Amuzie Akpaka et al., "Living in Nigeria", Thisweek, Lagos, October 3,1988, pp. 22-23.
32 K.K. Yope, "Weird Things People do for Money", Quality, Lagos, July 14,1988, pp. 8-10 and 38.
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public concern in 1991 as it involved ritual killings and injuries to many students.33 
In the 1970s the federal government proscribed membership of secret cults, making 
it a crime for all civil servants. The ban has not been effective. Benjamin Awolusi, the 
secretary general of a witches’ cult, pointed out that:
People will continue to kill for money. Unless government takes care of 
the needs of everybody and gives them food and clothing. But if every 
individual is to find his own money, some people will continue to kill.34
Recourse to religion for healing is natural for many Nigerians. The traditional 
world of the African does not separate between the sacred and the secular. There is 
a general conviction rooted in traditional beliefs that God is immanent and active in 
peoples’ lives and is both concerned and able to solve human problems. Faced with 
a problem - health, economic, legal, marital, sterility - most Nigerians turn to the 
babalawo, prophet, or mallam for help. For example, the head of the National Drug 
Law Enforcement Agency, Fidelis Edward Oyakhilome, in 1991 mobilized spiritualists 
to help him regain his job after he had been suspended by government. He and his 
family members ’engaged the services of Prophetess Lizzy Okeke of the Christ 
Revival Mission in Benin City and several notable spiritualists’ to pray daily to ensure 
his reinstatement.35 Their prayers worked for him. He has been reinstated.
Prayers are now being offered daily for Nigeria. Most people believe that only
33 For details see for instance, The African Guardian, Lagos, April 9, 1991.
M Yope, "Weird Things People do for Money", op. cit., p. 9.
35 Prime People, Lagos, April 4, 1991, p. 6.
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God can save the country.36 Nigerians are thus not just seeking individual healing but 
also national remedy through religion. The sacred emerges out of disorder and thus 
provides man’s ultimate shield against the terror of anomie:
To be in a 'right' relationship with the sacred cosmos is to be protected 
against the nightmare of chaos. To fall out of such a 'right’ relationship 
is to be abandoned on the edge of the abyss of meaninglessness.37
Many Nigerian- analysts and commentators have tried to explain the 
politicisation of religion from the perspective of elite manipulation of religion for 
individual political and economic ends.38 Bala Usman identified three groups that are 
engaged in the manipulation of religion in the country: foreign powers, their stooges 
in Nigeria and ruling elites.39 A group of academics from ABU, Zaria, see the 
politicisation of religion as a conspiracy on the part of government. They accused the 
government of deliberately engineering the antagonism between the two faiths as a 
tactic to divert attention from the urgent political and economic problems that face 
Nigeria.40 The major limitation of this approach lies in its inability to distinguish 
between a genuine place for religion in any society and its so called manipulation.
36 See for instance, Bashir Ikara, The greater Future of Nigeria: a Cultural Perspective, Lagos, 
Lantern Books, 1989, p. 26.
37 Peter L. Berger, The Social Reality of Religion, London, Faber and Faber, 1969, p. 27.
38 See for example, S.P.I. Agl, The Influence of Religion on Politics in Nigeria: Yesterday, Today 
And..?" in S.O. Olugbemi (ed.), Alternative Political Futures for Nigeria, Lagos, Nigerian Political 
Science Association, 1987, pp. 91-92.
39 Bala Usman, The Manipulation of Religion in Nigeria (1977-1987), London, Vanguard Publishers, 
1987, pp. 32-33.
40 Dele Olojede et al., Trip to Fez", Newswatch, Lagos, February 24, 1986, p. 17.
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Such an approach wrongly assumes that those manipulated have no minds of their 
own or have a false consciousness about their beliefs. The idea that ordinary 
Nigerians have been coerced or hoodwinked by powerful elites into a false awareness 
which causes them to misunderstand their own best interests is ridiculous.
Others believe that the politicisation of religion stems from fanaticism. For 
example, Bola Olowo pointed out that northern Nigeria is fertile ground for such 
fanaticism because of its floating population of Almajirais or Gardawa who obey the 
injunctions of their Mullahs, including killing and dying for the Islamic cause.41 
Certainly, the element of fanaticism cannot be discounted. However, most Almajirais 
depend on their Mullahs not only for spiritual guidance but also for material needs. It 
is thus difficult to say whether their so-called fanatical reaction is spiritually or 
materially induced. Lubeck has shown that the ideology which guided the Maitatsine 
gardawa to die for the cause of Islam’ contained a clear class antagonism which 
cannot be reconciled with religious fanaticism.42
Yet others believe that the politicisation of religion is a response to poverty. For 
example, the journalist who observed that Nigeria 'means far less to the ordinary 
Nigerian because, for years, it has not demonstrated its capacity to clothe him and 
house him’.43 Poverty is certainly a factor, but not a sufficient one to explain why the 
Nigerian identity is defined in religious terms, rather than in terms of region or class. 
It may explain why most Nigerians have resorted to religion but it is not an acceptable
41 Bola Olowo, "Prophets and Zealots", West Africa, 20 -26 May 1991, p. 796.
42 Paul Lubeck, Islamic Protest under Semi-industrial Capitalism: ‘Yan Tatsine Explained’, op. cit., 
passim.
43 New Nigerian, Kaduna, 6/12/77, cited in Kukah, "Religion and the Politics of Deprivation", op. cit., 
p. 23.
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explanation for the politicisation of religion.
Some commentators have attempted to explain the politicisation of religion as 
the consequence of limited opportunities for political expression. The military banned 
political parties and activities in 1984 and since then, they have banned other civil 
organizations which challenged governmental policies.44 Such an explanation is 
inadequate. It sees religion as mere substitute for politics, implying that religious 
revival is just a passing phase. If this were true, the reinstatement of secular parties 
in 1990 should have by now diminished the chances of political religion, but it has not. 
In 1991 the leader of the Islamic Movement ordered his followers to kill Governor 
Madaki for blaspheming against the Prophet Mohammed. Large-scale religious riots 
have occurred in Katsina and Bauchi States in 1991, in Kaduna State in May 1992, 
and again in Katsina in January 1993. These incidents suggest that political religion 
is more than mere political expression.
The whole problematic of political religion in Nigeria may be described as that 
of the sacralization of the Nigerian identity. By sacralization I mean the process by 
which individuals attempt to make meaningful their existence as Nigerians. It is thus 
the legitimation of the newly established national identity. Its ultimate goal is the 
conversion of Nigerian nationalism to holy nationalism.
Holy nationalism is the nationalism that inspires reverence.45 It is the 
nationalism that makes national symbols - flag, pledge, constitution, anthem, awards, - 
meaningful to individuals. In consequence, their flag becomes more than any other
44 Kukah, "Religion and the Politics of Deprivation", op. cit., p. 26.
45 Conor Cruise O’Brien, God Land: Reflections on Religion and Nationalism, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 40.
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piece of cloth in their eyes, their constitution more venerable than any other 
document.46 At this stage the collective emotional force of nationalism merges with 
religion and both become altogether indistinguishable; the two are one and the same. 
‘God chose a particular people and promised them a particular land’.47
The idea of a holy Nigerian nation is contained in radical Christian and Muslim 
beliefs. Muslims believe that the country’s problems are due to immorality or the evil 
of secularism. Ibrahim Suleiman, a leading commentator on Islamic affairs, argued 
that:
Historically and in practice, secularization is a development peculiar to 
Christian civilization. It is a child, albeit a bastard, of Christianity... 
Secularization has become a sinister but convenient mechanism to 
blackmail Muslims and impede the progress of Islam and reduce it to the 
level of earthly concepts and ideologies.48
The perception of the state security forces ‘as the contemporary expression of the 
devil’ by the Maitatsine group speaks for itself. Yakubu Yahaya, the leader of the 
Islamic movement in Katsina, described the federal, state and local governments ‘as 
a group of cheats’, running an ungodly government.49
Evangelicals similarly believe that the country’s problems are the work of the
46 Ibidem, p. 40-41.
47 Ibidem, p. 3.
48 Sunday Triumph, April 24 1986, cited in Jibrin Ibrahim, "The Politics of Religion in Nigeria", op. 
cit., p. 77.
49 Tell, Lagos, May 6, 1991, p. 19.
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devil and his minions, that is evil government officials. This view is illustrated by 
extracts from the Prayer Bulletin, an occasional newsletter of the Christian Students’ 
Social Movement of Nigeria (CSSMN), one of the 'Born Again’ organizations:
Our economy is in shambles with the extent of damage not accurately 
known.... Our economic situation makes it necessary for us to pray and 
ask the Lord to have mercy upon us. We also need to ask the Lord to 
deal with the men who compounded the problem - government 
officials.50
We must understand that quite a lot of the problems we face in this 
country today with relation to politics, agriculture, weather, etc. may be 
due in part to the fact that certain things have been programmed by the 
forces of darkness through interference in the heavenly bodies.51
Each group believes that it is the embodiment of good and the other the 
embodiment of evil. For Muslims, secularity is Christian and as such evil while for 
Christians, Muslim rule is the evil not secularity. Consequently, proselytization is an 
important activity of both groups, the idea being to transform ‘evil’ Nigeria into a holy 
nation, a nation of people united in their common calling as God’s prophets. This is 
why Nigerian unity means for Alhaji Gumi, the leader of Izala, the conversion of
50 Christian Students’ Social Movement of Nigeria, Prayer Bulletin, No. 12 (24 May 1983) pp. 1,3. 
Issues of the Bulletin are filed at the CSSMN office, 2 Akanbi Street, Satellite Town, Lagos.
51 Prayer Bulletin, No. 8 (18 February 1983), p. 3. For the Biblical echoes see Colossians 1:3, 
Romans 8:38 and II Corinthians 3-4 King James version.
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Christians and non-Muslims to Islam.52
Militant Muslims favour an interventionist approach in this enterprise of 
conquering the devil and establishing a holy Nigerian nation with tenure from Allah. 
This is a jihad which will establish an Islamic nation state. Mallam Yahaya, the leader 
of militant Islam in Katsina, claims that 'a battle will be fought and Allah has promised 
to help his people’.53 Mallam Zakzaky, the leader of the Islamic movement, observed 
that:
Eventually the movement will swallow up all of the Muslim population.
And when finally the Islamic system triumphs, the Christians will find that 
it is much better than the present set up.54
Christians favour the divine intervention or Holy Spirit approach. The head of 
the political science department at the Lagos State University, Dr. ‘Segun Johnson, 
referred to this approach as the 'Christian Liberation Movement, the Nation’s Liberation 
in the Spirit realm through Christ Jesus’.55 The major weapon of liberation is prayer. 
For instance, the CSSMN stated that:
1983 is the year of destiny for Nigeria. ...It will be the turning point 
spiritually for Nigeria. The Political, economic and social situations will
52 Quality, Lagos, October, 1987, p. 37.
53 Tell, op. cit., p. 19.
54 The Guardian, London, Tuesday May 7 1991, p. 11.
55 Segun Johnson, Readings in Selected Nigerian Problems, op. cit., p. iii.
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be the result of what goes on in the spiritual realm. Therefore 
EVERYONE has to be a WATCHMAN for NIGERIA. Learn to DAILY 
pray and intercede for at least a prayer item concerning Nigeria.56
Thus in the perception of both religious groups, Nigeria is established as a nation­
state. What is not yet established is which God rules the nation-state.
Each of the two groups clearly believes that Nigeria is God’s promised land for 
its members. For instance, the CSSMN urged the faithful to ‘speak healing’ to the 
Nigerian economy because:
[l]f Nigeria were to go down we cannot carry out God’s assignment for 
us as has been revealed by prophecy: we cannot run to Chad, 
Cameroon, Niger, Benin or the Atlantic Ocean. We must therefore have 
a good economy.57
Muslim fundamentalists, on the other hand, behave as if an Islamic state is a fait 
accompli. As they see it Muslims are in the majority and Islam is a total way of life. 
Mallam Zakzaky claimed that Christians had nothing to fear from the triumph of Islam 
in Nigeria as their religion expressed no views on the political and socio-economic 
aspects of daily life.58 Alhaji Gumi made similar claims, observing that Muslim rule 
in Nigeria is imperative for Nigerian unity. 'We have to divide the country’ if Christians
56 CSSMN, Post-prayer Conference Letter, January 1983, p. 1.
57 CSSMN, Prayer Bulletin, No. 14 (16 June 1983), p. 5. Healing is here used in the sense of order.
58 The Guardian, London, Tuesday, May 7 1991, p. 11.
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do not accept Muslim leadership.59 What is therefore seen to be at stake by both 
groups is which religious system provides the sacred normative substance to their 
identity as Nigerians. It is this substance that ultimately enables individuals and 
communities to accept as permanent and meaningful the suffering which is integral to 
a national identity. For most people, identity is simply a necessary stigmatic emblem 
one must learn to carry without disguise.60 Holy nationalism is the ideology that 
enables the stigmatic emblem of the nation to be carried with pride. It has a special 
appeal as a ‘secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into 
meaning’.61
The dilemma for Nigeria, however, remains. Although the politicisation of 
religion may seek to resolve the crisis of identity facing Nigerians, it also raises the 
delicate question of where their ultimate loyalties lie: religion, ethnic group, or state? 
As religion increasingly reinforces the sense of ethnicity, the old dialectic between 
ethnicity and nationalism continues in a new form and setting to divide Nigeria and 
confuse visions of her future destiny as a nation.
59 Quality, Lagos, October, 1987, p. 35.
60 George De Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross, Ethnic Identity: Cultural Communities and Change, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1975, p. 389.
61 Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities, London, Verso, 1983, p. 19.
CHAPTER TWELVE 
CONCLUSION
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This study has examined the relationship between ethnicity, nationalism and 
nation-building in post civil war Nigeria. It is argued that ethnicity is not necessarily 
incompatible with nationalism and nation-building. Ethnicity and nationalism, each 
contributes to political stability and, therefore, to civil peace and to the ability of 
individual Nigerians to pursue their non-political goals.
Nationalism contributes to political stability in Nigeria because it legitimatizes 
state power. Popular expectations of nationalism, and the frustration of its aspirations, 
has been the major factor in legitimizing and de-legitimizing all Nigerian governments 
and, therefore in causing their downfalls. They have only been replaced by military 
officers or party politicians who have successfully appealed to that sense of 
nationalism. Hence, Nigerian governments pursue policies that combine both a popular 
nationalist enthusiasm and the inculcation of nationalist ideology through the mass 
media, the educational system and administrative regulations. The mass campaigns 
for nationalism described in Chapter Six are the most concrete manifestation of such 
governmental desire to imbue the citizenry with a sense of common purpose and, 
thereby, to secure popular legitimacy for the Nigerian state and for their own rule.
Ethnicity is functional to political stability because it provides the basis for 
political socialization and for popular allegiance to political actors at the central state 
level. It also provides the framework within which patronage is institutionalized and 
related to traditional forms of welfare within a state which is itself unable to provide 
such benefits to its subjects. Nigerians, at least their leaders and representatives,
302
recognize that national cohesion cannot occur without their coming to terms with the 
durability of ethnicity in one form or the other. This is explicitly acknowledged in the 
adoption of a policy of proportional representation and rewards for ethnic groups.
Ethnicity can be incompatible with nationalism and nation-building. This is 
especially so where the federal arrangement consists of a few number of large ethnic 
states that have the economic and political power to challenge the state or dominate 
other ethnic groups. Under such conditions, legitimation of the state may be impossible 
to obtain as was the case in Nigeria in the 1960s and more recently in the former 
Republic of Yugoslavia. Nigeria managed to avoid disintegration by the creation of 
more states within the federation, providing evidence that political engineering can 
alter ethnic balances and alignments so that ethnicity, nationalism and nation-building 
are made more compatible.
Ethnic groups and the state have mutual need of each other even as they 
compete for the individual’s loyalty. Obviously, Nigeria would not be what it is without 
its numerous ethnic groups and conversely, the groups would not be what they are 
today without the Nigerian state. Cultural diversity is advantageous to Nigeria because 
of the wealth and variety it contributes to the resource base of the state. This is openly 
acknowledged by the state in its official policy on cultural nationalism. It is also implicit 
in the fact that the military and political elite that have ruled Nigeria have used 
traditional ethnic features to achieve their political objectives and legitimate their rule. 
They recognize the crucial role of ethnically-based institutions, such as traditional 
rulership, in constructing a national identity, describing such rulers as lathers of the 
nation’ or ‘highways to unity’. They know that if they get the allegiance of traditional 
rulers, Ihe fathers of their people’, they get the people as the majority of the people
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still respect their traditional rulers. On the other hand, the nation-state provides the 
arena within which ethnic groups are able to prosper in the modem sense, and within 
which political alliances are formed and reformed to the mutual advantage of different 
ethnic and political groups. The de-construction of Nigeria would not be in the interests 
of the numerous minorities who have been able to negotiate political alliances to 
assert their interests. It is also recognized that the secession of the other regions 
would not be in the economic interest of the dominant Muslim north.
Ethnic competition is beneficial for ethnic elites and for national integration. It 
enables elites to bargain and thus facilitates conciliatory politics. The advantage of 
threat forces immediate settlement. Ethnic rivalries have been of major benefit to 
ethnic minority groups. It is in the space between the majority groups that they can 
prosper. They have exploited the rivalry between the majority groups to assert their 
political and economic interests. As a result, they are the strongest supporters of 
Nigerian nationalism. Ethnic identity as pragmatic pursuit of economic and political 
advantage is, in these contexts, the route to the political centre. The more groups 
participate in the political centre, and the more effects that has on regional and 
communal interests and pursuits, the stronger will be the perception of Nigeria as an 
entity commanding loyalty from its people.
Ethnic conflicts are caused by fear of domination. This is basically the fear by 
ethnic group members about being alienated from the benefits of nationalism and 
modernity. The main features of this psychological state are irrationality and insecurity. 
This makes such fears conducive to manipulation by self-interested individuals. Fear 
of domination is the result of three related factors: the Nigerian conception of power, 
the inequalities in the economic and political relations of the groups, and the threat
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which such inequalities pose to members of the groups. In Nigeria, political power is 
conceptualized as residing in the ethnic group from which the leadership comes. This 
is because political power is seen as personalized in the politician (rather than in the 
post) and, by extension, in his group. Such a conception of power supports the 
reciprocal system of ethnicity discussed in Chapter Nine, and largely explains why the 
fear of domination is such a potent factor in Nigeria. Because of the social and 
economic benefits associated with state power in Nigeria, individuals and their ethnic 
elites fear that the group that dominates the state would use its position to promote 
its own interests above those of the other groups. The state is thus seen as a threat 
if it is not controlled by the group.
The pervasive significance of fears and anxieties about domination among the 
Nigerian ethnic groups suggest that analysts ought to be more attentive to the 
salience, importance and intensity of such fears and anxieties. Psychological factors 
have been emphasized in studies of ethnic conflict, but they have seldom been 
advanced as the fear of domination. Such a theory is advanced in Chapter Nine.
The central role of fear in ethnicity makes it difficult for nation-building policies 
to produce predictable results. It, however, suggests that in those areas of group 
interaction where fear of domination is marginal positive consequences for nation- 
building can be expected. The problem of ethnically-divided societies stem from the 
unpredictable nature of such fears and anxieties rather than from the cultural 
differences among the groups. To eradicate such fears is to check ethnic conflicts.
Planned nation-building is useful. Because of the persistence of ethnic 
identities, critics have disputed not only the validity of nation-building theories but also 
the utility of purposive nation-building actions. Some critics have even given the
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impression that such actions entail nothing but the destruction of distinctive ethnic 
cultures. Purposive nation-building may have limited success in promoting nationalism 
but it is nevertheless functional to nationalism. This is amply demonstrated in Chapters 
Three to Eight. For example, the Nigerian state has benefitted from successful nation- 
building in the area of foreign relations. The populist approach adopted under General 
Mohammed generated in Nigerians a consciousness of their political identity. As a 
nationalist ideology, Ramatism has, by Nigerian standards, been a peculiarly effective 
one. It generated quite a high pitch of Nigerian nationalism which was expressed 
strongly in foreign policy and in widespread demands for a Nigerian ideology. The 
creation of more states has been advantageous to the unity of Nigeria. Although it has 
not undermined ethnicity, it has provided Nigeria with a politics of conciliation. The 
policy of proportional representation and ethnic rewards has had limited success. It 
has the long term advantage of engendering national loyalty but it also has the shorter 
term disadvantage of increasing corruption and chaos, both of which are already 
endemic in Nigeria. The state has achieved considerable success in the area of 
cultural engineering because of its association with Nigerian intellectuals who have 
been the most prominent contributors to cultural nationalism. This is more so in 
relation to the development of folk art, a national history and a core of Nigerian 
literature. Attempts by the state to sponsor dramatic reforms in language usage and 
religious policies have had negative effects. However, this is mitigated by popular 
practices in language usage and religion. Purposive socialization actions have also 
produced mixed results. The educational system has produced a questionable minority 
of ethnic elites. The National Youth Service Corps has had a measure of success but 
it has been bedeviled by corruption. The mass mobilization campaigns to change
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peoples’ attitudes have had little or no effects. Opportunities matter more than 
attitudes.
The unintended or even unanticipated effects of planned nation-building can 
affect society in a more fundamental manner than do their intended results. For 
example, Nigerian nationalism developed as an unintended consequence of British 
imperial policy which was intended to promote ethnic distinctiveness. In Chapter Eight 
it was argued that the increasing cleavage between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria 
is largely an unintended consequence of federal government policy. Christian and 
Muslim identities have consequently become politicised and now constitute a threat 
to the Nigerian political identity. The creation of more states was originally intended 
to stop the secession of the Eastern Region but it demonstrated a manifest function 
for national integration, and consequently became the cornerstone policy for nation- 
building. This nationalist policy exploits ethnicity to achieve its objectives, emphasizing 
the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism and nation-building. The unintended 
and unanticipated consequences of purposive actions are, therefore, central to 
sociological inquiry.
What all this amounts to is that while ethnicity may obstruct the growth of 
national identity and cohesion in some areas of social life, it may not do so in others. 
Ethnicity, nation-building and nationalism are made more compatible by some of the 
intended and unintended effects which each has on the others.
Planned nation-building should not, then, be regarded as expendable in multi­
ethnic states. Nations are historical groups and, as such, are shaped by the collective 
experience of their members. To see nation-building solely in terms of its benefits as 
do the theorists of nation-building, or solely in terms of its sacrifices, as do many of
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their critics, is to misunderstand the processes of nation formation. The construction 
of a nation-state out of ethnic communities involves social, cultural, political, and 
economic sacrifices and benefits. The relative balance of such benefits and sacrifices 
to individuals and ethnic communities varies, depending on existing conditions. Such 
circumstances may be objectively or subjectively defined, externally or internally 
induced and may be redefined by affected individuals and groups at any given time 
as the recurring demands for the creation of more states shows. Nation-building is, 
therefore, a continuous process in which both the state and its peoples play a role.
The paradox of nationalism in Nigeria is that it is simultaneously integrative and 
disintegrative. This is illustrated in the dual sense of Nigerian nationalism, that is as 
both a popular emotional force and an elite ideology. Nigerian nationalism as a popular 
emotional force is strong in relation to other countries and foreigners. However, its 
appeal and strength tend to be greatly undermined internally by ruling elites who 
subvert its aspirations but use them to legitimize their rule. Thus, Nigerian nationalism 
as an ideology to legitimate the exercise of and, the struggles for state power by the 
elite is more effective than popular nationalism. But it does not have the intrinsic power 
to create a national identity. It can only exploit the sense of national identity which 
already exists. In doing this, it divides and disrupts the society. It alienates the vast 
majority of the people from the social and economic benefits of modernity. The people 
react and express their disillusion in civil unrest, mass demonstrations and strikes if 
the government was under the military, or by voting political elites out of power during 
elections. Attempts by political elites to subvert democratic decision-making and 
perpetuate their rule always precipitate political crises and provide the military with the 
opportunity to make a bid for power. Therefore despite the high public profile of its
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hyperbolic rhetoric, Nigerian nationalism largely fails as a means to unite the putative 
nation.
Nationalism as an ideology for domination is the most destabilizing factor in 
Nigerian politics. It accounts for the high rate of political renewal in Nigeria, that is the 
cycle of coups and counter coups, and the relative stability or frailty of particular 
regimes. However, its capacity to transform the society is derived from the political 
insecurity which it creates. Constant changes of government have mobilized Nigerians 
to a new awareness about their political and social identity. It has made them realize 
that their economic and social problems are not due to their ethnic affiliations but to 
the self-interested policies of their leaders. Each new government attempts to 
legitimate its rule by claiming to represent a new order of national salvation. They try 
to satisfy popular aspirations by promoting some form of development but they 
invariably succumb to the irresistible force of state capital and duplicate the crimes 
they seized power to correct. This process of development is stressful and creates an 
identity crisis for individuals and communities. A majority of Nigerians victimized by 
maldevelopment have turned to religion as a corrective for the disorder and 
meaninglessness in their lives. This growth in religious awareness has produced a set 
of new political actors who use established religious systems to challenge the state 
and agitate Nigerian nationalism. Thus the identity crisis caused by nationalism is 
critical for nation-building.
The current political revitalization of religion in Nigeria is regarded as an 
increasingly important factor in legitimating Nigerian nationalism. The competition 
between Christian and Muslim identities is redrawing cultural boundaries. Islam which 
has historically united sections of the society is increasingly losing its capacity to do
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so. It has become a divisive factor, particularly in northern Nigeria. In contrast, 
Christianity which is not known for its unity, is increasingly becoming a unifying factor 
for large sections of the population. It is the new political identity for previously subject 
ethnic communities of the middle belt now revolting against their former Muslim 
Hausa/Fulani rulers. The final outcome of the contest will no doubt have far reaching 
implications for the future of Nigeria as a nation. Meanwhile, as religion increasingly 
reinforces ethnicity, the old dialectic between ethnicity, nation-building and nationalism 
continues, in a new form and setting, to divide and confuse visions of Nigeria’s future 
destiny as a nation.
This interaction between religion and ethnicity and nationalism in Nigeria 
questions the validity of conventional sociological wisdom which claims that religion 
and democratic politics are isolated. Such notions ignore the fact that though church 
and state may in principle be separated, the rhetoric and symbolism of religion still 
persists. In other words, the two are not incompatible, democracy entails religiosity. 
What is incompatible with democratic pluralistic politics is an official religion. 
Nationalism and its inherent notions of democracy feeds on religious attributes. Apart 
from being clothed in the rhetoric and symbolism of religion, nationalism itself has 
religious properties. It has sacred rituals - march pasts, memorial days, flags, hymns, 
pilgrimages to national monuments. It has myths - the nation’s history, reference to 
national heroes, soldiers. It has ethics * being a good citizen. It has emotions - 
patriotism, loyalty, obedience. It has sacred institutions - schools with schoolteachers 
as priests, the military. It has its saints and martyrs - national heroes and national 
award winners. The powerful attraction of the ‘imagined community’ for most people 
can only be understood by aligning it with religion. It is religion that provides the spirit
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of the nation, that normative sacred essence which ultimately enables individuals and 
communities to endure the suffering which is integral to a national identity. This is why 
for nationalism two factors are crucial: the structure of domination and oppression and 
the fact of excessive ritualism or religion in the lives of people undergoing a period of 
social and economic uncertainty. Because of these two factors, it is easy for 
nationalism, as it is itself a kind of secular religion, to acquire the symbols and ideals 
of a traditional religion in order to attract followers. In other words, nationalism’s 
special appeal as the means of salvation from national bondage and suffering centres 
on the existence of oppression and suffering and the excessive resort to religious 
forms by the suffering masses alienated by the dominant structure of power in the 
social order. As a result, nationalism has two faces, one as dominant ideology 
legitimizing appropriation, the other revolutionary, resisting domination in a period of 
uncertainty.
This idea of nationalism controverts the analytical perspective which claims that 
nationalism is a phenomenon specific to modern industrialized societies. Nigeria, like 
many other African countries, is not industrialized but it would be wrong to deny these 
countries nationalism. The notion that nationalism is only feasible in industrialized 
societies misses the significance of social factors such as the structure of power in 
relation to the process of wealth accumulation and the contradictory relations of 
domination and resistance which accompanies such a process. Consequently it is not 
quite historical, and nationalism is best understood as a product of the continuing 
dialectic of history in which legitimation claims of a social order are sustained and 
challenged.
The principal conclusion of this study is that ethnicity and nationalism are not
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mutually incompatible. Both complement each other in the formation of ethnic 
communities into national societies. Ethnic politics in Nigeria reflect the reciprocity 
between ethnicity and nationalism. In the electoral process, nationalism and ethnicity 
complement each other and become indistinct, interdependent, and overlapping, 
serving simultaneously as mechanisms for inclusion and exclusion of elites from state 
power and its benefits. Elites and non-elites rationally use their ethnic identity as a 
bargaining tool in the process. The political effect of such a system may not be 
democratically ideal but it does not imply that ethnic and national sentiments are 
incompatible.
The disruptive nature of such politics stems from the close structural 
relationship between political power, the state and wealth accumulation on one hand, 
and political power and popular democracy on the other. Because the accumulation 
of wealth and status depends almost entirely on political power, both those who aspire 
to rule and those who wish to consolidate their rule need secure positions within or 
near the state. In an authoritarian state such security can be assured, whereas in a 
democratic state such as Nigeria which lacks social consensus legitimating capital 
accumulation, it cannot be assured. The position of ruling elites is under constant 
threat, especially during elections. Power elites and aspirants to power, therefore, use 
all available means, such as ethnicity, electoral fraud and brute force, to maintain or 
acquire power. Elections become warfare and rules of the game are disregarded as 
elites struggle for the state. Such undemocratic politics is neither the consequence of 
the persistence of ethnic identities nor of the presence of anti-democratic values. It is 
the consequence of the idea of nationalism as a guise for the accumulation of wealth 
and the domination of the country by a sectional elite. Consequently, the common idea
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that nationalism is the ‘glue’ or ‘cure’ for ethnic divisions is inapplicable to Nigeria or 
elsewhere in Africa for that matter. It is important to note that ethnicity is the one 
common factor in most, if not all, sub-Saharan African states. Zaire, Uganda, Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, Burundi, Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia, Sudan, Cameroon, Namibia, 
Mozambique and even South Africa all are plagued by the politics of domination or 
what is more generally perceived as ethnic politics.
The key to understanding nationalism in Nigeria lies in the democratic character 
of the modem state. Ruling elites oppose that democratic character and instead claim 
the state as their own. In Nigeria, unlike western European nation-states, popular 
legitimation of the state or elected government was installed before the successful 
development of capitalism and nationalism. Such a situation was bound to be 
problematic since it makes successful development of nationalism dependent on the 
quality and integrity of those elected to govern. The government is in an extremely 
difficult position because of the close links between political power and the acquisition 
of wealth, and the lack of social consensus legitimating capital accumulation in the 
country. It has somehow to overcome the conflicting demands made on it by ruling 
elites who wish to use state power to accumulate wealth, and by the public whose 
aspirations it must satisfy to legitimate its rule. Individuals always manifest a certain 
measure of greed, and therefore ruling elites use their political power to pursue their 
economic self-interests. As long as political power remains the means to economic 
advantage in ethnically-divided societies, political actors will use whatever means are 
available to possess the state. Ethnicity is the most readily available and efficient 
means for electoral mobilization, and therefore will continue to be an important political 
factor in the nation-building process. It would not be politically important in nation-
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building if the economic structure was decentralized and removed from the state 
structure. In that way, non-ethnic allegiances and interests would be more important 
in political competition and ethnic ties would adapt to such principles as the rule of law 
and respect for democratic institutions which are conducive to the process of nation- 
building.
Ethnicity should not, then, be regarded as inimical to nationalism. Both should 
be seen as related variables, playing a role in the formation of national societies. 
Ethnicity largely provides the cultural base while nationalism provides the political base 
for the nation-state. This approach acknowledges the historicity of nations and 
repudiates the idea that nations have been produced only by modern developments 
such as capitalism and industrialization. It has the additional advantage of rationalizing 
the frequently identified ‘ancient and modern1 paradoxes of nationalism.
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APPENDIX I.
NIGERIA’S NATIONAL SYMBOLS
National Colours: White and Green
The Nation’s motto: ‘Unity and Faith, Peace and Progress’.
National Day: Independence Day Celebration, October 1
National Flag: The Nigerian national flag is divided into three equal parts. The central 
part which is white symbolizes peace and unity, and the two outer parts which are 
green symbolize the country’s vast agricultural wealth.
National Coat of Arms: In the Nigerian coat-of-arms there is an eagle mounted on 
a black shield which is trisected by two silver wavy bands. Two white horses support 
the shield, and at its base is a wreath of coctus spectabilis flowers, cast in the national 
colours of white and green.
The black shield represents the fertile soil, the silver bands the Niger and 
Benue rivers which form the main inland waterways in the country. The coctus 
spectabilis is a wild flower found throughout Nigeria. The eagle stands for strength and 
the horses symbolize dignity.
National Anthem (Old)
Nigeria we hail thee 
Our own dear native land 
Though tribe and tongue may differ 
In brotherhood we stand 
Nigerians all are proud to serve 
Our sovereign motherland.
Our flag shall be a symbol 
That truth and Justice reigns 
In peace or battle honoured 
And this we count as gain 
To hand on to our children 
A banner without stain
Oh God of all creation 
Grant this our one request 
Help us to build a nation 
Where no man is oppressed 
And so with peace and plenty 
Nigeria may be blest.
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National Anthem (New)
Arise O compatriots, Nigeria’s call obey
To serve our fatherland
With love and strength and faith
The labour of our heroes past
Shall never be in vain
To serve with heart and might
One nation bound in freedom, peace and unity.
Oh God of creation, direct our noble cause;
Guide our Leaders right;
Help our Youth the truth to know 
In love and honesty to grow 
And living just and true 
Great lofty heights attain
To build a nation where peace and justice shall reign.
The new National Anthem replaced the old one on October 1, 1978. It is a 
combination of efforts by five Nigerians.
National Pledge
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I pledge to Nigeria, my country,
To be faithful, loyal and honest,
To serve Nigeria with all my strength, 
To defend her unity and uphold 
Her honour and glory.
So help me God.
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APPENDIX II.
MILITARY COUPS IN NIGERIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE
1. January 1966 Major Nzeogwu
2. July 1966 Lt. Col. Gowon
3. July 1975 Brigadier Mohammed
4. February 1976 (abortive) Col. Dimka
5. December 1983 Major Gen. Buhari
6. August 1985 Major Gen. Babangida
7. 1987 (abortive) Brigadier Vatsa
8. April 1991 (abortive) Major Orkar
APPENDIX III.
NIGERIA’S HEADS OF STATE SINCE INDEPENDENCE
Alhaji Abubarka Tafawa Balewa 
Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi 
General Gowon 
General Murtala Muhammed 
General Obasanjo 
Alhaji Shehu Shagari 
General Buhari 
General Babangida
October 1960-January 1966 
January 1966-July 1966 
July 1966- 1975 
July 1975- 1976 
February 1976- 1979 
October 1979- Decemberl 983 
January 1984-August 1985 
August 1985 - August 1993
APPENDIX IV.
MEMBERS OF SHAG ARKS EXECUTIVE CABINET IN 1979
POST NAME STATE/ETHNICITY/REGION
President Alhaji Shehu Shagari Sokoto/Fulani North
Vice-President Dr. Alex Ekwueme Anambra/lgbo South
Secretary/Government Alhaji Shehu Musa Niger/Fulanl North
Head Civil Service Mr. G.A.E. Longe Bendel/Edo South
Agriculture Alhaji Adamu Ciroma Borno/Kanuri North
Alhaji Usman Sani Sokoto/Fulani North
Mr. Ken. Green Rivers/I jaw South
Aviation Alhaji M.H. Jega Sokoto North
Commerce Alhaji Bello Yusuf Kano/Hausa/Fulani North
Communications Mr. Audu Ogbeh Benue/ldoma North
Dr. U.l. Okon Cross River/lbibio North
Defence Alhaji Shehu Shagari Sokoto/Fulani North
Education Dr. Sylvester Ugoh Imo/lgbo South
Mrs. Elizabeth Ivase Benue/ldoma North
Employment/Labour &
Alhaji B. Usman Kano/Hausa North
Productivity Dr. E.C. Osammor Bendel/lgbo South
External Affairs Prof. Ishaya Audu Kaduna/Hausa North
Alhaji B.M. Kirffi Bauchi/Hausa/FulaniNorth
Chief P. Bolokor Bendel South
Federal Capital Alhaji Iro Dan Musa Kaduna North
Mr. Mark Okoye Anambra/lgbo South
Finance Mr. Victor Masi Rivers/ljaw South
Chief Yomi Akintola Oyo/Yoruba South
Health Mr. D.C. Ugwu Anambra South
Housing & Environment Alhaji Ahmed Musa Bauchi/Hausa/FulaniNorth
Alhaji I.B. Bunu Borno North
Industries Alhaji Akanbi Oniyangi Kwara/Yoruba North
Dr. I.J. Igbani Rivers/ljaw South
Information Alhaji Garba Wushishi Niger/Hausa North
Internal Affairs Alhaji Ali Baba Gongola/Fulani North
Mrs. N. Kesiah Asinobi Imo South
Justice Chief Richard Akinjide Oyo/Yoruba South
Mines and Power Alhaji Ibrahim M. Hassan Bauchi/Hausa/FulaniNorth
National Planning Mrs. Adenika Oyagbola Ogun/Yoruba South
Mr. Ademola Thomas Lagoa/Yoruba South
Police Affairs Alhaji Ndagi Mamudu Niger North
Science & Technology Dr. Wahab Dosunmu Lagos/Yoruba South
Social Welfare, Youth,
Sports & Culture Alhaji Buba Ahmed Plateau North
Special Duties -
Steel Development Mr. Mamman Ali Makele Kwara/lgbirra North
Special Duties -
Establishment & Labour Chief Olu Awotesu Ogun/Yoruba North
Transport Dr. Umaru A. Dikko Kaduna/Fulani North
Alhaji Aliu Habu-Fari Gongola/Fulani North
Water Resources Dr. E.Y. Atanu Benue/ldoma North
Chief Okoi-Oboli Cross River South
Works Prof. M. Essang Cross River/lbibio South
THE PRESIDENTS ADVISERS
Budget Affairs Chief Adeleke Akinyele Oyo/Yoruba South
Economic Affairs Prof. E.C. Edozien Bendel/lgbo South
National Assembly Dr. K.O. Mbadiwe Imo/lgbo South
National Security Dr. Bukar Shaib Borno North
Petroleum & Energy Alhaji Yahaya Dikko Kaduna/Fulani North
Political Affairs Alhaji Suleiman Takuma North
PERMANENT SECRETARIES CABINET OFFICE
Council Secretaries Mr. E.E.Nsefik Cross River/Efik South
Economic Department Mr. F.l. Oduah Bendel/lgbo South
Police Affairs Mr. S.B. Agodo Yoruba South
Political Departments Mr. Bur Benue North
Special Service Mr. J.E. Uduehi Bendel South
Establishment Mr. A.M. Fika Borno North
Manpower Development Mr. S.O. Falae Ondo/Yoruba South
Public Service Dept. Mr. A.I. Obeya Benue/ldoma North
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APPENDIX V.
MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL UNDER BUHAR11985
NAME POSITION STATE/ETHNICITY/REGION
Major-General Buhari Chairman Kaduna/Fulani North
Major-General Tunde Idiagbon Vice Chair Kwara/Yoruba North
Major-General Domkat Bali Plateau/Langtan North
Rear Admiral A. Aikhomu Bendel/lshan South
Air Vice-Marshall Ibrahim Alfa Gongola North
Major-General Ibrahim Babangida Niger/Minna North
Brigadier Salihu Ibrahim Kano/Fulani North
Brigadier Y.Y.Kure Kaduna/Fulani North
Brigadier Sani Abacha Kano/Hausa North
Mr. Etim Inyang Inspector General Police +River/Efik South
Air Commodore Larry Koinyan Rivers/ljaw South
Major-General Mohammed Magoro Sokoto/Hausa/F North
Major-General Gado Nasko Niger/Minna North
Mr.Chike Ofodile Anambra/lgbo South
Brigadier Paul Omu Bendel/lsoko South
Brigadier Joseph Oni Oyo/Yoruba South
Ambassador Muhammadu Rafindadi Kaduna/Fulani North
Commodore Okoh Ebitu Ukiwe Imo/lgbo South
Major-General Mamman Vatsa (Deceased) Plateau/Tiv North
Mr. G. Longe, Secretary to Military Government Bendel/Owan South
APPENDIX VI.
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS UNDER BABANGIDA 1987/88
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NAME POST STATE/ETHNICITY/REGK
Chairman President Babangida Niger/Nupe North
Chief General Staff Vice-Admiral Aikhomu Bendel/lshan South
Press Secretary Chief Duro Onabule Ogun/Yoruba South
Secretary to Government Chief Falae Ondo/Yoruba South
Agriculture/Rural
Development Major-General Nasko Niger/Nupe North
Communications Col. David Mark Benue/ldoma North
Defence Lt. General D. Bali Plateau/Tiv North
Education Professor Jubril Aminu Gongola/Fulani North
Employment/Labour &
Productivity Alhaji Abubakar Umar Bauchi/Hausa North
External Affairs Maj. General Nwachukwu Rivers/lgbo South
Federal Capital Air Vice Marshall Abdullahi Kano/Hausa North
Finance &
Economic Planning Dr. S. P. Okongwu Anambra/lgbo South
Health Prof. Ransome-Kuti Ogun/Yoruba South
Industries Rtd. Lt.Gen. Akinrinade Oyo/Yoruba South
Information Prince Tony Momoh Bendel/Etsako South
Internal Affairs Col. John N. Shagaya Plateau/Tiv North
Justice &
Attorney-General Prince Bola Ajibola Ogun/Yoruba South
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Mines, Power and Steel Alhaji Bunu Sheriff Musa Borno/Kanuri North
Social Development,
Youth Sports & Culture Air Commodre Lawal Kwara/Yoruba North
Science and Technology Prof. Emmanuel Emovon Bendel/Edo South
Trade Alhaji Ismaila Mamman Kaduna/Fulani North
Aviation Air Vice Marshall Okpere Bendel/lshan South
Transport Dr. Kalu 1. Kalu Imo/lgbo North
Petroleum Resources Alhaji Rilwanu Lukman Kaduna/Fualni North
Works and Housing Brigadier Kontagora Niger/Hausa/Fulani North
External Affairs -
(Minister of State) Alhaji Mamman Anka Sokoto/Fulani North
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APPENDIX VII.
MEMBERS EXECUTIVE ARMED FORCES RULING COUNCIL 1988
RANK OFFICER STATE/ETHNICITY/REGION
1. General Ibrahim Badamosi
(C.F.R.)President, Babangida 
Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces.
2. Vice-Admiral 
Chief of General 
Staff.
3. Lt. General 
Minister of Defence 
and Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4. Lt. General
Chief of Naval Staff.
5. Vice-Admiral 
Chief of Naval Staff.
6. Air-Marshal 
Chief of Air Staff.
7. Inspector-general of 
Police.
8. Major-General
Augustus Aikhomu
Domkat Bali
Sanni Abacha
Patrick Koshoni
Ibrahim Alfa
Niger/Nupe
Bendel/lshan
Plateau/Tiv
Kano/Hausa
Lagos/Yoruba
Gongola
Mr. Muhammadu Gambo Gongola 
Paul Omu Bendel/lsoko
North
South
North
North
South
North
North
South
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9. Major-General
10. Major-General
11. Rear-Admiral
12. Air vice-Marshal
13. Major-General
14. Air Vice-Marshal
15. Major General
16. Major-General
17. Major-General
18. Air Vice-Marshal
19. Brigadier
20. Navy-Commodore
21. Navy-Commodore
22. Navy-Commodore
23. Brigadier
24. Brigadier
25. Air-Vice-Marshall
26. Colonel
27. Colonel
28. Colonel
29. Secretary Federal 
Military Government.
Y. Yohanna Kure 
D.O. Ajayi 
Murtala A. Nyako 
Nurudeen Imam 
Sanni Sami 
Mu hammed Yahaya 
Peter Ademokhai 
M. Gado Nasko 
Garba Duba 
Nunaini Yusuf 
Oladipo Diya 
Godwin Ndubuisi Kanu 
M.A.B. Elegbede 
S.O. Aluko 
Joshua Dogonyaro 
Ola Oni 
Larry Koinyan 
John N. Shagaya 
H. Akilu 
David Mark
Chief Olu Falae
Kaduna/Fulani North
Oyo/Yoruba South
Gongola North
Kano/Hausa North
North
Benue/ldoma North
Benue/lgala North
Niger/Nupe North
Niger/Nupe North
Ogun/Yoruba South
Imo/lgbo South
Oyo/Yoruba South
Ond/Yoruba South
Plateau North
Oyo/Yoruba South
Rivers/ljaw South
Plateau/Tiv South
Kano/Hausa North
Benue/ldoma North
Ondo/Yoruba South
Domkat Bali and John Shagaya are from the same Local Government area.
APPENDIX VIII. WHO IS DOMINATING WHAT?
STAFFING AT FOUR FEDERAL CORPORATION BY STATE
STATE F.R.C.N. N.E.P.A.
LEVELS 7-13 14-17 7-13 14-1
ANAMBRA 100 2 288 30
BAUCHI 10 2 5 0
BENDEL 123 7 428 21
BENUE 15 1 22 2
BORNO 9 2 12 3
CROSS RIVER 38 4 100 3
GONGOLA 15 2 4 1
IMO 161 4 416 22
KADUNA 102 6 11 1
KANO 12 3 5 2
KWARA 49 3 142 24
LAGOS 33 - 53 2
NIGER 12 - 8 2
OGUN 121 5 288 30
ONDO 62 5 210 14
OYO 153 4 299 19
PLATEAU 2 - 8 5
RIVERS 15 - 57 5
SOKOTO 4 - 2 2
TOTAL 1036 50 2358 188
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STATE NIPOST N.T.A.
LEVELS 7-13 14-17 7-13 14-17
ANAMBRA 167 6 118 6
BAUCHI 2 0 18 1
BENDEL 105 4 139 14
BENUE 15 1 85 6
BORNO 5 0 38 6
CROSS RIVER 72 0 67 4
GONGOLA 4 - 0 37 4
IMO 109 3 122 4
KADUNA 14 0 43 7
KANO 6 0 38 2
KWARA 30 0 109 6
LAGOS 35 1 22 2
NIGER 7 1 21 4
OGUN 162 2 93 4
ONDO 75 5 76 7
PLATEAU 7 0 30 4
RIVERS 16 0 32 3
SOKOTO 2 1 34 4
TOTAL 945 24 1225 94
Sources: FRCN Staff list 1986, NEPA Staff list 1983 and 1986 NEPA Manpower 
Statistic, NIPOST Senior Staff list and NTA Staff list December 1985, in Hotline, April 
15, 1987, p. 8. and April 30, 1987, p. 16.
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